Philosofilm: towards a cinematic philosophy by Biderman, Shai
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2012
Philosofilm: towards a cinematic
philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/31509
Boston University
I 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
Dissertation 
PHILOSOFILM: TOWARDS A CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 
by 
SHAI BIDERMAN 
;::: 
LL.B,The College ofManagement,2000 
M.A., Tel Aviv University, 2005 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2012 
© Copyright by 
SHAI BIDERMAN 
2012 
PhD 
zotz 
blcl 
c.op. ( 
First Reader 
Second Reader 
Third Reader 
Approved by 
Daniel 0. Dahlstrom, Ph.D 
Professor of Philosophy 
C. Allen Speight, Ph.D 
Professor of Philosophy 
Victor Kestenbaum 
Professor of Philosophy 
ACKN9;WLEDGEMENTS 
My sincere thanks to all of tb<?.~~ :whose encouragement and help aided in the 
·writing of this thesis:to Professor D~~l Dahlstrom, my advisor and intellectual 
inspiration, whose comments, critiqu~~ .. ,~d insightful readings greatly improved the 
text and inspired me philosophically;!Q_~:Professor C. Allen Speight, for his wonderful 
ii4vice and suggestions throughout th~.,t~!mation of this thesis;to Professor Kestenbaum, 
for his comments and insight; and tQ .?~gfessors Roochnick, Hopp and Katsafanas, for 
their willingness to sit on the commj.t,tee. Thanks also to Boston University, for 
providing me with the financial supp~rt and academic environment to do my work. 
Many thanks to Professors William Irwin and Thomas W artenberg, whose works on 
philosophy and film influenced me gr_gatly. Special thanks to Michael Weinman and 
Andy German, distinguished colleagq~s and friends, for long hours of philosophizing 
~,.,......~..,.·· ~. 
film and sharpening the argument. Th.eir undying support of my passion for philosophy 
and film has helped make my work p~§,$ible. I would also like to thank my friends, Bill 
Devlin, Eliana Jacobowitz, Gal Kober, and Nir Eisikovits, whose help and support was 
unparalleled. Finally, my deepest and warmest thanks to my family for their love and 
support; my parents, Shlomo and Israel9; my wife, Yael, without whom none of it would 
be possible; my daughter Tal, the light of my life, and to Masha Y aron and Harry and 
.Sharon Hirsch. I dedicate this work to the memory of my grandfather, Menaci,.emYaron, 
a man of stature, whose academic inspirations I hope to live up to. 
iv 
PHILOSOFILM:TOWARDS A CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 
(Order No. 35"20'22.)0 
SHAI BIDERMAN 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2012 
Major Professor: Daniel 0. Dahlstrom, Professor of Philosophy 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines existing attempts to answer the question "Can film 
philosophize?" (the"CFP question")and offers an original, affirmative account of the 
possibility of philosophizing by means of film. Focusing OD. narrative fiction films, this 
dissertation shows how the practice of philosophy can be transformed, and its powers 
expanded, through its encounter with the realm of moving images. 
The first chapter presents the groundwork for such a discussion, laying bare the 
scope of the various theoretical bases through which film and philosophy have been 
thought to intersect. The chapter follows the threads of extant discussions, from (a) 
explicitly philosophical approaches to film ("philosophy of film") to (b) in-depth studies 
of film's thematic constructs ("film theory") and (c) proposals of the symmetry or even 
fusion of film and philosophy ("film-philosophy"). 
Each of the three subsequent chapters addresses one of three possible answers to 
the CFP question.Chapter two focuses on a conservative approach ("the exclusivist 
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thesis") that negates the possibility of any meaningful philosophical capacity in 
film.Chapter three considers a more moderate view ("the inclusivist thesis") that 
acknowledges the cinematic capacity for philosophical argumentation, in a manner that 
is unique, but only partial. The fourth and last chapter introduces an innovative 
perspective ("the integralist thesis") that countenances a unique cinematic potential to 
philosophize by insisting on a radical conception of the practice of philosophy itself. 
To reach this ultimate conclusion, the dissertation elaborates two crucial features 
of film - the non-linguistic nature of its narrative and the role played by the audience in 
film - and shows that exclusivists and inclusivists fail to take these features into 
consideration (largely owing to the principles from which these theorists set out to 
answer the CFP question).Exclusivists and inclusivists argue that film cannot 
philosophize (at least notproperly) because philosophizing is an essentially linguistic 
endeavor and film is not.If, however, those crucial features are taken into account, it 
becomes apparent that exclusivist and inclusivist approaches alike are fatally flawed. The 
dissertation concludes, in conversation with the integralists, with an affirmation of film's 
philosophical potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What, if anything, makes film philosophical? The tensions pervading film's 
connection with philosophy are obvious and immediate, so much so that it might well 
be asked - and many in fact have asked - whether there is any meaningful connection 
between them at all. After all, at least at first blush, film is experience and entertainment 
unfolding in sight and sound, concerned with particular stories and emotional 
engagements; philosophy is reasoning and contemplation unfolding in language, 
concerned with abstract problems and universal principles.While film employs 11action 
and appearance," philosophy demands "reflection and debate."1 Philosophy engages in 
"sitting and thinking"; film embraces "going and seeing."2 Thus, it seems prima facie 
unlikely that any significant connection persists between film and philosophy. 
Moreover, within philosophy there is a deep-seated tradition of distrust toward 
the visual image. This tradition can be traced back to Plato's concerns regarding the 
pernicious power of artistic practice. In the Republic, as well as in other dialogues, Plato 
establishes the power of art as a double edged-sword. On the one hand, art attracts the 
imagination and inspires the soul with its poetic license and passionate sensibilities; on 
the other hand, it's supposed indifference to truth, to reality, and to absolute values 
turns its freedom into a devastating instrument of false images and dubious 
1 Perkins, V. F. (1972). Film as Film. Harrnondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books: 69. 
2Ernrnet, E. R. (1968). Learning to Philosophize. Harrnondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books: 12. 
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perceptions.Hence, art is appreciated but blamed for corrupting young minds. The poets 
are quoted and adored - and banished from the "city in speech." Film, the 
technologically superior offspring of the ancient arts, only intensifies this predicament. 
Film seems to have conquered the minds of the many (hoi poloi) in just the way Plato had 
foreseen, filling their heads with false images, leaving no room or desire for true 
wisdom. 
The central aim of the proposed dissertation is to investigate and ultimately belie 
this appearance. In so doing, I show how each makes an independent contribution to the 
practice of the other. A proper appreciation of these contributions, I argue, entails a 
transformation of how we understand both film and philosophy, as activities. 
I pursue these objectives in four chapters.In the course of analyzing how the 
basic question-Can film philosophize? (hereafter, "the CFP question")-has been 
posed, Chapter One demonstrates how answers to the CFP question depend upon 
which of three conversations provides the context for the answer: the philosophy of film, 
film theory, or film-philosophy. Here I present the initial groundwork for an argument 
that challenges those views that deny film any significant philosophical potential. 
Chapter Two presents, under the rubric of film and philosophy, the central claims (and 
unstated assumptions) of those who answer the CFP question negatively, based on what 
I dub an exclusivist account of the relation between film and philosophy. Chapter Three 
critically examines versions of an inclusivistaccount, i.e., the idea of film in philosophy, 
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according to which film can be subordinated or even useful to philosophy, while 
remaining a practice essentially separate from it. Chapter Four considers film as 
philosophy, i.e., an integralistaccount, according to which film and philosophy coincide, 
such that film is in some sense philosophy in action.! offer sympathetic criticisms of 
various versions of this view, setting up a defense of the kind of integralist account I 
endorse. In the brief conclusion, I offer the seeds prolegomena for an argument that 
would build my version of an integralist account into an organic theory of film-
philosophy, dubbed "philosofilm," a theory that takes seriously- indeed, more seriously 
than do other proponents of film's philosophical potential - the import of new 
developments in film technology and the cognitive character of emotions at work in 
film. 
The structure of the dissertation's argument is as follows.In the first chapter I 
present three traditional approaches to the CFP question and the three accounts of the 
relationship between film and philosophy yielded by those approaches.The remaining 
chapters elaborate those three accounts in some detail.By way of anticipation of the 
overall argument of the dissertation, it may be helpful to set forth in a programmatic 
way the main contentions and conclusions in these chapters. 
Chapter One begins by showing that the implications of the CFP are vaster and 
more significant than might at first appear. For, while it is often discussed by 
mainstream contemporary aestheticians, whom we can call the philosophers of film,the 
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CFP question is also contemplated, to certain extent, by film theorists, and, using a newly 
invented title (which seems to have caught the,flavor of certain contemporary scholars,) 
by film-philosophers as well. This threefold categorization - which incorporates the CFP 
question into "philosophy of film," "film theory," and "film-philosophy" respectively -
points to the reciprocal nature of the CFP question. Whereas the question itself is 
undoubtedly "philosophical," it similarly targets the same philosophical quality in its 
subject matter. That is to say, the three approaches each show, in their unique way, the 
biconditional character of approaches to the CFP question, relative to how the activity of 
film and the activity of philosophy are understood. This biconditional character is of 
central importance to the development, in the following chapters, of the three kinds of 
accounts of the relation of film and philosophy to one another. 
Distinguishing this threefold typology from Thomas W artenberg' s fourfold 
classification,31 propose a distinctive way of framing the debate over the CFP question. I 
do so in order to present the scope of the debate as a most accurate reflection of the 
thematic scope presented in three kinds of disciplinary approaches to the CFP question 
analyzed earlier in Chapter One. The exclusivist approach is a rubric designed to 
highlight attempts (by philosophers of film) to defend and uphold a narrow definition of 
swartenberg, T. E. (2011). On the Possibility of Cinematic Philosophy. New Takes in Film-
Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 9-24. Wartenberg makes similar attempts in: Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). Film as 
philosophy. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. 
London & New York, Routledge: 549-559. 
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philosophy as an exclusive practice, categorically different from any other artistic 
practice, film included. Likewise, the inclusivist approach can be understood as an 
attempt by philosophers of film to respond to insights from the film theorists in 
conversation and controversy with the film-philosophers. Finally, the integralist approach 
is that undertaken by the film-philosophers themselves. 
Chapter Two lays out the exclusivist approach and points to its weaknesses. For 
the exclusivist, the CFP question can only be considered in light of a preliminary 
condition. Film, in order to be defined as a way of doing philosophy, has to be able to 
make ''an independent contribution" to philosophy.4 We can substantiate the claim that 
film can be considered as an integral component of philosophy (or at least as a valuable 
participant in a philosophical activity), if we form a conception of the exclusive 
capacities of the cinematic medium, i.e., capacities of film on its own, independent of 
philosophy. The argument then proceeds by demonstrating what those exclusive 
capacities are, what special contribution they make to philosophy, and what the 
significance of that contribution is.5 This approach, I shall argue, predetermines the 
relationship between film and philosophy to be external. In other words, it regards film 
and philosophy as two separate and distinct entities. 
4Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 2. 
s Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-18,11. 
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This strict separation raises the possibility that film might, in ways yet to be 
determined, be regarded as a philosophical practice, a way of doing philosophy - but 
film can never be regarded as philosophy. What is at stake here is not whether film may 
have philosophical themes or implications, or whether film can be used to introduce a 
philosophical conundrum or argument. What is at stake is, instead, the question of 
whether a film can be accepted as philosophical.6 Film's independence from philosophy 
rules out this possibility. 
In this way, the first ("exclusivist") attempt to answer the CFP question yields a 
strong objection to any form of essential and meaningful relationship between the two 
activities. According to Livingston and others, film cannot philosophize, since (1) 
philosophy is a verbal discipline and film is an essentially visual medium, and (2) 
"philosophy is generally characterized by explicit argumentation," while film presents 
narratives that, as such, are unable to "establish the sorts of general truths that 
philosophers take to be the goal of their enterprise."7Whereas Livingston's account does 
allow film to have a secondary and peripheral "philosophical" role, I argue that this 
position undermines a priori any possibility of film as philosophy. As long as 
philosophy is reduced or limited only to a linguistic enterprise, film becomes 
6 Smith, M. (2006). Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 33-42. 
7 Wartenberg, T. E. (2006). Beyond Mere lllustration: How Films Can Be Philosophy. Thinking 
Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
19-20; Cf.: Russell, B. (2006). The Philosophical Limits of Film. Philosophy of Film and Motion 
Picture: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 387-390. 
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automatically excluded from such an enterprise. Having argued this point against 
Livingston's account, the analysis moves on to present and evaluate a more moderate 
variation, the inclusivist thesis, which acknowledges some sort of a meaningful role for 
film in philosophy. 
The inclusivist account, the subject of Chapter Three, offers a more moderate 
response to the proposition that film can philosophize. While conforming to the 
exclusivist premise regarding the significance . of argumentation in philosophy, 
inclusivists extend the definition of argumentation to include a greater variety of 
discursive techniques, most notably, counterexamples and thought experirnents.While 
these techniques are not, by any means, substitutes for logical syllogisms, they are 
nevertheless a powerful mode of argumentation by instantiation, and, as such, are a 
valuable component of the philosophical argumentative arsenal. Film - so argue 
inclusivists - is a particularly compelling candidate for the exhibition of such a mode of 
argumentation, and as such, can be understood as part of the practice of philosophy. 
The inclusivist view, even as it brings a more nuanced perspective to the 
philosophical resources in film, still fails to truly account for what I call "cinematicity" 
-the truly central powers of film that make it what it is and by means of which it does 
what it does. Chapter Four begins by pointing to two central ways in which both 
inclusivists and exclusivists fall short. The first has to do with a mistaken understanding 
of cinematic narrativity, mistaken because it collapses the latter into an overly linguistic 
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understanding of narrativity as such.Both the conservative and the moderate variations 
of the external account take on what Livingston calls "the bold (epistemic) thesis," 
namely, "the idea that films do make historically innovative and independent 
contributions to philosophy by means exclusive to the cinematic medium or art form."8 
Both accounts call for more modest expectations about what film can contribute to the 
discipline of philosophy.Patent here is their first key error: the adoption, with respect to 
cinema, of a literary (hence linguistically determined) notion of narrative, by means of 
which film's unique capacities (deemed necessary for any true contribution to 
philosophy) are ruled out in advance, since its uniqueness is intimately connected to 
cinematic narrativity which is precisely not the kind of narrativity for which they allow. 
The second key error of the earlier accounts focuses on the technical and 
operative manner in which film is expected to make a contribution to the field of 
philosophy. The exclusivist has very little to say about the nature of the cinematic 
apparatus as such. Film is said to be a visual medium which involves experience, but 
this assumption about the intrinsic nature of the cinematic apparatus is typically the 
only assumption taken under consideration by the exclusivist account. We will see 
however, that film as apparatus actually points to the spectatorial experience of film, 
which has everything to do with the way in which film can (and does) philosophize. 
s Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-12. 
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Working from these two objections, Chapter Four goes on to develop and 
sympathetically critique integralist accounts of the interplay between film and 
philosophy. These accounts relinquish the asymmetric notion of "externality" and adopt 
in its stead a more equal (and less prejudiced) picture of the artistic (and specifically the 
cinematic) intrinsic merits. In other words, the integralist thesis abandons the Platonic 
dichotomy between art and philosophy, and replaces it with what has to be a radically 
different picture. What emerges in this new picture is, first, the film philosophy of 
Stanley Cavell9, and then Stephan Mulhall's philosophy in action.10 Underlying these 
two accounts is one understanding of film as philosophy, which I dub "cinematic 
philosophy."The ultimate expression of the phenomenology of film, cinematic 
philosophy aims to solve two basic problems of the external account, namely, the 
9 These claims are broadly developed in Cavell's many innovating writings, and in the many 
scholarly writings on Cavell. See: Cavell, S. (1971). The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean 
What We Say? New York, Cambridge University Press; Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: 
The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 31-33; 
Cavell, S. (1984). Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes. San Francisco, North point Press; 
Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press; Cavell, S. (2005). Knowledge and Transgression: It Happened One 
Night. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Cm;ran. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 253-259. 
to For Mulhall's writings on Cavell, see: Mulhall, S. (1994). Stanley Cavell, Philosophy's 
Recounting of the Ordinary. Oxford, Clarendon Press; for Mulhall own theory, see: Mulhall, S. 
(2002). OnFilm.London & New York, Routledge; Mulhall, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear 
You Scream: Acknowledging the Human Voice in the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays 
in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 57-71; Mulhall, S. (2006). The Impersonation of Personality: Film as Philosophy in 
Mission: Impossible. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. 
Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 97-110. 
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asymmetry between film and philosophy (which enforces the one to be subjected to the 
other) and the disregard of film's unique nature.11 
Chapter Four also juxtaposes Cavell's and Mulhall's versions of the integralist 
thesis with a third version, namely, Daniel Frampton's theory offtlmosophy.12 Frampton's 
main contribution is his insistence that the world inside cinematic representation and 
the world outside film can easily be characterized in each other's terms.In other words, 
film allows us to "re-see reality," challenging "our view of reality, forcing a 
phenomenological realization about how reality is perceived by our minds. It "refigures 
reality"13 and reveals it, "exactly by showing a distorted mirror of it."14In this way, for 
Frampton, philosophy becomes "[just] another kind of film," in the sense that 
philosophy's ways and means are nothing more or less than a special case of what is 
happening when film conceptualizes its own production and consumption. 
Via a sympathetic critique of these three integralist accounts, I conclude Chapter 
Four with my own attempt to integrate and expand on them, while also avoiding some 
difficulties besetting them.Key to my proposal is an analogy between film and music, 
capable of demonstrating how non-linguistic arts philosophize precisely through their 
11Critchley, S. (2005). Calm: On Terrence Malick'sThe Thin Red Line. Film as Philosophy, Essays in 
Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 159. 
12 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press. 
13Jbid, P· 3. 
14 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
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conscious deployment of non-linguistic expression.Two examples of what I consider to 
be cinematic philosophy demonstrate this deployment. The examples are sequences 
from Chaplin's City Lights and Hitchcock's The Man Who Knew Too Much, and crucial to 
my appeal to them is that they are understood as sequences-as moments in which the 
cinematic experience unfolds, independent of any position in an overarching narrative 
arc, and (crucially if accidentally) in (total or near total) silence, and especially non-
linguistically. Along the way, various difficulties with the earlier integralist accounts-
having to do with issues like narrativity, authorship, genre and the series-are 
articulated and resolved. 
Finally, in a brief conclusion I introduce the terms in which a possible extension 
of my thesis might proceed. The key step in this direction (here called "philosofilm") 
involves the integration of recent insights in neurophilosophy with an analysis of recent 
and crucial changes to way film is produced, distributed and consummated in light of 
recent technological advances. Putting these insights and analysis together presents 
promising possibilities for a new and richer understanding of the phenomenology of 
film by means of a more complete, and more up-to-date, account of film's spectatorial 
experience. 
12 
CHAPTER 1: PHILOSOPHY OF FILM 
The question at the center of this dissertation is "Can film philosophize?" 
(henceforth: CFP) and it is a question at the forefront of a contemporary debate, held in a 
variety of philosophical circles, in both the (Anglo-American) analytic and Continental 
traditions. Triggered by Stephen Mulhall's controversial essay, On Film (2002; now in its 
second edition, 2008), this question has been made prominent through his somewhat 
ambiguous claim that film is (or can be) "philosophy in action." The CFP question 
appears, at least superficially, to be just one more e?'emplar of the long history 
philosophical issues categorized under the rubric of "philosophy of art" or "aesthetics." 
However, as much as this debate seems to rest within the confines of 
philosophical aesthetics (and, as such, to be a part of the "philosophy of film" debate), 
its implications are vaster and more significant. The debate's broader scope can be 
deduced from the variety of classificatory titles under which it is raised and discussed. 
For instance, the CFP question is broadly discussed by mainstream contemporary 
aestheticians, but to certain extent film theorists also discuss it, as do film-philosophers (the 
latter is a newly invented title that seems to have caught the flavor of certain 
contemporary scholars.) This threefold categorization - which incorporates the CFP 
13 
question in "philosophy of film," "film theory," and "film-philosophy" -is worthy of 
further consideration. 
One might be tempted to dismiss this multiple classification as a nuisance, 
blaming the tediousness of modem academic obsession with typologies for its existence. 
However, in this case, the multiplicity is, if decoded properly, actually revelatory for the 
merits and importance of the question at hand. I argue that this multiplicity points to the 
reciprocal nature of the CFP question. Whereas the question itself is undoubtedly 
"phil~sophical," it similarly targets the same philosophical quality in its subject matter. To 
put it in a slightly different way, since we are engaged with a philosophical question 
about the philosophical nature and capacities of film, it is fair to suggest that we 
acknowledge the possible role of the contextual background which surrounds this 
reciprocal interaction. The multiplicity of classificatory contexts might well affect the 
way we understand and analyze, and then attempt to answer, the CFP question.Hence, I 
turn now to discuss the respective thematic contexts endorsed by each of the above 
mentioned titles. This preliminary discussion of the structure and the thematic 
background, against which this question is raised, yields surprisingly important results. 
The First Thematic Context: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Film 
Philosophical aesthetics (aptly called, for our purposes, the "philosophy of art") 
has a rich and storied history. Spreading from antiquity to the modem age, the 
philosophical examination of art and the art world has given birth to many traditions, 
14 
methods of inquiry, conceptual analyses and devout arguments. The common task 
underlying this enterprise was, and to some extent still is, the philosophical urge, if not 
to impose its modes of reasoning on the world of art, at least to make art conform to its 
concerns.Thus, for example, aesthetics is typically concerned with classifying and/or 
defining art in terms of certain concepts which constitute the necessary and sufficient 
conditions fundamentally characterizing the world of art. The very concept of art itself, 
as well as related concepts like representation, expression, artistic form, interpretation, 
forgery, creativity, artistic value, and the variety of artforms, among others, were put on 
the philosophical operating table. Hence, the philosophy of art, in its most efficient and 
professional mode, stands for a thematic attempt to reason and explain the artistic 
phenomenon.15 
Soon after its birth in the late nineteenth century, philosophers began to take 
notice in film, as a new phenomenon that displays artistic potential. At first, film was 
philosophically received with suspicion and distaste, and its place among the arts was 
severely questioned. However, gradually, film has made its way out of this state of 
underestimation (where it was considered a low-class entertainment, designed for the 
consumption of the masses) and was reconsidered as a more highbrow, if under-
defined, artform. 
1s See: Carroll, N. (1999). Philosophy of Art, A Contemporary Introduction. London & New York, 
Routledge, pp. 2-5. 
15 
As the new candidate for philosophical evaluation, film was first subjected to the 
most basic question of philosophy, namely, the search for an essential and 
comprehensible definition of the cinematic practice.16 The search for an essential 
definition which suffices the "what is film?" question was then followed by the second 
obvious question, namely, "is film art?" Conjointly, these questions reflected the type of 
interest (and the underlying methodology) employed by philosophy in its investigation 
of film, namely, a conceptual analysis of a new expressive phenomenon, followed by the 
determination of whether or not this phenomenon can be conceived as a work of art, 
and, accordingly can be explored aesthetically.17 
16 It is worth noting that Carroll refers to an essential definition as a "real" definition. He writes: 
"[w]hen philosophers attempt to produce what they variously call a definition, a theory, or an 
analysis of x (whatever xis), they usually have in mind something very specific- what is often 
called an essential or real definition. What is a real definition? The short answer is: a definition or 
analysis of some concept in terms of a set of necessary conditions that are conjointly sufficient for 
the application of said concept." See: Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. 
Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell, p. 54. Carroll maintains this distinction in: Carroll, N. (1988). 
Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 204; 
Carroll, N. (1996). Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 49, 55, 
71; Carroll, N. and J. Choi, Eds. (2006). Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell, 113; and, Carroll, N. (2001). Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: (where he sets apart the classical essentialism of a real 
definition, e.g., Bell, Croce, Collingwood, and Tolstoy, from anti-essentialist who take an "open 
concept approach,"like Morris Weitz). 
Following Carroll, others have used this distinction in order to characterize an essential definition 
as a "real" definition. Such are: Franks, P. (2006). The discovery of the other: Cavell, Fichte, and 
skepticism. Reading Cavell. A. Crary and S. Shieh. London & New York, Routledge: 166-203, 173; 
I<hatchadourian, H. (1975). "Film as Art." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33(3): 271-
284, 279; and Flaxman, G. (2000). The brain is the screen: Deleuze and the philosophy of cinema. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 142. 
17 See: Andrew, D. (1984). Film in the Aura of Art.Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press. 
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The philosophical investigation into the ontology of film - the "what is film?" 
question- first attempts to unpack the new phenomenon by empirically noting its main 
apparent features. Among these, the following features stand out as potentially essential 
to the core definition of film. First, film consists of visual images. Much like photography, 
and in strict opposition to the purely linguistic artforms (most notably literature and 
poetry,) these images require making use of a technical apparatus (i.e. a camera) which, 
when operated properly, is able to visually capture the reality set before it. Second, and 
in contrast to photography, the cinematic camera captures (or, at least, is able to capture) 
motion. The possibility of movement is than added to the list of film's leading features. The 
third feature is a restriction to the mimetic capacities of film, namely, its two-
dimensionality and its ontological reliance upon screening. Under this constraint, film is 
essentially different from other artforms (el?pecially theatre), but also different from the 
real world, as it reshapes the way the visual images are conceived by flattening their 
spatial dimension. Following this, a fourth distinctive feature has to do with the way 
film exists. Film, as opposed to the plastic and figurative artforms (most notably 
painting and sculpture) exists in three separated, yet interrelated, modes. First, film 
exists materially, historically as a strip of celluloid and nowadays in a digital format. 
Second, it exists categorically, both as a template (the categorical existence of a specific 
film, which sets it apart from other films) and as a token (which consists of the various 
17 
instances and forms of the master template.)18 Lastly, film exists phenomenologically, as a 
performed sequence of screened photos (i.e., frames) that creates the illusion of movement by 
conjoining this sequence of consecutive frames into a shot, and shots into scenes.19 This 
mode of existence is temporal in nature, and is interdependent with its mechanical 
projection on a screen as well as with the existence of a viewing audience, serving as 
intended viewers of the screened content.20 
This suggested list of attributes, while not necessarily comprehensive, can 
nevertheless be taken as a working definition of film, namely, as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that constitutes something as film. The second philosophical task, 
namely, determining whether or not film can be conceived as art, can now be 
1B See: Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 
53, 73. 
19 See: Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 
80-83. 
2o For a thorough analysis of these features, see: Carroll, N. (1996). Defining the Moving 
Image.Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 49-74 
(republished in: Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 113-134). For a thorough discussion and critique of this analysis, see: 
Yanal, R. J. (2008). "Defining the Moving Image: A Response to Noel Carroll." Film and 
Philosophy 12(General Interest Edition): 135-140; Goldman, A. (2002). "Response to Carroll." Film 
and Philosophy 5/6 (General Interest Edition): 106-107; Goldman, A. (2002). "Specificity, 
Popularity, and Engagement in the Moving Image." Film and Philosophy 5/6 (General Interest 
Edition): 93-99; Goldman, A. (2003). Representation in Art. The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. J. 
Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 192-210; Sparshott, F. E. (2006). Vision and Dream in 
the Cinema. Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 82-90; and, Danto, A. C. (1999). Moving Pictures.Philosophizing Art: 
Selected Essays. A. C. Danto. Berkeley, University of California Press: 205-232 (republished in: 
Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, 
Blackwell: 100-112.) Regarding tokens, types, and templates see: Wollheim, R. (1980). Art and its 
Objects. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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approached. With this question we wish to explore the nature of film as an art-form, 
namely, the possibility of film as an instance of cinematographic art, and determine the 
difference between such a conception of film and an opposing conception, which takes 
film to be a technique or craft aiming at a variety of non-aesthetic goals. 21 However, 
before attending to this question, a preliminary question must be addressed, namely, 
"what is art?" 
Many attempts have been made at an essential (or "real") definition of art. Art 
has been defined in terms of imitation, representation, the transmission of feelings, 
intuition and expression, to name a few.22 However, these definitions were harshly 
criticized, for failing to satisfy the need for necessary and sufficient conditions required 
21 Foe a detailed discussion of this claim, see: Khatchadourian, H. (1975). "Film as Art." The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33(3): 271-284; Carroll, N. (2003). The Essence of 
Cinema?Engaging the Moving Image. New Haven & London, Yale University Press: 255-264; 
Carroll, N. (2003). Forget the Medium! Engaging the Moving Image. New Haven & London, Yale 
University Press: 1-9; Carroll, N. (2008). Chapter Three: What Is Cinema? The Philosophy of 
Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 53-79; Sweeney, K. W. (2009). Medium.The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New 
York, Routledge: 173-183. 
22 For a more detailed survey, see: Graham, G. (2005). Philosophy of the arts: an introduction to 
aesthetics. London; New York, Routledge; Gaut, B. N. and P. Livingston (2003). The creation of 
art: new essays in philosophical aesthetics. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press; Dickie, 
G. (2004).De£ining Art: Intension and Extension. The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics. P. Kivy. 
Oxford, Blackwell: 45-62; Thomasson, A. L. (2004). The Ontology of Art. The Blackwell Guide to 
Aesthetics. P. Kivy. Oxford, Blackwell: 78-92; Davies, ·s. (2003). Ontology of Art.The Oxford 
Handbook of Aesthetics; J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 155-180; Goldman, A. 
(2003). Representation in Art.The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 192-210; Livingston, P. (2003). Intention in Art.The Oxford Handbook of 
Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 275-290; Ridley, A. (2003). Expression in 
Art.The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 211-227; 
Stecker, R. (2003). Definition of Art.The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 136-154. 
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for an essential definition. This failure was commonly ascribed to either attributing to art 
a property that not all art works possess, or attributing to art a property that is not 
essentially and exclusively artistic.23 Notwithstanding the many attempts to analyze and 
define art, every such attempt to constitute a definition of art in terms of necessary 
conditions that are jointly sufficient, ultimately failed.24 Consequently~ the philosophy of 
art had to come to terms with the need to reexamine the means by which the definition 
of art was supposed to be achieved. Since art seemed to elude the conventional search 
for a philosophical definition, philosophers looked for such a definition elsewhere or 
looked for another sort of definition. 
The definition offered by Morris Weitz, in his landmark essay The Role of Theory 
in Aesthetics, marked the methodical turning point in this quest.25 Employing a 
Wittgensteinian approach to the question of art, Weitz argued that, although an essential 
definition of art is impossible, we may nevertheless still possess a reliable method for 
identifying candidates as artworks. We do that by assuming that an art work can only be 
defined contextually, namely, through the web of family resemblances it upholds 
23 See: Davies, S. (2001). Definition of Art. The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Gaut and 
D. M. Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 169-180, 170. 
24See: Danto, A. C. (1964). "The Artworl~." Journal of Philosophy 61(19): 571-584 (republished in: 
Aesthetics: The Big Questions. C. Korsmeyer. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 33-44.) 
25Weitz, M. (1956). "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
15:27-35. 
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(presumably, with other art works).26 Although strongly criticized for its ambiguity and 
redundancy, Weitz's definition was groundbreaking.27 For if Weitz is right in claiming 
that art can be distinctively conceived contextually, thenthe traditional method, which 
sought to define art in terms of internal and non-relational aesthetic properties, is 
misguided. By pointing towards the inadequacy of any previous definition to capture 
the essence of art, Weitz turned the table on the method of inquiry used to conduct these 
attempts, claiming that there is something inherently flawed in the method itself. 
Traditionally, the search for an essential definition of a concept had overlooked 
the history of the concept, in order to sketch a general definition which consists of 
essential features and not specific and circumstantial ones. This method was 
unsuccessfully employed on the concept of art. For Weitz, this lack of success shows that 
art, due to its changing and unpredictable future which is a significant part of what art 
is, cannot be traditionally defined as having a fixed essence.Art should be conceived 
26 For a further discussion of Weitz's position, see: Weitz, M. (1964). Philosophy of the arts. New 
York, Russell & Russell; and: Weitz, M. (1988). Theories of concepts: a history of the major 
philosophical tradition. London; New York, Routledge; Gaut, B. N. and D. Lopes (2005). The 
Routledge companion to aesthetics. London; New York, Routledge: 170-172; Carroll, N. (1993). 
"Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
51(3): 313-326. 
27 As Davies notes: "[T]he problem with this claim is that everything resembles, or can be made to 
resemble, every other thing, so the invocation of resemblances cannot explain the unity and 
integrity of any concept." See: Davies, S. (2001). Definition of Art. The Routledge Companion to 
Aesthetics. B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 169-180, 171. See also: 
Mandelbaum, M. (1965). "Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the Art." 
American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 219-228; Manser, A. (1967). "Games and Family 
Resemblance." Philosophy 42: 210-225; Dickie, G. (1971). Aesthetics; an introduction. 
Indianapolis, Pegasus: 95-98; Danto, A. C. (1981). The transfiguration of the commonplace: a 
philosophy of art. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: 57-66. 
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instead as a constantly evolving entity whose only definition is that which reflects the 
dynamic and developmental nature and the historical roots of this entity. 
Following Weitz, the philosophical discussion regarding the nature of art in the 
latter part of the twentieth century has abandoned the "ahistorical point of view,"28and 
instead adopted a relational and historical one. This perceptual shift created a new 
methodological climate, aptly characterized by Arthur Danto as the renunciation of the 
traditional view of aesthetics as "the dim, retarded offspring of two glamorous 
parents,its discipline and its subject." Prior to this shift, the philosophy of art was too 
"professionalized and technical," resulting in a state where "questions about art seemed 
peripheral and its answers cloudy - far too cloudy for those caught up in the reinvention 
of painting and music and literature to find much help in the dated, faded reflections of 
the aesthetician." Alluding to John Passmore, who depicted this state as "the dreariness 
of aesthetics," Danto notes that the philosophy of art, prior to this shift, was consumed 
in a self-defeating way which, to paraphrase the witty observation of the painter Barnett 
Newman, was as valuable to art as "ornithology is for the birds."29 Following Danto's 
depiction, Noel Carroll surmises that after making the methodical switch, the 
philosophy of art, by coming to terms with the importance of the "virtually continuous 
28 Carroll, N. (1993). "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 51(3): 313-326, 313. 
29 Danto, A. C. (1983). "Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art." Humanities 4(1): 1-2. 
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revolutions in artistic practice," is able to produce "an attractive alternative to real 
definitions."30 
This last point is further stressed by Davies and Carroll.31 Davies classifies the 
new trends in the philosophy of art as yielding two types of definitions: functional 
definitions and procedural ones. Functional definitions conceive art as a phenomenon 
which is designed to serve a purpose. Accordingly, something can be conceived as an art 
work only if it succeeds in achieving the objective of art, which, although in dispute, is 
commonly characterized in terms of aesthetic pleasure. Procedural definitions, by 
contrast, appeal to the practice of art, and hold that something "becomes an art work 
only if it is made according to the appropriate process or formula, regardless of how 
well it serves the point of art."32 
What unifies the two approaches, and as such underlines the new take of 
aesthetic theories, is, of course, the methodical embeddedness of the history of art, both 
in its past form and in its prospective future, in the core of its definition. Simply put, 
both the functionalists and the proceduralists conceive the nature of art, whether 
determined by its function or by the way it is practiced and consumed, as informed by 
3o Carroll, N. (1993). "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 51(3): 313-326, 314. 
31 See: Davies, S. (1991). Definitions of art. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press; Carroll, N. 
(1993). "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 51(3): 313-326. 
32 Davies, S. (2001). Definition of Art.The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Gaut and D. M. 
Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 169-180, 172. 
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its history, namely, as an inherent result of the way art has been, is now being, and 
presumably will be, practiced. Both approaches are historically reflexive, and can 
therefore be conceived, to use Davies' term, as hybrid definitions of art, namely, as 
definitions which acknowledge the inherently evolving nature of art.33 Adding to this 
conclusion, Carroll notes that what underscores both approaches (in a way echoing 
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions) is their appeal to the avant-garde. For both 
approaches, the avant-garde - namely, the most recent, radical and unconventional, 
evolution of the art world -is put front and center, as it is the most acute reflector to the 
changes that the art world is undergoing.34 
Following the new approach to the philosophy of art, the task of defining art is, 
at least to some extent, more congenial than ever before. Noting this, Davies concludes: 
"By drawing attention to the ubiquity of the artworld relativity problem I do not mean 
to imply that the enterpri.se of defining art is bound to fail. The point, rather, is that 
progress in analyzing art's nature is likely to demand ... a closer attention to the wider 
social setting in which art is produced and received, and a greater sensitivity to the 
variety of such settings, many of which fall optside the ambit of the artworld of 'high' 
33 Davies, S. (2001). Definition of Art.The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Gaut and D. M. 
Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 169-180, 175. 
34 See: Carroll, N. (1993). "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art." The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51(3): 313-326, 314. See also: Carroll, N. (1996). Avant-Garde Film 
and Film Theory.Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Carroll, 
N. (1995)."Avant-Garde Art and the Problem of Theory." The Journal of Aesthetic Education 29: 
1-13; Carroll, N. (1998). Film in the Age of Postmodernism.Interpreting the Moving Image. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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Western art."35 Carroll adds to this conclusion by noting that "the recurrent task of the 
philosophy of art, as a matter of fact, has been to provide means to identify new and 
emerging work, particularly work of a revolutionary sort, as art."36 
We are thus brought to the point at which we can state our conclusions as 
follows: (1) Art - possibly uniquely so - cannot be defined by way of an essential 
definition. This inability is due to the inherent nature of the artistic phenomenon, which 
i~ (a) constantly changing, (b) emooted in specific cultural histories, and (c) self-
reflexive. Although it was shown that we can probably identify art by pointing towards 
its function or the procedure by which it is manifested, we cannot claim that this 
identification satisfies the traditional requirement for an essential definition, since by 
this means we merely give a descriptive account of art, and not a definition of an 
essence. Accordingly, (2) the philosophy of art has to methodically reinvent itself, in 
order to capture the elusive nature of its subject matter. In doing so, the major 
philosophical discovery amounts to the need to reevaluate the role played by the history 
of art, and the empirical data it produces, in the acclaimed definition of art. 
35 Davies, S. (2001). Definition of Art. The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Gaut and D. M. 
Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 169-180, 177-8. . 
36 Carroll (1993), p. 314. Shaw criticizes Carroll: Carroll still seems to be operating under the 
assumption that artistic media like the cinema can be given 'real' definitions in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the proper application of the term. See: Shaw, D. (2008). "A 
Rejoinder to Noel Carroll's The Philosophy of Motion Pictures." Film-Philosophy 12(2): 142-151 
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It is time now to go back to the question which initially stirred this discussion, 
namely, "is film art?" The surprising conclusions of this discussion have a significant 
influence on the possible ways of answering this question, as well as on the ways of 
forming the question itself. For the question regarding the artistry of film can now be 
understood as a question about the philosophical foundations of art as a whole, and 
since film can easily be characterized as an "avant-garde" instance of the progressing 
history of artistic expression, we can quite confidently assert that film qualifies as art. 
Whereas not necessarily all films are works of art, some definitely are, at least in the way 
they employ the otherwise acknowledged components of the artistic practice, such as 
mimesis, drama, and representation, among others. Films that are engaged in such a 
practice, in ways which challenge and expand on the grand corpus of the art world, can 
definitely, by themselves, be conceived as new and innovative works of art. 
The Second Thematic Context: Film Theory 
We concluded the previous section with a first step towards a new contextual 
framework for the CFP question. Under the cohesive title of "philosophy of film" (a sub-
category of "philosophy of art" or "aesthetics"), the CFP question was confronted with 
the need to take under consideration the evolving nature of art and, accordingly, the 
dynamic nature of the film as potentially an artistic phenomenon. As we have noted, an 
essential definition of art and its sub-concepts (including film) is of no real use to the 
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philosophical understanding of the art world.37 In the absence of such definition, the 
relation between film and philosophy has to be reevaluated. This, of course, changes the 
nature of the way that we conceive and explain the cinematic phenomenon, and, more 
acutely, changes the way that we evaluate the importance and meaning of the CFP 
question. 
The true nature of this change, as far as the CFP question goes, can be 
extrapolated from the formulation of the question itself. By asking whether or not film 
can "philosophize," we are not asking what film is, but, rather, what film does, or can do. 
This important emphasis is a direct outcome of the shift in aesthetic perspective that we 
have experienced in the previous section. For when we ask "what is film?"- as we did 
in the outset of this chapter - we seem to expect an essential definition as an answer, 
namely, a list of "if and only if" type of conditions which, if valid, are able to properly 
define the concept of film. However, as an artistic phenomenon, film eludes such 
definitions, at least those definitions that are given in order to satisfy the above 
mentioned expectation. Accordingly, if we shift our focus, and understand the "what is 
film?" question as an attempt to give a functional (or procedural) account of film 
(namely, to give a descriptive account of what film does and how it develops) instead of 
the failed attempt to define film as a concept, then we are sure to end up with a 
workable understanding of the cinematic practice. Under these terms, the "what is 
37Shaw, D. (2008). "A Rejoinder to Noel Carroll's The Philosophy of Motion Pictures." Film-
Philosophy 12(2): 142-151. 
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film?" question - and, consequently the CFP question as well- are bound to yield more 
constructive results. 
This methodical turn fits nicely with a second contextual framework of the CFP 
question. This framework stems from the disciplinary rubric - commonly practiced in 
academic departments of film studies but also significantly present in departments of 
philosophy- which is aptly called film theory. The practice of film theory- or so its name 
strongly suggests - engages with what is predominantly a philosophical task, namely, 
the theorizing of film as a given subject matter in order to have a better grip on the 
practice and activities it upholds. Admittedly, the goal of this practice seems at first not 
to agree with our previous conclusions, for the idea of a "theory" seems to imply the 
need for an essential definition of what is being theorized.38 However, this notion is 
misleading. According to David Bordwell, one of the major practitioners in the field of 
film theory, any serious attempt to give a theoretical account of film must first 
acknowledge that "no single megatheory can comprehend the diversity of cinematic 
38 Carl Plantinga describes this shift as "the turn away from aesthetics," and concludes that "the 
relationship between film theory and traditional aesthetics has been marked to a great extent 
either by mutual inattention or by open suspicion and disagreement... Film theory and 
aesthetics- both sub-fields within the disciplines of film studies and philosophy, respectively-
share a number of concerns: canons and canonization, interpretation, spectatorship, narrative, 
style, feminism and feminist aesthetics, and photography, to name a few." (Plantinga, C. (1993). 
"Film Theory and Aesthetics: Notes on a Schism." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 
(3): 445-454: 445-6). 
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phenomena."39 Instead of a search for an overarching account of what film is, Bordwell 
offers a more modest (and pragmatic) methodical enterprise, which focuses on what film 
does, and aims to articulate the thematic means by which it operates. Following 
Bordwell's observation, film theorists across the border are not bothered by the essential 
definition of film; instead, they aim to show the methods through which film operates, is 
created, is conceived, and is perpetuated. 
As can be read from this depiction of the methodical background that sustains 
film theory, the philosophical quest of the film theorist approaches film at a different 
angle from that of the philosopher of film. Namely, while film theory pursues a 
philosophical task, its goal undeniably stands for an interest that philosophy has in film 
that differs from that of philosophical aesthetics.While no longer consumed with the 
need to propose a conclusive "external" definition of film, film theory delves into the 
actual corpus of cinematic works, aiming to come up with an "internal" theoretical view 
of the practice at hand. This "internal" viewpoint aims to better understand the craft of 
the filmmaker, the nature and experience of film-viewing, and the guidelines for a 
proper film analysis and film interpretation. The thematic adoption of an empirical 
39Bordwell, D. (1989). "A Case for Cognitivism." Iris 9: 11-40, 12. Similarly, Noel Carroll has 
argued at length that we should abandon the attempt to construct grand film theory, and instead 
adopt piecemeal theorizing. See: Carroll, N. (1996). Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, especially part I; and Casebier, A. (2002). "Noel Carroll's Theorizing 
the Moving Image." Film and Philosophy 5/6 (General Interest Edition): 86-92. 
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method of inquiry (in the interest of forming a theory which will explain film for what it 
is and can do) is, in this sense, the crown of the theorist's contribution to our debate. 
Correlatively, it comes as no surprise that film theory begins its task by aiming at 
the same basic questions as the philosophy of film, namely, "what is film?" and "is film 
art?" However, this time around, these questions aim at a pragmatically applicable 
theory of film and not at the abstraction of an essential definition. Simply put, the film 
theorist's answer to these questions will not lean on an abstract definition of film, but 
will investigate film as it is (and was) practiced (from its early days until present time) 
and will aim to validate his answer by speculating the ways film will be practiced in the 
foreseeable future.40 This interweavement of viewpoints and methodical attitudes is, as 
Carroll observes, comprehensive reflection of the true interest philosophy has in film: 
"Such a mission brought film theory in contact with philosophy almost immediately, 
since proving that film is an art requires making philosophical assumptions about such 
things as the nature of art and the conditions a medium must meet in order to be 
regarded as an autonomous art form."41 
To further unveil the film theorist's practice and sequential contribution, we 
might want to look at the kind of questions which have traditionally captured the 
40 Notably BerysGaut, who devotes a major part of his work to discuss video games, interactive 
cinema, digital images and their effect on the ways films are created and conceived. 
41 Carroll, N. (1998). A Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford, Clarendon Press: iii (Quoted in: Shaw, D. 
(2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 
3.) 
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theorist's gaze.Such questions embark, among others, on the following topics: film 
authorship42; film styling (especially in regard to already established artistic styles, like 
formalism and realism); film techniques and inherent vocabulary (most notably:film 
acting, film genres, shooting techniques, and the employment of dramatic instruments 
vis-a-vis film narrative and narration43); film's affinities with other artforms (most 
42 More on these questions can be found in contemporary literature. On the question of 
authorship, see: Heath, S. (2005). Against Authorship. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text 
and readings. T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 118-122; Meskin, A. 
(2009). Authorship. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. 
Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 12-28; Bordwell, D. (2003). Authorship and Narration 
in Art Cinema. Film and authorship. V. W. Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University 
Press: 42-49; Gaut, B. (1997). Film Authorship and Collaboration. Film Theory and Philosophy. R. 
Allen and M. Smith. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 149-172; Heath, S. (2005). Against 
Authorship. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings. T. E. Wartenberg and A. 
Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 118-122; Livingston, P. (1997). Cinematic Authorship. Film 
Theory and Philosophy. R. Allen and M. Smith. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 132-148; 
Livingston, P. (2006). Cinematic Authorship. Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An 
Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 299-309; Meskin, A. (2009). 
Authorship. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. 
London & New York, Routledge: 12-28; Naremore, J. (2004). Authorship. A Companion to Film 
Theory. T. Miller and R. Starn. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 9-24; Salchannel, M. (2003). 
Cinema in Search of Its Authors: On the Notion of Film Authorship in Legal Discourse. Film and 
authorship. V. W. Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press: 152-178; Wexman, V. 
W., Ed. (2003). Film and authorship. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press. 
43Qn the question of narration, see: Wilson, G. M. (1986). Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic 
Point of View. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press; Wilson, G. M. (1986). On 
Narrators and Narration in Film. Narration in Light, Studies in Cinematic Point of View. G. M. 
Wilson. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press: 126-144; Wilson, G. M. (1997). On Film 
Narrative and Narrative Meaning Film Theory and Philosophy. R. Allen and M. Smith. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 221-238; Wilson, G. M. (2003). Narrative. The Oxford Handbook of 
Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 392-407; Wilson, G. M. (2005). Narration 
as Showing. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings. T. E. Wartenberg and A. 
Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 198-208; Wilson, G. M. (2006). Le Grand Imagier Steps Out: The 
Primitive Basis of Film Narration. Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. 
Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 185-199; Wilson, G. M. (2006). Transparency and 
Twist in Narrative Fiction Film. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. 
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notably literature, theatre and photography); the affinity of film to a variety of issues 
and topics which inhabit the cultural domain (such as gender and censorship); the 
challenge embedded in the concept of film reality (especially in its depiction of time and 
space); and film perception (especially in regard to emotions, the role of consciousness, 
and the interpretive role of the viewers). 
These topics, as noted before, stand for a philosophical interest in film, different 
from that of the philosophy of film discussed above. By making the attempt to 
philosophize about these matters, the film theorist aims to give a concise account of 
what film is by way of investigating what film does. With this, the theorist employs a 
different attitude, and expresses different sensitivities, than that of the traditional 
philosopher of film. His overarching goal, as opposed to that of the philosopher of film, 
is to subject the cinematic corpus itself to a theoretical view which, if successful, will 
encompass film's practice. As such, film theory has opened up the philosophical debate 
on film by applying various thematic trends and attitudes, commonly held and 
developed in humanities, on the investigation of the world of film. 
As argued here, the investigatory role of film theory can be considered as a 
successful attempt to bring philosophy closer to its cinematic subject matter. fu other 
words, the goals of a philosophically inclined theory is not to force an abstract definition 
E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 81-95; Wilson, G. M. (2006). "Transparency and Twist in 
Narrative Fiction Film." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64(1): 81-95. 
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on its subject matter (in this case, film) but to aim at a practical account which, if 
coherent and comprehensible, can adequately explain the ways by which the given 
subject matter (film) is practiced and manifested. Following the view that asserts that 
film, as a newly integrated component of the art world, has to be perceived (and 
explained) through historical and social lenses, the task which stands before the film 
theorist can be depicted as a thematic merger between philosophy and the social 
sciences. Not surprisingly, the major trend in contemporary film theory debate can be 
characterized as vigorously pursuing this type of socially-embedded explanation of the 
cinematic phenomenon. Two of the major film theories - cognitive film theory and 
psychoanalytical film theory - are predominant examples of this systematic philosophical 
line of investigation. 
First is the cognitive theory. This predominant offspring of analytic philosophy, 
led by David Bordwell and Noel Carroll, is designed to give an account of what film 
does, by way of tracking down key features which typically characterize the way film is 
perceived. Simply put, as a comprehensive attempt to theorize the cinematic 
phenomenon, the cognitive theory maintains that the best way to understand film is by 
analyzing the cognitive states of spectators as they respond to cinematic interaction.44 Following 
44 See Coplan, who argues that: "cognitive film theory is based largely on research in empirical 
sciences related to the mind, such as cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, social 
psychology, and neuroscience. Most cognitive film theorists also share the assumption that our 
cognitive and perceptual experience when watching film is more or less like our cognitive and 
perceptual experience of events in ordinary life." (Coplan, A. (2009). Empathy and character 
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early film theorists - most notably Sergei Eisenstein, Hugo Munsterberg, Siegfried 
Kracauer and Andre Bazin- the cognitivists assert that the cinematic capacities are best 
demonstrated in their ability to elicit metal representations and expound on cognitive 
activities such as memory and imagination.45 
Munsterberg pioneered this approach by claiming that film closely parallels our 
thought processes. According to Munsterberg, there are some distinctive features 
(embedded in the cinematic storytelling process) that are able to mimic not only the 
content of the real world but also, and mainly, the processes by which we conceive it.46 
As such, film can act as our imagination acts, and in so doing, it obeys the laws of the 
mind rather than those of the external world.47 
engagement.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. 
London & New York, Routledge: 97-110.) 
4SSuch is the case with Wilson, who develops a theory of cinematic point of view and narration, 
and Currie, who advances a comprehensive theory of cinematic representation, while drawing 
heavily on cognitive psychology. See: Wilson, G. M. (1986). Narration in Light: Studies in 
Cinematic Point of View. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press; Currie, Gregory. 
(1995). Image and mind: film, philosophy and cognitive science. Cambridge England New York, 
NY, Cambridge University Press. 
46 Munsterberg, H. (1916). The Photoplay: A Psychological Study. New York, D. Appleton; 
Munsterberg, H. (2005).Defining the Photoplay.The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and 
readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 43-49. 
47 Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 4-6. See also: Carroll, N. (1996). Film/Mind Analogies: The Case of Hugo 
Munsterberg. Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 293-304; 
Fredericksen, D. (2009). Hugo Miinsterberg. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. 
P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 422-434; Sinnerbrink, R. (2009). 
Hugo Miinsterberg Film, Theory and Philosophy, the Key Thinkers. F. Colman. Montreal & 
Kingston, Ithaca, McGill-Queens University Press: 20-30. 
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Similarly, Eisenstein, who is known as the father of the montage theory, asserts 
that film provokes an affective mental response that stimulates the mind in turn and 
elicits thought processes from its spectators.48 This unique cognitive experience triggered 
by film is, according to Eisenstein, the explicit result of cinematic editing, most notably 
the montage. The montage or the cinematic device that enriches the cinematic sequence 
with a collision of juxtaposed shots is, according to Eisenstein, the main feature 
responsible for triggering this automatic response from the spectator.49 
Both Eisenstein and Munsterberg emphasize the expressionist side of cognitive 
theory. A more realistic cognitivist account is held by Siegfried Kracauer and Andre 
Bazin. Bazin claims that the focus of the cognitivist attention should not be the ways by 
which film manipulates reality (vis-a-vis the intentional trickery of the montage) but 
instead should be the ways by which film is able to accurately represent reality.50 
Adding motion and sound to the otherwise photographic capacities of film, Bazin 
argues that film is the most accurate reproduction of reality. Cognitively speaking, film 
must be understood as the most adaptable form of artistic realism, as it recreates the 
world in its own image, "an image unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the 
48See: Taylor, R. (2002). October. London, British Film Institute: 32. 
49 Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 8-10. 
so Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 10-13. 
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artist or the irreversibility of time."51 His preference of realism over expressionism is 
evident in the cinematic techniques he favors. The expressionist techniques - most 
notably the montage and the shot/reverse-shot technique52 -are, according to Bazin, a 
corruption of "the pure cinema." Other, less manipulative, techniques, such as the deep-
focus, the long-shots and the long-takes, are better suited to incorporate the realistic 
nature of the cognitive process which is what film, according to Bazin, is all about. 
An even more adamant defense of cinematic realism is mounted by Siegfried 
Kracauer.53 According to Kracauer, film is capable of much more than the accurate 
reproduction of the appearances of things as it evokes a richer and much more inclusive 
reality than the one which is actually present in front of the camera. In his enthusiasm, 
Kracauer even goes as far as to suggest that this cinematic reality, properly so called, can 
"fittingly be called 'life',"54 and as such, can be conceived as the "redemption of physical 
reality."55That said, it is important to stress here that neither Bazin nor Kracauer thought 
S1Bazin, A. (1967). The Ontology of the Photographic Image. What is Cinema?, vol. I. A. Bazin. 
Berkeley, University of California Press: 21. See also: Bazin, A. (2005). Cinematic Realism.The 
Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, 
MA, Blackwell: 59-69. 
52Which is typically used to represent conversations in Hollywood films. 
53 Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 13-14. 
54Kracauer, S. (1960). Theory of film; the redemption of physical reality. New York, Oxford 
University Press: 71. To this affect, Shaw adds:"Even a film about vampires can capture the flow 
of life, or fail to do so." (Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London 
& New York, Wallflower Press: 13) 
ssJ<racauer, S. (1960).Theory of film; the redemption of physical reality. New York, Oxford 
University Press. See also: Kania, A. (2009). Realism.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 237-248. 
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that the cinema was limited to recording accurate mechanical reproductions of 
particular objects. They stress, however, that film can be explained by the ways it 
appeals to the cognition-by which they mean the representation of reality for the 
perceiver's mind-in ways that are not paralleled by other artforms. 
The cognitive perspective which stems from these scattered observations (of both 
expressionists and realists) is further pursued by David Bordwell. While combining a 
thorough analysis of the early theoreticians with the newly emerging theories in 
cognitive science and brain research, Bordwell aims to give an account of film by 
alluding to the somewhat uncharted world of human mentation.56 By directing his 
56 Here Bordwell is influenced principally by George Lakoff' s studies in prototype theory, but 
also by the New Look School (promoted by Jerome Bruner, George Miller, Irwin Rock, and R. L. 
Gregory, among others). It proposes what has been called a constructivist research program, 
whereby the mind actively contributes to the shaping of experience. Mental processes are not 
wholly stimulus-bound. The mind goes "beyond the information given," in Bruner's famous 
phrase, and fills in or extrapolates from what is supplied by brute experience. The mind is so 
made that it harbors assumptions - that lighting comes from above, that objects are bounded and 
are not infinitely plastic- and contextual expectations which it brings to every encounter with the 
world. We see what we expect to see; the very concept of surprise entails a violation of 
expectations. New Look thinkers held that any sensory array is inherently ambiguous. 
For further discussion, see: Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories 
reveal about the mind. Chicago, University of Chicago Press; Lakoff, G. (1988). Cognitive 
Semantics. Meaning and mental representations. U. Eco, M. Santambrogio and P. Violi. 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 119-154. He also follows the researches of Gombrich 
regarding the cognitive connections in visual art. See: Gombrich, E. H. (1969). Art and illusion; a 
study in the psychology of pictorial representation. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press; 
Gombrich, E. H. (1982). The image and the eye : further studies in the psychology of pictorial 
representation. Oxford, Phaidon; Gombrich, E. H. and D. Eribon (1993). Looking for answers: 
conversations on art and science. New York, Harry N. Abrams; Gregory, R. L. and E. H. 
Gombrich (1973). illusion in nature and art. London, Duckworth. He also employs Virginia 
Brooks. See: Brooks, V. (1984). "Film, Perception, and Cognitive Psychology." Millennium Film 
Journal 14(15): 105-126; Hochberg, J. and V. Brooks (1996). Movies in the Mind's Eye. Post-
Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies. N. Carroll and D. Bordwell. Madison, Wisconsin, The 
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efforts towards the cognitive schemata - which chiefly argues for the centrality to the 
human condition of mental phenomena such as memory, repetition, visualization, 
recognition, comprehension, inference-making, interpretation, judgment, and 
imagination - Bordwell is able to show how film corresponds with these aspects of 
cognition, in ways which suggest that this is in fact what film is designed to do in the 
first place.57 Focusing on these features of human cognition, which constitute what 
Wilson refers to as "the meaningful perceptual experience of human observers,"58 
epitomizes the strength of the cognitive film theory, as it aptly determines a correlation 
between the ways that film is practiced and manifested, and the ways that the mind of 
the spectator works. Accordingly, and while employing the cognitive frame of reference, 
film is best explained as an artificial mechanism designed to elicit cognitive responses 
from its viewer (to whom Bordwell refers to as "an active information seeker"). The 
University of Wisconsin Press: 368-387. Bordwell, D. (1985). Narration in the Fiction Film. 
Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press; Bordwell, D. (1989). Making Meaning: 
Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press. Also: Bordwell, D. (1989). "A Case for Cognitivism." Iris 9: 11-40; Bordwell, D. (1990). "A 
Case for Cognitivism: Further Reflections." Iris 11: 107-111. Firther reading: Bordwell, D. (1996). 
Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory. Post-Theory: Reconstructing 
Film Studies. N. Carroll and D. Bordwell. Madison, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin 
Press: 3-36; Bordwell, D. (2009). Cognitive theory. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and 
Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 356-367; and recently: 
Bordwell, D. and K. Thompson (2011). Minding movies: observations on the art, craft, and 
business of filmmaking. Chicago ; London, The University of Chicago Press. Regardint the 
founding fathers of cinematic cognitivism, see: Bordwell, D. (2009). Sergei Eisenstein. The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New 
York, Routledge: 378-386; Bordwell, D. (2005). The Cinema of Eisenstein, Routledge. 
57Bordwell, D. (1989). "A Case for Cognitivism." Iris 9: 11-40, 14-15. 
ss Wilson, G. M. (1986). Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View. Baltimore, MD, 
Johns Hopkins University Press: 84. 
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power of film, and, similarly, its various techniques and practices, can therefore be 
unified under a guiding theory which stresses the cognitive role of the spectator in the 
unveiling of the cinematic content. 
A second, and somewhat complementary, theoretical approach to the cinematic 
practice is the psychoanalytic film theory. As the name suggests, this theory rests 
heavily on Freudian psychoanalysis and its successors (mostly Lacanian, Marxist and 
feminist appropriations.) Much like cognitive theory, psychoanalytic theory also relies 
on the mental states of the spectator as the best explanatory axis of the cinematic 
practice. However, and as Bordwell spells out, there are several divergences between the 
two perspectives. For one, whereas the cognitive frame of reference focuses on the 
mundane, trivial, so-called "normal" mental behavior, psychoanalytic theory tends to 
prefer the abnormal and the eccentric over the expected "normal" behavior.59 Cognitive 
theory focuses on the normal pathways of reception, perception and recognition, to 
name a few. Contrarily, psychoanalysis focuses on neurotic symptoms, bizarre dreams, 
slips of the tongue, and dysfunctional personalities. It is therefore evident that, despite 
similarities, the psychoanalytic account of film offers a somewhat different observation 
of the cinematic phenomenon. Accordingly, the main concerns of psychoanalytic film 
theory- as reflected in the writings of some of its advocates, like Robin Wood, Jean Luis 
Baudry, Christian Metz, and Laura Mulvey - are to unveil the ways that filmmaking, 
59Bordwell, D. (1989). "A Case for Cognitivism." Iris 9: 11-40, pp. 12-14. 
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and especially film viewing, manages to exploit unconscious desires and reproduce 
dominant ideologies. 6o 
In his lengthy investigation of the works of specific filmmakers, like Alfred 
Hitchcock and John Ford, Wood manages to show how instinctual drives of eros and 
thanatos are recreated in certain films (especially horror films,) and are then met with a 
cathartic response which embodies the Freudian term, "the return of the 
6o See: Wood, R. (1978). "The Returne of the Repressed." Film Comment 4Guly-August): 61-72; 
Wood, R. (1976). Personal Views, Explorations in Film. London & Bedford, The Gordon Fraser 
Gallery Ltd; Wood, R. (1998). Sexual politics and narrative film: Hollywood and beyond. New 
York, Columbia University Press; Baudry, J.-L. (1986). The Apparatus: Metaphysical Approaches 
to Ideology. Narrative, apparatus, ideology: a film theory reader. P. Rosen. New York, Columbia 
University Press: 299-318; Baudry, J.-L. (1986). Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus. Narrative, apparatus, ideology: a film theory reader. P. Rosen. New York, Columbia 
University Press: 286-298; Metz, C. (1974). Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. New York, 
Oxford University Press; Metz, C. (1982). The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the 
Cinema. Bloomington, Indiana University Press; Casetti, F. (2009). Christian Metz. The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, 
Routledge: 387-396; Rushton, R. (2009). Christian Metz. Film, Theory and Philosophy, the Key 
Thinkers. F. Colman. Montreal & Kingston, Ithaca, McGill-Queens University Press: 266-275; 
Mulvey, L. (1989). Visual and Other Pleasures.Bloomington, Indiana University Press; Mulvey, L. 
(1996). Netherworlds and the Unconscious: Oedipus and Blue Velvet. Fetishism and Curiosity. 
London, BFI Publishing: 137-154; Mulvey, L. (1997). The Pre-Oedipal Father: The Gothicism of 
Blue Velvet. Modem Gothic: A Reader V. Sage and A. L. Smith. Manchester, UK, Manchester 
University Press 38-57; Mulvey, L. (2000).Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. Film and 
Theory: An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, Blackwell: 483-494. Erhart, J. (2004). Laura 
Mulvey Meets Catherine Tramell Meets the She-Man: Counter-History, Reclamation, and 
Incongruity in Lesbian, Gay, and Queer Film and Media Criticism. A Companion to Film Theory. 
T. Miller and R. Starn. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 165-181; Sorfa, D. (2009). Laura Mulvey. 
Film, Theory and Philosophy, the Key Thinkers. F. Colman. Montreal & Kingston, Ithaca, McGill-
Queens University Press: 286-295. See also: Carroll, N. (1988). Marxism and Psychoanalysis: The 
Althusserian-Lacanian Paradigm. Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film 
Theory. New York, Columbia University Press: 53-88; Carroll, N. (1988). Psychoanalysis: Metz 
and Baudry. Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory. New York, 
Columbia University Press: 9-52. 
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repressed."61Baudry and Metz, individually yet interdependently, develop an 
understanding of the spectatorial response, which also rests heavily on the mechanism 
of human desires and repressions.Baudry argues that, by identifying first with the point-
of-view (henceforth: POV) of the camera and then with the characters on-screen, the film 
spectator is conquered by the cinematic experience in ways which echo the Lacanian 
"mirror phase," in which the child identifies with idealized images of himself. This, 
Baudry claims, explains the natural appeal of the film viewing experience, as it "fulfills 
an unconscious wish by triggering an artificial regression back to a state of complete 
narcissistic fusion."62 
Like Baudry, Metz too argues for the mirror phase relationship between the 
spectator and the cinematic experience. However, he differs from Baudry in the way he 
explains the adaptation of the Lacanian concept to film experience. According to Metz, 
and in contrast with Lacan' s original depiction of the child identifying himself in the 
mirror, the film spectator does not reasonably expect to find himself on-screen reflected 
' 
back at him. Accordingly, the reciprocal relations of the original mirror stage are, in 
Metz' s view, more one-sided than Baudry intended them to be. Character identification 
61 See: Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 14-17. 
62 See: Wartenberg, T. E. (2004). "Looking Backward: Philosophy and Film Reconsidered." Film 
and Philosophy 8 (Special Interest Edition: Ethical and Existential Themes in Cinema): 138-141, 
139. See also: Baudry, J.-L. (1986). The Apparatus: Metaphysical Approaches to Ideology. 
Narrative, apparatus, ideology: a film theory reader. P. Rosen. New York, Columbia University 
Press: 299-318, 313. 
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is less central to Metz' s analysis. In other words, it is the spectator which constitutes the 
cinematic experience (as it is for him,) and not, as Baudry maintained, the cinematic 
experience which constitutes the self-image of the spectator. 
Another variation of the psychoanalytic approach, constructed in the writings of 
Laura Mulvey, also takes notice of the spectator's gaze.63Mulvey, a committed feminist, 
follows on Metz' s one-sided view of the spectator's interaction with the cinematic 
experience, and claims that this is, in fact, a form of voyeuristic pleasure, which fosters 
the male gaze at the female body. By perpetuating oppressive patriarchal ideals, the 
cinematic experience, according to Mulvey, is designed to meet and reaffirm the basic 
sexual desires of the male spectator.64 Through his identification with the active 
controlling agent on screen, the male spectator controls the unfolding of the narrative 
events and takes pleasure in looking voyeuristically at the "private world" of the female 
character. 65 
63Mulvey, L. (2000). Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. Film and Theory: An Anthology. R. 
Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, Blackwell: 483-494. 
64 See also: Devereaux, M. (2002). Oppressive Texts, Resisting Readers, and the Gendered 
Spectator: The 'New' Aesthetics. Arguing about art: contemporary philosophical debates. A. Neill 
and A. Ridley. London; New York, Routledge: 381-398; Devereaux, M. (1981). Epistemology of 
cinema audience response to the moving image, University of Chicago: v, 146leaves. 
65Mulvey writes: "the mass of mainstream film, and the conventions within which it has 
consciously evolved, portray an hermetically sealed world which unwinds magically, indifferent 
to the presence of the audience, producing for them a separation and playing on their voyeuristic 
fantasy . . . conditions of screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of 
looking in on a private world." (Mulvey, L. (1989). Visual and Other Pleasures. Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press: 17). 
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Though widely criticized as oversimplifying the importance of gender to the 
understanding of the cinematic gaze, Mulvey's account nevertheless fits nicely with the 
dominant claim underlying both the psychoanalytic and the cognitive film 
theories.66Both theories, though differing in many respects, share the basic assumption 
according to which the cinematic apparatus can best be explained by way of the spectatorial 
experience. Whether by way of examining the interaction of film with human psychology, 
or by way of examining the attunement of the cinematic apparatus to cognitive patterns 
and capacities of the spectator, both theories are in agreement as to the centrality of the 
spectatorial agency to any cohesive explanation of the cinematic phenomenon. Hence, 
the spectator, together with the way he interacts with the cinematic imagery, becomes 
the methodical hallmark of film theory. 
This methodical hallmark has to be further examined, as it yields a significant 
change in the contextual framework which supports the philosophical engagement with 
66For such criticism, see: Studlar, G. (1985). "Masochism and the Perverse Pleasures of the 
Cinema".B. Nichols. Movies andMethods, vol. 2. Berkeley,University of California Press; Studlar, 
G.(1988). In the Realm of Pleasure: Von Sternberg, Dietrich, and the Masochistic Aesthetic. 
Urbana, University of illinois Press; New York: Columbia University Press; Clover, C. (1992). 
Men Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modem Horror Film. Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press; Rodowick, D. N. (1991). The Difficulty of Difference: Psychoanalysis, Sexual 
Difference and Film Theory. NewYork, Routledge; Gaut, B. (1994). "On Cinema and Perversion". 
Film and Philosophy 1: 3-17.Creed, B. (1998). "Film and Psychoanalysis".J. Hill and P. Church 
Gibson. The Oxford Guide toFilm Studies. New York, Oxford University Press; Friedberg, 
B.(1990). "A Denial of Difference: Theories of Cinematic. Identification". E. A. Kaplan. 
Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. New York, Routledge; White, P. (1998). "Feminism and Film".J. 
Hill and P. Church Gibson. The Oxford Guide to FilmStudies. New York, Oxford University 
Press; and, Smith, M. (1995). Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema. New York, 
Oxford UniversityPress. 
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film, and, more specifically, the CFP question. To further examine this thematic change, I 
wish to introduce two subsidiary theories which emerged from the cognitive-
psychoanalytic debate depicted here. These theories, in addition to adding to the overall 
debate regarding the nature of the cinematic practice and the merits of the cinematic 
experience, will serve to further crystallize the impact of the view embedded in film 
theory on the CFP question. 
The sub-theories I refer to here are linguistic/semiotic film theory and dream film 
theory. Both sub-theories employ, as I have already implied, the basic assertion of both 
the cognitive and the psychoanalytic theories, namely, the assertion regarding the 
centrality of the spectator to the understanding of the cinematic phenomenon. However, 
additionally, both sub-theories offer a more specific and fine-tuned focus than that of the 
master theories. As such, they are able not o!1ly to demonstrate the relevance of the 
spectatorial experience to the comprehension of the cinematic phenomenon, but also to 
better shape a more fine-grained picture of this experience, and to further pursue its 
structure and impacts. I will therefore turn now to briefly discuss these two additions to 
our debate. 
First is linguistic/semiotic film theory. Grounded on the wide scope of the 
cognitivist account, the linguistic film theory holds that film, perceived as a pictorially-
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based representational medium, is structured as a language-like system of symbols.67 
Replacing the verbal with the visual, these symbols, systematically arrayed, employ the 
expressive potential of film, and hence employ the way to articulate the way film 
interacts with the spectator's cognition. Among its proponents are the Russian 
theoreticians Lev Kuleshov and VsevelodPudovkin, who held that the cinematic shot 
bears structural similarities to a word, and, accordingly, that the edited sequence of 
shots bears structural resemblance to a sentence68; Sergei Eisenstein, who claimed that 
film should be conceived as a form of pictorial language (much like the hieroglyphics 
and the pictograms); Andre Bazin, who coined the term "language of film"; and, most 
notably, Christian Metz, who, following the semiotics of Ferdinand de Saussure, argued 
that, at least in some levels, film can be decoded in the same binary fashion as other 
semiotic systems, most distinctively the verbal ones.69 
67 Regarding the differences in sign systems between symbols (standing in a conventional relation 
to things; an example is language), icons (based on resemblance; an example is, arguably, 
pictures), or indexes (standing in a causal relation; an example is photographs), see: Peirce, C. S. 
(1868). "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2: 140-157. 
68Pudovkinwrites: "Editing is the language of the film director. Just as in living speech, so one 
may say in editing: there is a word - the piece of exposed film, the image[, and] a phrase - the 
combination of pieces." See: Pudovkin, V.I. (1970). Film Technique and Film Acting.New York, 
Evergreen Press: 100. 
69Bazin, A. (1967). The Evolution of the Language of Cinema. What is Cinema?, vol. I. Berkeley, 
University of California Press; Bazin, A. (1967). The Ontology of the Photographic Image. What is 
Cinema?, vol. I. Berkeley, University of California Press; Eisenstein, S. (2004). Beyond the Shot 
[The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram]. Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory 
Readings. L. Braudy and M. Cohen. New York, Oxford University Press; Metz, C. (1974). Film 
Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. New York, Oxford University Press; Metz, C. (1982). The 
Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. Bloomington, Indiana University Press; 
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The high point of the analogy sustaining the linguistic/semiotic film theory is, 
evidently, the claim that a cinematic expression bears structural resemblance to a 
linguistic expression, and should therefore be understood and comprehended in 
linguistic terms. According to the proponents of this claim, the resemblance at hand 
occurs on various levels. For one, the key components of language, namely, words and 
sentences bear structural similarity to the cinematic shots and sequences, respectively. In 
other words, cinematic images communicate after the fashion of words, and cinematic 
sequences after the fashion of sentences, due to their representational capacity. 
Secondly, the overarching rules and principles which guide filmmaking (especially 
cinematography and film-editing) are synonymous with the role of grammar and syntax 
in language. Finally, the cognitive efforts made by the perceiver in his attempt to 
comprehend the expressive system set before him are, to no lesser extent, identical. 
Consequently, the analogy between film and language is made into a cohesive account 
which aims to explain how film works and should be understood. Hence, not 
surprisingly, the linguistic/semiotic film theory is regarded as highly influential in film 
studies.70 
However, despite this apparent persuasiveness, several philosophers, led by 
Gregory Currie, BerysGaut and Noel Carroll, raise strong objections to the film as 
Pudovkin, V. (1958). Film Acting and Film Technique. London, Vision Press. See also: Gaut, B. 
(2010). A Philosophy of Cinematic Art. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 51. 
70 See, for instance: Cubiti, S. (2004). The cinema effect. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press: 7-8. 
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language analogy. Their claim that film falls short from satisfying the formal 
requirements of language focuses on the contingency that both the cinematic shot and 
the linguistic word have similar representational relations with their respective 
references. This, as Currie argues, is scarcely the case. A linguistic word is arbitrary, its 
relation with its reference is merely conventional, and the form of representation it 
embeds is denotative. A cinematic shot, by contrast, is pictorial and hence, not arbitrary 
but indicative to its reference. Accordingly, the cinematic image does not communicate 
its reference arbitrarily, but instead embarks on what Flint Schier calls "natural 
generativity," namely, a meaning which is embedded within the pictorial representation 
itsel£.71 
The different ways that pictorial images and words relate to their respective 
references also suggests a difference in the cognitive capacities employed in the process 
of comprehending their meanings. In other words, our ability to recognize pictures is 
essentially different from our cognitive ability to understand words. Gaut and Carroll, 
among others, quote a famous experiment, conducted by Julian Hochberg and Virginia 
Brooks, in which their nineteen-month-old child was deprived of any pictorial exposing 
in his early days, and after a while was presented with a set of drawings and 
photographs of objects familiar to him. The child could easily recognize the objects in the 
pictures, which led his parents to conclude that the depictive relation cannot be 
71Schier, F. (1986). Deeper into pictures: an essay on pictorial representation. Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
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conventional.72This experience shows, as Carroll argues, that pictorial understanding is 
essentially different from linguistic understanding. 
Whereas this conclusion, by itself, seems to prove that the initial analogy 
between film and language ends up as a failed account of what film is, I wish to argue 
that it nevertheless yields a most clear understanding of what film does. The realization 
that pictures are not language-like (and, accordingly, that film has neither grammar nor 
syntax, two features which are, per Carroll, the "hallmark of language"73) amounts to an 
insightful and most significant look into the nature of film. By pointing towards the 
categorical differences between film and language, we managed to isolate the cognitive 
faculties which are put to work when being exposed to cinematic stimuli. By 
crystallizing the nature of the cinematic expression as generative, we gave weight to the 
cognitive claim, according to which it is vital to focus on the cognitive processes of the 
spectator in order to fully understand the unique ways of film.As will be shown in later 
chapters, this realization can serve as an innovative background for attempts to answer 
the CFP question, as it suggests that the CFP question, properlyunderstood, is in fact a 
72 Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 107-8; 
Carroll, N. (2003). Engaging the Moving Image. New Haven & London, Yale University Press: 18-
19, 245; Bordwell, D. (1990). "A Case for Cognitivism: Further Reflections." Iris 11: 107-111, 110; 
Allen, R. and M. Smith, Eds. (1997).Film Theory and Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 121; Gaut, B. (2010). A Philosophy of Cinematic Art. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 51-58; the original experiment is depicted in: Hochberg, Julian and Virginia Brooks. (1962). 
"Pictorial Recognition as an Unlearned Ability?" American Journal of Psychology 75 (4): 624-8. 
73Carroll, N. and J. Choi, Eds. (2006). Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 62. 
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challenge to the hegemony of language in the world of philosophy. To accept this 
challenge is to open the door for some new and exciting ways to answer the CFP 
question. 
I present a more detailed examination of this challenge in later chapters. For 
now, I wish to introduce the second offspring of the cognitive-psychoanalytic debate, 
namely, the dream sub-theory of film. Much like its linguistic counterpart, the dream 
theory too is based on an analogous relationship film supposedly has with an external 
cognitive or psychological phenomenon. The basic premise of the dream theory, as the 
name suggests, points towards what looks on the surface like an uncanny similarity 
between the film world and the dream world. This similarity is based on the perception 
that both film and dream, although distinctively unique modes of presentation, 
nevertheless share a similar stance, in contrast with "the real." That is to say, both film 
and dream present their observer (whether a spectator or a dreamer) with a visually 
based fictitious reality which, as such, is essentially different from the "real" (awakened) 
experience of "reality." Jean Gouda! noted this salient similarity, and pointed out that 
"the cinema constitutes a conscious hallucination,"74 while Suzanne Langer contended 
that "Cinema is 'like' dream" since "it creates a virtual present, an order of direct 
74 Hammond, P. (1978). The Shadow and its shadow: surrealist writings on cinema. London, 
British Film Institute: 51. 
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apparition," activities which are dreamlike in nature.75 Christian Metz concurred with 
this assessment by referring to film as "a waking sleep."76 Other proponents of this 
analogy further examined the apprehension of this theory by examining both its 
structure and thematic applications.77 
According to the proponents of this theory, there are two major features which 
support this anal9gy. For one, the structural dispositions of both film and dream tend to 
suspend the physical laws of nature, laws of causality, continuity and the like. In other words, 
both the dream world and the film world are marked by the possible demarcation of 
those considerations which otherwise form our perception of reality.78 Such is the case, 
for instance, with the discontinuity of space and time. The spatial dimensions of the 
dream/film scenario, as well as their temporal features, are inconsistent with both the 
actual state of the dreamer/the spectator, and with the inner plotline of the film/dream 
scenario itself. The dreamer/spectator experiences the dream/film reality as it unfolds 
(and the timeline is often at odds with the normal course of events) and the 
discontinuity of space insures a sense of discrepancy and alienation. Needless to say that 
75 Langer, S. K. (1953). Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New 
Key. London, Routledge: 415. See also: Langer, S. K. (2006). A Note on the Film. Philosophy of 
Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 79-81 
76 Metz, C. (1982). The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press: 116. 
77 See, for instance, Jacques Brunius, who writes that "the disposition of screen images in time is 
absolutely analogous with the arrangement thought or the dream can devise." (Hammond, P. 
(1978). The Shadow and its shadow: surrealist writings on cinema. London, British Film Institute: 
61.) 
7B See: Sparshott, F. E. (2006). Vision and Dream in the Cinema. Philosophy of Film and Motion 
Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 82-90. 
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in both cases the actual dreamer/spectator is seated in the movie theatre (for the 
duration of the film) or lies comfortably in his bed (for the brief duration of the REM 
sleep) and is not submitted to the distorted spatial and temporal constraints of his 
respective experience. 
A second salient feature of the film-dream analogy underlines the centrality of 
the dreamer/spectator. Both films and dreams are structured as a fusion of emotional and 
sensory apperception on the one hand, and visual mode of representation on the other hand. As 
Richard Allen notes, "films, like dreams, are often characterized by a heightened 
sensation of movement that is linked to the solicitation of strong emotion."79 This 
solicitation, according to Allen, points to the fact that films, like dreams, are "attention 
dependent," namely, that both experiences are inherently dependent on the first person 
apperception of the spectator/dreamer. The subjective (and some would even say 
egocentric) nature of the cinematic/dream experiences is also the reason why, as McGinn 
argues, the minds of others seem peculiarly transparent to the spectator. 
These features, which arise from the film-dream analogy, amount to a 
reductionist view of the "filmic state" (to borrow Metz's term), according to which the 
cinematic medium can be understood as transferring reality in the same fashion as 
dream does, namely, as a distorted and disarrayed experience, which is basically 
79 Allen, R. (2009). Psychoanalysis. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. 
Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 446-456, 449. 
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submitted to no other rules but its own. Also, this analogy heightens the role of the 
spectator/dreamer as the one whose experience of reality is being challenged by the 
dream/film he experiences. In other words, both film and dream seem to share a similar 
disposition regarding the dubious nature of their respective realities, and a similarly 
important disposition regarding the centrality of the dreamer/spectator and his mental 
(and cognitive) states to the construction of these realities. 
These groundbreaking assessments are, of course, highly contestable, as they rest 
on somewhat shaky assumptions regarding the ways of the brain and the nature of 
dreaming (two topics about which, as Carroll notes, we know so little).80 However, as 
McGinn notes, our natural propensity to assume that our minds and cognitive capacities 
do paint an accurate and reliable pictures of reality is nevertheless seriously challenged 
by the general epistemological skepticism which emerges from the cinematic dream-like 
experience.B1 Accordingly, the cinematic experience, again, much like dreaming, puts us 
in a kind of "metaphysical solitary confinement" (to coin McGinn,) and hence challenges 
so For Carroll's reservations, see: Carroll, N. (1988). Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in 
Contemporary Film Theory.New York, Columbia University Press; Carroll, N. 
(1988).Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory.Princeton, N.J., Princeton University 
Press. 
BlMcGinn explores the film-dream analogy in a more systematic way, plausibly noting the way 
that our familiarity with dreams tutors our experience of film. See: McGinn, C. (2005). The Power 
of Movies, How Screen and Mind Interact. New York, Pantheon Books; McGinn, C. (2004). 
Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; McGinn, C. 
(2005). The Matrix of Dreams. Philosophers Explore the Matrix. C. Grau. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 62-70. 
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our metaphysical framework in a unique way.82 The cinematic experience, much like the 
I 
dream one, by standing in ontological and epistemic opposition to "reality," is, as such, 
an apt and unique generator of philosophical skepticism. 
Accordingly, and despite Carroll's concern regarding the heavy reliance on 
partial scientific dispositions, the film-dream analogy is nevertheless able to flesh out 
(and challenge) the preliminary distinctions we employ in our mundane cognitive and 
psychological experiences of reality. One need only reflect on similarly challenging 
constructions in the history of philosophy - most notably Plato's allegory of the cave 
and Descartes' dream argument - in order to get a clearer sense of the skepticism which 
characterizes the cinematic experience. The shadows in Plato's movie-like cave and the 
objects in Descartes' dream similarly expose the basic skepticism of reality. However, in 
the case of the filmic state, this skepticism is not merely argued but in fact actually 
experienced by the skeptic, namely, by the spectator/dreamer himself. The film-dream 
analogy therefore succeeds in showing not only how skepticism is engraved in the 
cinematic experience, but also, in an equally important way, how film is properly 
designed to confront the spectator with this skeptical challenge.83 
The Third Thematic Context: Film-Philosophy 
s2 See: Grau, C. (2006). Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and the Morality of Memory. Thinking 
Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
119-133, 122; see also: McGinn, C. (2006) Consciousness and Its Objects, Oxford: Clarendon. 
83 This point will be further examined in Chapter Four. 
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The emergence of philosophical skepticism as a defining characteristic of the 
cinematic experience is an apt way to conclude the last section. We began this section by 
aiming to define the ways by which the practice of film theory forms a contextual 
framework to our philosophical investigation of film, and, more acutely, our future 
investigation of the CFP question. In the course of this section we found out that film 
theory, despite being, for all purposes, a philosophical endeavor, nevertheless is 
different from traditional philosophy of film, in two distinctive ways. 
First, whereas traditio~al philosophy of film aimed for an essential definition of 
film, film theory has abandoned this goal, and instead aimed to unveil film "from 
within," namely, to give an account of what film does (or is capable of doing) by way of 
examining the social and scientific surroundings in which the cinematic phenomenon is 
embedded. Second, following this methodical shift from the strictly conceptual to the 
empirical, film theory has managed to come up with two surprising analogies. The first 
analogy compared film to language. Though unsuccessful in fulfilling its original task, 
the analogy successfully showed us that film has the capacity to bear meaning, albeit in 
a generative way instead of a denotative one. This, by itself, is an important distinction, 
one that suggests that film, although lacking the conventional features of language, can 
nevertheless be conceived as a medium capable of conveying meaning (philosophical or 
otherwise). The second analogy, which compared film to dream, expanded on this 
notion, suggesting that the meaning absorbed in the filmic state is skeptical in 
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nature.With these conclusions in hand, I move to the recently invented title of film-
philosophy, as the final contextual framework for the CFP question. 
The main idea behind this newly invented title stems from the previously stated 
conclusion. The first hypothesis assembled under this title aims to solve the asymmetry 
between film and philosophy (which would compel one of them to .be subjected to the 
other). This asymmetry, which was most apparent in the outset of this chapter, has 
traditionally overlooked the innovation required when philosophically examining the 
cinematic phenomenon, and, consequently, has often disregarded film's unique nature. 
By posing film in a hyphenated relation with philosophy, this title reflects a more 
symmetric attitude to the relations between film and philosophy, and as such it stands 
for a more balanced way of making sense of both practices. 
The film-philosophy approach was fathered by Stanley Cavell84 and then 
modified through an innovative evolution in the recent independent writings of Stephen 
84 These claims are broadly developed in Cavell's many innovating writings, and in the many 
scholarly writings on Cavell. See: Cavell, S. (1971). The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean 
What We Say? New York, Cambridge University Press; Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: 
The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 31-33; 
Cavell, S. (1984). Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes. San Francisco, North point Press; 
Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press; Cavell, S. (2005). Knowledge and Transgression: It Happened One 
Night. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 253-259. 
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Mulhall.85 Cavell's film-philosophy is based on what he calls "the truth of 
skepticism."For Cavell, the truth of skepticism is "a place, perhaps the central secular 
place, in which the human wish to deny the condition of human existence, is 
expressed."86 The skeptical denial is most intensely played out through the cinematic 
drama.87 The drama of the skepticism is the high point and the full manifestation of "the 
world viewed," i.e., the world as it is created through our skeptical experience of it. The 
cinematic apparatus is, therefore, an intrinsically powerful producer of such 
experience.88 It enables us to intensively experience our contemplation of the world and 
of others. It makes us engage with our skeptical comprehension of the world, and 
philosophize our attunement with the world via our experience of it. It provides a 
"sense of reality" from which "we already sense a distance."89 In short, film is itself a 
85 For Mulhall's take on Cavell, see: Mulhall, S. (1994). Stanley Cavell, Philosophy's Recounting of 
the Ordinary. Oxford, Clarendon Press. For Mulhall own theory, see: Mulhall, S. (2002). On 
Film. London & New York, Routledge; Mulhall, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear You Scream: 
Acknowledging the Human Voice in the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays in Cinema 
After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 57-
71; Mulhall, S. (2006). The Impersonation of Personality: Film as Philosophy in Mission: Impossible. 
Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, 
Blackwell: 97-110. 
86 Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press: 5. See also: Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, 
Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy. Oxford, Clarendon Press: 37; Turvey, M. (2001). Is Scepticism 
a 'Natural Possibility' of Language?: Reasons to be Sceptical of Cavell's Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts. R. Allen and M. Turvey. London, Routledge: 118. 
87 Cavell emphatically pursues this matter inPursuits of Happiness(1981) as well as in Contesting 
Tears (1996). 
88 Cavell writes that it is "a succession of automatic world projections [given significance by] 
artistic discoveries of form and genre and type and technique". See: Cavell, S. (1979) The World 
Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press: 105. 
89 Ibid, 226. 
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philosophical experience, an experience which "emphasizes the synthetic activity that 
underlies all of human experience and cognition."90 
Following Cavell, Mulhall argues that the performed experience of our 
attunement to the world is the extended mode of attentiveness that is so uniquely 
distinctive of the philosophical ear.Philosophy aims to think seriously, systematically 
and insistently, about "issues concerning which no-one whose form of life is complex 
enough to be burdened with language can avoid thinking."91Moreover, "philosophy 
asks of us a certain kind of attentiveness to others - a willingness to remain awake to 
certain implications and unclarities and emptinesses of meaningful human speech and 
action with which other disciplines need have no concern."92Film, as an enacted 
contemplation of these thoughts and ideas, is thus itself an active manifestation of a 
philosophical quest. 
Echoing the generative nature of the cinematic meaning, and, similarly, the . 
dream-like skeptical nature of the reality constructed in the cinematic narrative, both 
Cavell and Mulhall point towards the sense of immanence which underlines the film-
philosophy hyphenation. Cavell concludes that "this is the sense, the only sense, in 
90Stoehr, K. L., Ed. (2002). Film and Knowledge: Essays on the Integration of Images and ideas. 
Jefferson, North Carolina & London, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers: 2. 
91Mulha11, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear You Scream: Acknowledging the Human Voice in 
the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays in Cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read 
andJ. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 57-71,69-70. 
92Jbid. 
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which what a work of art means cannot be said.Believing it is seeing it."93 Another way 
to capture this sense is by employing the term coined by W. T. Mitchell, who described 
this sense as embedding "a pictorial tum" in our world of perceptions.94Mitchell 
describes this turn as "the widely shared notion that visual images have replaced words 
as the dominant mode of expression in our time."95 The hegemony of the word, and its 
alleged superiority over the pictorial image, are replaced with a more congenial picture, 
which, at least, pays equal respect to both means of expression as being different, yet 
equally important, in contemplative processes. The film-philosophy title, as such, 
captures this exact thematic sentiment, as it corresponds with other phenomenological 
enterprises, most notably that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, concluding that "if philosophy 
is in harmony with the cinema, if thought and technical effort are heading in the same 
93 Cavell, S. (1969). Must We Mean What We Say? New York, Scribners: 85-86. 
94 Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). What do pictures want? the lives and loves of images. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press: 5. 
95Jbid. For Mitchell's view, see: Mitchell, W. J. T. (1980). The Language of images.Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press; Mitchell, W. J. T. (1981).0n narrative. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press; and especially: Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). What do pictures want? the lives and 
loves of images. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. For discussions of Mitchell's view, see: 
Sobchack, V. (2004). Carnal Thoughts, Embodiment and Moving Image Culture. Berkeley, Los 
Angeles & London, University of California Press: 142; Persson, P. (2003). Understanding 
Cinema, A Psychological Theory of Moving Imagery. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
268, 272, 274; Gaut, B. N. (2010). A philosophy of cinematic art. Cambridge; New York, 
Cambridge University Press: 18, 47-59; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy 
and the Moving Image. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: xiii, 186-189. 
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direction, it is because the philosopher and the moviemaker share a certain way of 
being, a certain view of the world which belongs to a generation."96 
An Appendix: The Typology of the Cinematic Philosophy Theses 
The three approaches examined in this chapter - namely, "philosophy of film," 
"film theory," and "film-philosophy" - provide a broad and innovative thematic 
background for our discussion of the CFP question. In the following chapters I aim to 
examine and evaluate the various attempts to give a satisfactory account to this 
question. However, before delving into a detailed discussion of these accounts a word is 
in order regarding the typology which guides their construction. 
The three types of approaches echo a similar fourfold classification by Thomas 
Wartenberg.In the recent New Takes in Film-Philosophy (Carel& Tuck, Eds.), Wartenberg 
eloquently introduces a fourfold division of the film-philosophy debate. He articulates 
four distinctive approaches to the debate, namely: the extreme anti-cinematic 
philosophy position (EACP); _the moderate anti-cinematic philos,ophy position (MACP); 
the moderate pro-cinematic philosophy position (MPCP); and the extreme pro-cinematic 
philosophy position (EPCP).97W artenberg characterizes the four approaches as follows: 
96Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964).The Film and the New Psychology. Sense and Nonsense, 
Northwestern University Press: 48-59,54,59. 
97Wartenberg, T. E. (2011). On the Possibility of Cinematic Philosophy. New Takes in Film-
Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 9-24. Wartenberg makes similar attempts in: Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). Film as 
philosophy. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. 
London & New York, Routledge: 549-559. 
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the EACP sets a strong claim against the philosophical role to film. Conversely, the 
EPCP vigorously promotes the plausibility of such a role. The MACP and the MPCP, 
respectively, are two more moderate approaches, each of which countenances a limited 
role of film in philosophy.9s 
In contrast to W artenberg' s classification, I suggest a different way to frame the 
debate of the CFP question. In my typology, there are three approaches that parse the 
field of "cinematic philosophy thesis" (CPT).99 They are: (1) an exclusivist approach (which 
basically denies any innovative contribution of film to philosophy, outside of a merely 
pedagogical or technical one); (2) an inclusivist approach (which acknowledges the value 
of film to philosophy, by way of specific philosophical procedures, such as thought 
experiments and counterexamples); and (3) an integralistapproach - or "film as 
philosophy"- which is the most radical approach (and as such, the toughest to support), 
which perceives film (in Mulhall's famous formulation) as "philosophy in action."100 
9BWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 2-3. Wartenberg comes in support of the MPCP - as will be shown in the next 
chapters- while convincingly arguing against both the EACP and the MACP. As for the EPCP, he 
makes the assertion that this approach, while appealing (and surely exciting), is nevertheless too 
extreme to be convincingly grounded. 
99Wartenberg, T. E. (2011). On the Possibility of Cinematic Philosophy. New Takes in Film-
Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 9. 
too A somewhat similar typology is handed by McClelland. See: McClelland, T. (2010). "What Is It 
Like To Be John Malkovich?: The Exploration Of Subjectivity In Being John Malkovich." 
Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 7(2): 10-25. 
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In addition to presenting the scope of the debate in a more telling manner than 
Wartenberg' s mode of classification, this threefold division more accurately reflects the 
thematic scope presented in this chapter.Whereas my "exclusivist" thesis seems to draw 
from Wartenberg'sextreme anti-cinematic philosophy position (EACP), I am reluctant to use 
this classification.On the surface, it looks as if both titles stand for a similar approach, 
namely, the understanding that film cannot' do philosophy in any innovative way, and, 
accordingly, that the relation between film and philosophy is barren and uninventive. 
However, it is my claim that, despite similarities, the exclusivist classification reflects a 
somewhat different set of preliminary dispositions than those reflected by the EACP. 
One such difference between the two titles focp.ses on the "anti-cinematic" 
character of the EACP.My objection is not a matter of mere semantics, since the negative 
tone of the anti-cinematic characterization misrepresents the tendency of the position 
elaborated in section one above.By calling representatives of this position "anti-
cinematic," W artenberg pinpoints what he believes to be the main idea underlying this 
position, namely, a negative stance towards film which in itself is an objection to the 
idea of film partaking m the works of philo~ophy.The emphasis here is on film- the 
medium, the phenomenon, and the art - and its inability to philosophize. However, at 
least for the representatives of this position reviewed in the opening section of this 
chapter, this sort of negative characterization misrepresents the main idea which 
underlines this philosophical position. I wish to argue that this position is not an 
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objection to the participation of film-qua-film (more than it is an objection to usage of 
other art forms, like literature and theatre) in the practice of philosophy- but is more an 
attempt to defend and uphold a narrow definition of philosophy as an exclusive 
practice, which is categorically different from any other artistic practice, film included. 
In short, I think that the importance of this position - which corresponds with other 
restricted definitions of philosophy, ancient and modem alike - lies with its attempt to 
guard the traditional definition of philosophy as an intellectual and conceptual 
discourse which, as such, does not share a domain with the artistic. 
Another problem with the EACP classification is rooted in the way it employs 
the "extreme/moderate" distinction. One important application of the 
"extreme/moderate" language, as I see it, is that it brings forward and emphasizes the 
backbone polarity between traditionalists/conservatives on the one side, and 
reformists/revisionists on the other. The same polarity is echoed in the language Paisley 
Livingston uses to stress his position (and reject other positions). Livingston, a 
predominant figure in the EACP view, uses the word "bold" (which replaces the word 
"extreme") to express the polarity between his own (probably "moderate" but possibly 
"congenial" or "realistic") approach and other, less congenial, more whimsy, 
approaches. In his critique of Livingston, Aaron Smuts employs and revises this 
terminology, adding "the super bold" thesis over the "bold" one. 
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This choice of words, in my mind, is somewhat puzzling. As I see it, it fails to 
include a clear criterion which categorically sets the "extreme/bold" and the "moderate" 
apart. In other words, it is not clear what makes the "bold" thesis bold, or what exactly 
earns the extreme positions their title. When I use this language I imagine a distinctive 
core definition/position of the topic at hand, which defines the proximity (and 
marginality) of any position in the field. However, this core position is missing, or at 
least the basis disagreement between the two positions is not articulated. 
I therefore argue that the threefold typology is better tuned to the underlying 
basis of the various positions taken in this debate. Its major strength, as will be pursued 
later on, lies in its ability to reflect accurately the shift in traditional aesthetics, and the 
"pictorial tum," depicted above.For this reason, the threefold typology underlies the line 
of inquiry pursued in what follows.! assess the three accounts of the CFP question as 
they unfold. 
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CHAPTER II: FILM AND PHILOSOPHY 
Having defined the basic scope of the CFP question, and the respective typology 
of accounts which aim to answer this question, I tum now to discuss the first of these 
accounts, namely, the exclusivist thesis. The following sections introduce and discuss the 
main premises of the exclusivist outlook.After establishing these premises, I explore the 
exclusivist argument, as it is constructed and pursued in the writings of its main 
proponents. I then demonstrate how the contextual background depicted in the previous 
chapter exposes the etiology of the exclusivist position. Finally, .I critically assess the 
exclusivist thesis, evaluating its strengths and weaknesses in the CFP debate, and 
conclude that the exclusivist position rests on a misguided conviction regarding the 
nature of film and the aesthetic prism by which its philosophical capacities should be 
examined. 
Exclusivism Unpacked: Premises and Initial Dispositions 
The predominant expression of the exclusivist thesis - advanced by, among 
others, Paisley Livingston, Murray Smith and Bruce Russelll01 - rests mainly on what its 
101 Livingston, P. (2003). "Nested Art."The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61: 233-246; 
Livingston, P. (2006).Cinematic Authorship. Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An 
Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 299-309; Livingston, P. (2006). "Theses 
on Cinema as Philosophy." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (1): 11-18; Livingston, 
P. (2008). "Recent Work on Cinema as Philosophy." Philosophy Compass 3 (4): 590-603; Allen, R. 
and M. Smith, Eds. (1997). Film Theory and Philosophy.Oxford, Oxford University Press; Smith, 
M. (1998)."Regarding film spectatorship: a reply to Richard Allen."The Journal of Aesthetics and 
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advocates take to be the three indispensable features of philosophy.The first such feature 
is the purely linguistic character of philosophy as a discipline. Its discourse is conducted 
verbally, whether written or oral. Secondly, philosophy is generally characterized by 
explicit argumentation. Whether formal or informal, rigorous or flexible in style, 
philosophy is chiefly characterized as the practice of raising sound and valid arguments 
and as an attempt to "give an account" that justifies a general claim, principle or 
proposition, in line of such arguments. Finally, philosophy is chiefly guided by the desire 
to attain truth. In order to achieve this end, the philosophical practice is characterized as 
aiming for rational conviction and thoughtful contemplation.Echoing the apt structure 
formulated by Plato in the allegory of the cave, philosophy on this view strives to free its 
Art Criticism 56: 63-65; Smith, M. (2005).Engaging Characters.The Philosophy of Film, 
Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 160-
169; Smith, M. (2006). "Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 64(1): 33-42; Smith, M. and T. E. Wartenberg, Eds. (2006). Thinking through cinema: 
film as philosophy. Malden, MA, Blackwell Pub; Russell, B. (2000)."The Philosophical Limits of 
Film." Film and Philosophy (Special Issue on Woody Allen): 163-167; Russell, B. (2008). "Film's 
Limits: The Sequel." Film and Philosophy 12 (General Interest Edition): 1-16; Russell, B. (2008). 
"Replies to Carroll and Wartenberg." Film and Philosophy 12 (General Interest Edition): 35-40; 
Russell, B. (2010). "Limits to Thinking on Screen." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest 
Edition): 109-116; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Film as Philosophy: A Mission Impossible? European Film 
Theory. T. Trifonova. New York & London, Routledge: 65-79. See also: Pamerleau, W. (2009). Can 
Film Philosophize? Existentialist Cinema. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 37-43; Pamerleau, W. 
(2009). "Film as a Non-Philosophical Resource for Philosophy Instruction." Film and Philosophy 
13 (Special Interest Edition: Teaching Philosophy Through Film): 87-98; Knight, D. (2004). 
"Philosophy of Film, or Philosophies of Films?" Film and Philosophy 8: 146-153; Knight, D. (2011). 
The Third Man: Ethics, Aesthetics, Irony. Ethics at the Cinema.W. E. Jones and S. Vice. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 285-299; Knight, D. and G. McKnight (2002). "Whose Genre Is It, 
Anyway? Thomas Wartenberg on the Unlikely Couple Film." Journal of Social Philosophy 33(2): 
330-338. 
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pursuer from the shackles of ignorance and misconceptions, and lead the way into the 
light of reason and justified true beliefs that rest outside this metaphorical cave. 
From the outset, it appears that film, at least according to the way we defined it 
in the previous chapter, fails to accommodate these features. Film fails to accommodate 
the first feature, since it is essentially a visual medium, and, as such, is fundamentally 
different from the linguistic medium in which philosophy is exclusively understood (on 
this view) to be practiced. Secondly, as to the matter of explicit arguments, it seems that 
film, primarily perceived as an artistic phenomenon, is chiefly characterized in terms of 
its affinity to narratives and stories.102 Since narrative is an essentially different form of 
expression (in both structure and content) from that of an argument (formal or 
informal), it is hard to imagine films constructing arguments, other than the very 
specific arena of a filmed philosophy lecture, in which case it is the lecture, and not the 
film as such, which raises arguments.l03 Finally, since narrative cannot propose explicit 
102 As stressed in the introductory chapter, the discussion henceforth will focus on fiction films, 
leaving out the specifically non-narrative types of cinematic expression, namely, documentary 
and experimental film. As I will argue here, the predominance of narrative will serve as one of 
the strongest bases for the exclusivist position. In turn, it will serve my critique of that very 
position, as I will argue that the exclusivist fails to acknowledge the essential disparity between 
narrativity (as ~ defining characteristic of fiction films) and the embodiment of narrative in 
language (which is not necessarily an innate feature of narrative). 
103 See: Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 
381; Yanal, R. J. (2005). Hitchcock as Philosopher. Jefferson, North Carolina & London, McFarland 
& Company, Inc., Publishers: 4; Russell, B. (2008). "Film's Limits: The Sequel." Film and 
Philosophy 12(General Interest Edition): 1-16, 6, 12; Wartenberg, T. E. (2008). "What Else Films 
Can Do: A Response to Bruce Russell." Film and Philosophy 12(General Interest Edition): 27-34, 
27-28; Wartenberg, T. E. (2006). "Film as Argument." Film ?tudies: An International Journal 8: 
126-137. 
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arguments, it cannot establish the sorts of general truths at which philosophy aims. The 
particularity of film narrative stands in odds with the tendency of philosophy to operate 
at a general and an abstract level. Moreover, this goal of philosophy is, at times, 
fundamentally different from the agenda guiding film production, namely, the desire to 
engage (and entertain) an audience. Since we cannot simply overlook the initial artistic 
(and some would say: commercial) motivation of the filmmaker, one is liable to 
determine that film does not meet the standard set by the aims of the philosophical 
practice.104 
Resting on these premises regarding the nature of film and philosophy 
respectively, one engages in one or the other but not both.In other words, the "or" is 
thoroughly disjunctive, this being the ground of the exclusion intrinsic to the exclusivist 
position.The exclusivist argument maintains that film- and, for that matter, any other 
artistically-inclined practice which falls short in complying with these features of 
philosophy - cannot be claimed to be doing philosophy in any meaningful or resourceful 
way.105 In other words, the exclusivists proclaim that film can never be construed as a 
104 For an elaborated discussion of this picture, see: Wartenberg, T. E. (2006). Beyond Mere 
illustration: How Films Can Be Philosophy. :rhinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. 
Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 19-32. Also: Smith, M. and T. E. Wartenberg 
(2006). Introduction. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. 
Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 1-9,3. 
1oswith this I refer to Wartenberg's typology, discussed at the end of the previous chapter. 
Wartenberg refers to this approach as "anti-cinematic."Here, I argue that it is not anti-cinematic 
more than it is anti-artistic, or, better yet, anti-narrative (in its various forms). This, as we'll later 
learn, is crucial to understand the essential critique of the exclusivist position, namely, their 
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core element of philosophy, due to its fundamental differences from the goals and ways 
of philosophy. This exclusivist proposition stems from an essentialist picture of the 
indispensable features that constitute philosophy as such. Contrasting this picture with a 
similarly essentialist picture of film viewing and filmmaking, the exclusivists conclude 
that the latter practice, being essentially different from the first, cannot be claimed to be 
a significant part of the first. 
This line of exclusivist inquiry is faced with an additional need to examine the 
two practices. Namely, in order to sustain the conclusion that film cannot 'do' 
philosophy, it is vital to clarify the conditions which sustain the possibility of such a 
practice, namely, philosophizing. The mere definition of the two practices as being 
fundamentally different will not do. We have to come up with a better understanding of 
the activity involved, namely, philosophizing. Consider the following example: a hammer is 
essentially different from a screwdriver. The first is used to nail (and is defined in 
a·ccordance with this feature); the latter is used to screw (and is accordingly defined). If 
one is to raise the question "Can a screwdriver nail?" one could not be satisfied with 
merely pointing out that the two household appliances in question are different from 
each other. One can easily imagine one instrument being used for the other's purpose (if 
not always vice versa). It is therefore imperative to clarify the initial question, and to 
unjustified focus on narrativity (as the supposedly main feature of film) and their related 
presuppositions, namely: (1) the innate inexplicitness of narrative in the course of philosophy; (2) 
the one-dimensionality of narrative as exclusively lingual. 
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stress that by asking if a screwdriver can nail, we actually strive not merely for a clear 
picture of the instruments (screwdriver/hammer), but also for a similarly clear picture of 
the activity in question (nailing). Following this example, if we return to our original 
topic, it becomes evident that the exclusivist conclusion cannot rest solely on the claim 
that film is essentially different from philosophy. It has also to show that philosophizing 
is an activity which is essentially different from viewing or making films. 
This clarification amounts to an additional condition underlying the exclusivist 
conclusion. In line of the essentialist view of both film and philosophy, and following 
our renewed attention to the activity of philosophizing, it is argued that if film is to be 
considered as actually "doing" philosophy, its contribution to the overall body of 
philosophical knowledge has to be independent and unique. That is to say, if film is to be 
taken as "doing" philosophy (philosophizing,) film has to be doing so in a uniquely 
cinematic way. In other words, if film is not said to be "doing" philosophy in a uniquely 
cinematic and independent way - it would be wrong to claim that it is "film per-se" (or 
"film-qua-film") that performs the action.106 Going back to the screwdriver example, if 
106 See: Wartenberg, T. E. (2008). "What Else Films Can Do: A Response to Bruce Russell." Film 
and Philosophy 12 (General Interest Edition): 27-34, 27-28; Livingston, P. (2008). "Recent Work on 
Cinema as Philosophy." Philosophy Compass 3 (4): 590-603, 599; Carroll, N. (1988). Philosophical 
Problems of Classical Film Theory. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 121; Carroll, N. 
(1996). Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 87, 221, 259, 275. 
Stoehr, K. L. (2011). "By Cinematic Means Alone": The Russell-Wartenberg-Carroll Debate." Film 
and Philosophy 15 (General Interest Edition): 111-126, 115; Huston, M. (2009). "The Conversation, 
Film, and Philosophy." Film and Philosophy 13 (Special Interest Edition: Teaching Philosophy 
Through Film): 77-86, 77-80; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the 
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we argue that a screwdriver can "nail" while "posing as a hammer" it would not be due 
to its essential features (the features which essentially define it as "a screwdriver") but 
due to its more general (and hence trivial, accidental, and inessential) features, which 
allow it to function (in certain circumstances, to a certain extent) "as" a hammer. In other 
words, "for the claim that films can be philosophy to be in any way significant, the 
philosophy contained in the film must somehow be presented in a way that depends on 
some feature of film as an artistic medium."107 Only as such can the contribution be 
characterized as being purely and uniquely cinematic. 
One salient variation of this condition, regarding the cinematic capacity to 
philosophize, points towards the idea of innovation. If, according to the exclusivist 
understanding of this term, film is to philosophize then film's philosophizing must be 
somehow innovative. That is, for the exclusivist, if film is to philosophize, it must do so in 
a way that reflects the essential nature of the cinematic contribution to philosophical 
practice. In other words, an essential contribution of film to the corpus of philosophical 
deliberation, if it is to be uniquely cinematic and independent (as was previously stated,) 
must also be innovative, at least in the sense that it could not have been made by any 
Moving Image. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 150; Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, 
Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 110. 
1o7 Smith, M. and T. E. Wartenberg (2006). Introduction. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 1-9,3. [emphasis mine] 
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other field or art form.108 According to the exclusivists, if film is indeed capable of 
philosophizing, independently and in a unique way which reflects its essential nature, 
this activity should comply with the need to "say something new," namely, something 
which is new either because it was never said before, or is new because it cannot be said 
in means other than cinematic ones. The contribution of film to philosophy, if it is to 
comply with the essentialist picture of philosophy and, accordingly, the similarly rigid 
picture of what counts as "philosophizing," has therefore to be innovative in one of 
these two senses (preferably the latter one).109 Otherwise, if not innovative, any 
cinematic contribution to philosophy will be inessential to philosophy, if only because it 
can be produced by other non-cinematic means. 
Surely enough, the exclusivist account, primarily rejecting the idea of film being 
able to philosophize, shows that film fails to meet these additional conditions. First, it is 
claimed that film cannot philosophize in a uniquely cinematic and independent way, for 
the same essential reasons that stem from the picture of philosophy depicted above. For, 
given that film is a visual practice, if one additionally holds that philosophy is a 
linguistic practice, it is clearly not possible to philosophize in a uniquely cinematic way. 
1°8 See: Livingston, P. (2009). Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman, On Film as Philosophy. Oxford & 
New York, Oxford University Press: 20 (the demand that in order to be considered as doing 
philosophy, film has to be shown to "make historically innovative and independent contributions 
to philosophy by means exclusive to the cinematic medium or art form.") 
109 Livingston, P. (2009). Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman, On Film as Philosophy. Oxford & New 
York, Oxford University Press: 34: "'what must be found is a case where a film-maker uses 
cinematic devices alone successfully to formulate and express an innovative and sophisticated 
philosophical line of thought or argument." 
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Thus, through this theoretical lens, film cannot philosophize, since to "philosophize" 
means to engage in an activity that is essentially linguistic, and neither the making nor 
the watching of cinema is essentially linguistic, though film does involve linguistic 
capacities (most notably the text of the script that subtends a fiction film and of the 
occasional titles which can be found .in most fiction films). Since, on this view, film 
cannot philosophize by uniquely cinematic means, it goes without saying that any 
cinematic attempt to make some contribution to philosophy will also fail to meet the 
norms of independence and innovation. 
To sum up, the exclusivist thesis amounts to an adamant rejection of the idea that 
film can philosophize in any significant way. Resting on a clear, if strict, picture of 
philosophy (primarily as linguisticpractice, manifested in explicit argumentation and 
striving for general truths) and on a similarly clear picture of philosophical activity (as 
requiring independence and innovation in order to be considered as uniquely 
philosophical), the exclusivist thesis asserts that there is no meaningful way in which 
film can philosophize, and, to a certain extent, goes as far as to reject the initial premise 
of the CFP question.110 Its intentions, as reflected, for instance, in Livingston's choice of 
no See: Livingston, P. (2006). "Theses on Cinema as Philosophy." The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 64 (1): 11-18; Livingston, P. (2009). Narrativity and Knowledge.The Poetics, 
Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Narrative. N. Carroll. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 25-36; 
Livingston, P. (2010). "Teaching & Learning Guide for: Cinema as Philosophy." Philosophy 
Compass 5 (4): 359-362; Russell, B. (2000). "The Philosophical Limits of Film." Film and 
Philosophy (Special Issue on Woody Allen): 163-167; Russell, B. (2008). "Film's Limits: The 
Sequel." Film and Philosophy 12 (General Interest Edition): 1-16; Russell, B. (2008). "Replies to 
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words, are to create a thematic barricade against any "bold thesis," by which he means 
an argument that would aim not merely to take the CFP question seriously, but to 
answer it affirmatively. 
To be sure, by arguing that film cannot philosophize in an essential sense, the 
exclusivist leaves open the possibility that film can nevertheless otherwise participate in 
philosophy, namely, in a non-essential sense. This latter possibility requires clarification. 
What might the exclusivists have in mind when they acknowledge the possibility of a 
trivial and non-essential participation of film in philosophy? To answer this question, 
one can first take the line of viewing film along its technical features as a mere recorder 
of moving images. From this technical point of view, film is "essentially a recording 
medium,"111 an apparatus consisting of the capacity to copy and record moving images. 
Whether in its classical form, as a celluloid-based photo-chemical strip of still pictures, 
or in the new form of digitally imprinted computerized images (CGI), the main capacity 
of film resides within the ability to capture and record an activity set in front of a 
camera.112 Once this activity is philosophical in nature (and here we can imagine various 
activities which can qualify this condition: a philosophy lecture, a philosophical text 
Carroll and Wartenberg." Film and Philosophy 12 (General Interest Edition): 35-40; Russell, B. 
(2010). "Limits to Thinking on Screen." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest Edition): 109-
116. 
m Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 11. 
112Gaut, B. N. (2010). A philosophy of cinematic art. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: 19-20, 138-140. See also: Tetreault, Y. (2008). "Mechanical Recording in 
Amheim'sFilm As Art." Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 5 (1): 16-26. 
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being screened, a conversation between philosophers which includes philosophical 
arguments and issues, etc.) - then filming this activity can be construed as a sort of 
cinematic participation in the works of philosophy. For those who hold that 
"photography, moving or otherwise, is essentially a process of exact recording,"113 it is 
fair to suggest that film, while not producing an original philosophical knowledge, can 
nevertheless fulfill the task of "downloading the argument onto the soundtrack,"114 
satisfying its participation in philosophy in the "mere recording of talking heads."115 
Livingston makes a second suggestion of an inessential cinematic contribution to 
philosophy, referring to the extremely suggestive way that film can illustrate a pre-
conceived philosophical idea, or the way that it can provoke a philosophical discussion. 
As Livingston writes, "films can provide vivid and emotionally engaging illustrations of 
philosophical issues, and when sufficient background knowledge is in place, reflections 
about films can contribute to the exploration of specific theses and arguments, 
sometimes yielding enhanced philosophical understanding."116 Along these lines, film 
113 Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 9. 
114 Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 381. 
115 Carroll, N. (2006). Philosophizing Through the Moving Image: The Case of Serene 
Velocity.Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, 
MA, Blackwell: 173-185, 174, 180; Wartenberg, T. E. (2003). "Philosophy Screened: Viewing The 
Matrix." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27: 139-152, note 15; and, Wartenberg, T. E. (2005). 
Philosophy Screened: Experiencing The Matrix. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and 
readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 270-283. 
116 Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and· T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-18, 12. Livingston also 
says that lllustrating philosophy is "the single most valuable contribution the cinema can make to 
philosophy." (p. 17). 
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can be used as a pedagogical instrument in philosophical classrooms, as a way to visualize 
(and increase accessibility of) philosophical topics.This perspective rests on a perception 
of film as a narrative-based composition with a vivid depiction of detailed plotlines.We shall 
have reason to question this perception later, but from the perspective resting on it, film 
is seen as possessing the capacity to "raise philosophical issues" by, for example, putting 
a concrete face on an otherwise abstract philosophical argument.117 As Wartenberg 
describes it, "films provide philosophy with an empirical content that shows why 
philosophy is more than the mock combats Kant claimed many saw in traditional 
philosophical debates."ns 
This cinematic capacity, while suggestive and helpful to philosophers, is 
nonetheless non-essential and merely subsidiary to actual philosophizing. And this for 
117Wartenberg defines "philosophical issues" as those certain basic questions that philosophy has 
traditionally attempted to answer. Acording to this definition, any intellectual domain that faces 
issues about its own possibility thereby becomes philosophical. 
118Wartenberg_ T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 9. Here, Wartenberg demonstrates this claim by posing an insightful analysis of 
several films. For instance, Ridley Scott's Blade Runner (1982) is analyzed as an illustration of an 
argument against the concept of identity, Woody Allen's Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989) as a 
concretization of deontological ethics and its downfall, the Wachowski brothers' the Matrix (1999) 
as a useful explanation of Descartes' cogito argument, and Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times (1936) 
as an illustration of "Marx's conception of the ills of a capitalist society'' (p. 53.) Commenting on 
this type of analysis, Dan Shaw adds: "What I take W artenberg to be saying here is that we have 
a deeper and more detailed understanding of the notion of how machines turn men into 
machines after having seen the film, and hence that Modern Times deserves to be recognized as 
philosophically Significant." (Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. 
London & New York, Wallflower Press: 106.) As will be apparent in the next chapter, both 
Wartenberg and Shaw find these analyses to be more than mere subsidiary illustrations of 
preconceived philosophical positions. However, for now, the cinematic capacity to illustrate 
philosophical content is sufficiently proved. 
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two reasons: first, th~ cinematic illustration hangs on a preconceived (and pre-
formulated) argument and, therefore, fails to make a genuine contribution to philosophy. 
Second, any such cinematic contribution will fail to be, at least in respect to the narrative 
which embeds the aforementioned illustration, "cinematically unique." A screened 
narrative is undoubtedly unique in a trivial sense, since no medium can screen 
narratives, other than the medium that screens narratives and that happens to be 
film.Yet a screened narrative fails to be unique when it comes to the service its narrative 
aims to provide, namely, illustrating a philosophical argument (and, by that, partaking 
in the activity of philosophizing.)119 For the purposes of this service, there is no essential 
difference what form the narrative takes, be it literary, theatrical or cinematic, or some 
other. Following the exclusive line of argument, then, it is simply wrongheaded to 
attribute any innovative and unique stance to the cinematic participation in the 
philosophical practice (as suggestive and engaging as it might be.) 
On balance and in conclusion, the exclusivist thesis maintains that film is capable 
of illustrating and illuminating a philosophical thesis or idea. However, as merely a 
pedagogical crutch that does not, by itself, change the nature of the philosophy being 
done, film can participate in philosophy only in a marginal and non-essential way.l2° As 
119 Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4 Fall): 409-420, 409-411. 
12o The pedagogical value of films, for philosophy as well as for other disciplines, is rarely 
contested. See discussions such as the 2009 special interest edition of "Film and Philosophy'' (Vol. 
13, ed. Daniel Shaw) which is devoted to teaching philosophy through film, as well as the 
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such, film can be taken as no more than "a spoonful of sugar" which helps the 
"philosophical" medicine to go down (as William Irwin puts it).121 
Exclusivism Unraveled: Problems and Further Objections 
Having seen the exclusivist thesis thus unfold, we turn to a more in-depth 
scrutiny of it.This scrutiny hinges on six problems and objections that exclusivists raise 
in order to justify their exclusive understanding of both philosophy and film and of 
philosophizing and the viewing and making of films. These problems -presented in the 
writings of Livingston, Wartenberg, Smith and Smuts, among others - are separately 
tagged as follows: the generality objection, the explicitness objection, the agency problem, the 
problem of paraphrase, the banality objection and the imposition objection. While distinct, there 
is a dialectical character, moving from the first to the final objection.While these 
problems and objections are meant to support the exclusivist viewpoint, I aim to show 
following readers: Litch, M. (2002). Philosophy Through Film. New York & London, Routledge 
and Falzon, C. (2002). Philosophy Goes to the Movies: An Introduction to Philosophy. London & 
New York, Routledge. 
The idea that filmcan be regarded as a valuable pedagogical tool is therefore uncontested. As 
Wartenberg surmises, ""the teaching of film has burgeoned in academia" (Wartenberg, T. E. 
(2004). "Looking Backward: Philosophy and Film Reconsidered." Film and Philosophy 8(Special 
Interest Edition: Ethical and Existential Themes in Cinema): 138-141, 138).However, a more 
attuned discussion of this capacity, cannot overlook the following questions: (1) the question of 
film specificity -namely, what is it in film that by definition makes it more valuable, as valuable, 
or merely valuable, for pedagogy; and, following that, (2) does this value exceeds the 
interventional role and actually changes the nature of the subject of intervention? It is this line of 
questioning which undermines the exclusivist position here. 
121Irwin, W. "Fancy taking a pop?" The Philosopher's Magazine (49): 48-54; Also: Irwin, W. (2007). 
Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture.Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture. W. 
Irwin and J. J. E. Garcia. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman& Littlefield Publishers: 41-64. 
77 
that they also reveal the exclusivist' s self-defeating suppositions. This demonstration 
raises in tum two thematic problems for the exclusivists. The first problem concerns the 
way in which their understanding of narrative mistakenly gives rise to a number of their 
objections, and the second problem arises from the corresponding way in which a faulty 
understanding of the technical aspects of film viewing and making gives rise to others. 
A central rationale for this examination of the six principal objections raised in 
defense of the exclusivist position is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
exclusivist's premises and arguments.The examination also importantly provides the 
basis for the defense of my central contention in response to this position, presented in 
the concluding sections of this chapter.Whereas those who argue for the exclusivist 
thesis assert that these objections lead them to answer the CFP question as they do, I 
content that their answer, along with the objections, owes more to their conviction that 
film cannot be seriously claimed to be doing philosophy, and that if film does exhibit 
philosophical tendencies, it will merely do so in a marginal, and hence in a non-essential 
sense. The relevant difference, as we shall see in the concluding section of this chapter, is 
that it is precisely because the exclusivist thesis is a presupposition and not a conclusion 
of their critiques that they answer the question about the potency of film to philosophize 
in the way they do. If this analysis is correct, then the present argument can displace the 
force of the exclusivist claim without denying the partial truth of objections raised, in a 
certain light. That is to say, it is not my task here to dispute with those who take the 
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exclusivist line whether or not the problems they identify are or are not present ill 
film.Instead I aim to demonstrate simply that these phenomena have salience for the 
CFP question only if one has already presupposed that philosophizing means something 
that is either contrary to these problems, or at least essentially other than them. This 
demonstration suffices to draw the conclusion, in the final section of this chapter, that 
the exclusivist thesis cannot meet its own demand to essentially dissociate philosophy 
and film. 
In examining these problems and objections through the exclusivist "lens" (so to 
speak) we begin with the generality objection. Briefly put, the generality objection states 
that films are inherently particular while philosophy is inherently general. In other 
words, the narrative structure of fiction films "stands at odds with the [presupposed] 
generality of philosophical argumentation." Accordingly, film is unable to "establish the 
sorts of general truths that philosophers take to be the goal of their enterprise."122 Since, 
"philosophy can be characterized as involving a rejection of narrative ill favor of an 
alternative style of explanation," we end up with the conclusion, according to which 
"fiction films appear to be the wrong type of entity to embody philosophic reflection."123 
122Wartenberg, T. E. (2006). Beyond Mere Illustration: How Films Can Be Philosophy. Thinking 
Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
19-20; a.: Russell, B. (2006). The Philosophical Limits of Film. Philosophy of Film and Motion 
Picture: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 387-390. 
123Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 21; See also: p. 77; Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. 
London & New York, Wallflower Press: 110. 
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A second objection, which follows the generality objection and enforces the same 
critical line of inquiry, is the explicitness objection. According to this objection, film can 
never be said to be "explicitly" about something (philosophical or otherwise,) in the 
same manner that a philosophical text can be said to be explicit about the arguments it 
raises. In other words, although "film might be 'about something"' it nevertheless "lacks 
the means for articulating the conceptual structures necessary to embody" a 
philosophical argument.124According to Bruce Russell, film lacks this level of 
explicitness, namely, the determinate nature of such propositional content as is allegedly 
necessary for the task of philosophizing. Hence, film cannot be said to be "doing 
philosophy," since philosophical arguments require, by nature, a level of precision and 
determinacy in order to sustain.125 Resting on film's "natural" affinity for ambiguity, as it 
presents narrative-based scenarios instead of explicit arguments, this objection asserts 
that film cannotreach the level of precision required by philosophy.126 
124Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 8. 
125 For Russell's view, see: Russell, B. (2000). "The Philosophical Limits of Film." Film and 
Philosophy(Special Issue on Woody Allen): 163-167; Russell, B. (2008). "Film's Limits: The 
Sequel." Film and Philosophy 12(General Interest Edition): 1-16; Russell, B. (2010). "Limits to 
Thinking on Screen." Film and Philosophy 14(General Interest Edition): 109-116. 
126 Adding to this, Smith reminds us that despite often carrying a "message,""morals," or 
"lessons," film narrative cannot carry a clear and explicit argument. He alludes to Andre Bazin, 
who uses the idea of "implied thesis" to depict the relationship between film narrative and the 
philosophical argument or thesis. Film can only imply the philosophical content or refer to it in 
an inexplicit way; however, it cannot, by virtue of its nature, be explicit about it. (Smith, M. 
(2006). "Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64(1): 
33-42, 34. See also: Smith, M. (1998). "Regarding film spectatorship: a reply to Richard Allen." 
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Considered together, the generality and explicitness objections reflect a certain 
negative attitude towards the CFP question. This negative attitude insists, first and 
foremost, that film is a medium of expression that dwells in ambiguity, either because its 
content is too specific or because its narrative-based goals are imprecise. The inherent 
ambiguity of film is set in relief by William Pamerleau, who relies on Murray Smith's 
observation, according to which "[f]ew criticisms are more apt to strike terror into the 
heart of the philosopher than the assertion that such-and-such a proposition is 
'ambiguous,' while in the world of art, that term is more apt to be used as a term of 
praise."127 Stressing the importance of this observation, Smith adds (while paraphrasing 
Sam Goldwyn's famous dictum): "pictures are for entertainment- if I wanted to make a 
philosophical point, I'd publish an essay in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society."128 
A third consideration is raised in the form of the problem of agency. The mere idea 
of a philosophy as an activity presupposes an actor who performs it. Namely, if 
something is claimed to "be done," there has to be someone who can be claimed to be 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56: 63-65, where Smith makes similar points on 
cinematic spectatorship in reply to Richard Allen's critique on this matter.) 
127pamerleau, W. (2009).Existentialist Cinema. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 40. See also: 
Pamerleau, W. (2009). "Film as a Non-Philosophical Resource for Philosophy Instruction." Film 
and Philosophy 13 (Special Interest Edition: Teaching Philosophy Through Film): 87-98, 91; the 
original quote can be found in: Smith, M. (2006). Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity. Thinking 
Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
33-42, 40; also recited in: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. 
London & New York, Routledge: 17. 
12ssmith, M. (2006)."Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 64 (1): 33-42, 39; restated in: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as 
Philosophy. London & New York, Routledge: 16; also quoted in: Yanal, R. J. (2005). Hitchcock as 
Philosopher. Jefferson, North Carolina & London, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers: 10. 
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doing the deed. Moreover, and in order to qualify as really "doing" this something, the 
"doer" has to be doing it intentionally.By the same token, the linguistic usage of the verb 
"doing'' requires the usage of a noun or pronoun to which the verb - the activity -
refers.129 Consequently, when supposed as "doing ·philosophy," film is presupposed as 
being capable of "doing" things altogether, namely, as being able to operate and 
intentionally initiate the performing of "deeds."I3o 
Accordingly, the exclusivists find the assumption that film can "do" philosophy 
(or "do" any other thing for that matter) to be highly contestable. Film is an artifact, a 
129 This being the corollary of Nietzsche's famous dictum that the doer is a construct required in a 
juridical or normative framework, identified with the agency of the deed itself. In Excitable Speech, 
Judith Butler succinctly explicates this notion of subjectivity and agency, emphasizing that 
Nietzsche's claim is not so much about the identification of the doer and the deed, but of the deed 
and the doing. This "phenomenological" character of the deed itself (as event), prior even to its 
identification with the agent responsible for the deed, will be of great importance in the 
forthcoming chapters. See: butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech: a politics of the perforrnative. New 
York, Routledge: 45-46. 
13° Stressing the intentionality aspect of the claim, Gaut notes that for an image to express a 
thought about a subject it must stand in an intentional relation to that subject, since intentionality 
is the general mark of thought. In contrast, if an image stands in a merely causal relation to its 
subject, it cannot express thoughts about it. Paintings, therefore, stand in an intentional relation 
to their subjects and thus are representations; photographs stand in a causal relation to their 
subjects and thus are not representations, but mere simulacra. See: Gaut, B. (2010). A Philosophy 
of Cinematic Art. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 24. The extent of this discussion goes 
beyond the scope of this project, and is spread in a conclusive debate regarding intentionality, 
representation and the nature of art. See: Scruton, R. (1983). Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen. 
The Aesthetic Understanding. London, Methuen; Scruton, R. (1983). Photography and 
Representation. The Aesthetic Understanding. London, Methuen; Scruton, R. (1990). The 
Photographic Surrogate. The Philosopher on Dover Beach. Manchester, UK, Carcanet; Davies, D. 
(2008). How Photographs "Signify": Cartier-Bresson's "Reply" to Scruton. Photography and 
Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature. S. Walden. Malden, MA, Blackwell; King, W. L. 
(1992). "Scruton and Reasons for Looking at Photographs." British Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 32: 258-265; Lopes, D. M. (2003). "The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency." Mind 
112: 433-448; Wicks, R. (1989). "Photography as a Representational Art." The British Journal of 
Aesthetics 29: 1-9. 
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performed (screened) object, and hence has no cognitive or intentional capacities. 
Treating film as an "agent" (who can intentionally initiate the "doing" of various deeds) 
would therefore be a miscasting of attributes. H philosophizing is to be included within 
filmmaking or film viewing, the exclusivist position demands, it has to occur in the 
minds of the filmmaker and/or the spectator, respectively.131 It is the spectator/filmmaker 
and not the film per-se who philosophizes. The film might be designed as a triggering 
device for these agents to engage in the practice of philosophizing. However, the film 
itself, being a mute artificial object, cannot be claimed to be doing so. Following that, the 
exclusivists maintain that the CFP question is wrongly formulated, attributing agency 
where there can be none. 
Paisley Livingston introduces a parallel but arguably even more stringent 
contention in the form of the problem of paraphrase. The problem of paraphrase, which 
rests on the explicitness objection, asserts that film has to be able to formulate - namely, 
paraphrase - its claims in an explicit way, in order for these claims to qualify as 
philosophical. In order to make a valid contribution to philosophy, film is required to be 
able to paraphrase its content in a way which forms an adequate and general 
philosophical argument. However, since film is, at best, merely a "visually mediated 
mwartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 12. See also: Livingston, P. and C. Plantinga, Eds. (2009). The Routledge Companion 
to Philosophy and Film. London & New York, Routledge; Rothman, W. (2004). The "I" of the 
Camera, Essays in Film Criticism, History, and Aesthetics. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 9, 22, 62. 
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recollection of some previously known philosophical thought,"132 it cannot be argued 
that film thereby fulfills the task of doing philosophy in an "independent, innovative 
and exclusively cinematic manner,"133 which is to say, "through means that are exclusive 
to cinema."134 In order to fulfill these tasks, film has to abandon the initial (linguistic) 
means by which philosophical thought is formulated. In so doing, though, the medium 
lacks the ability to phrase the philosophical thought altogether.135 
This conundrum is best explicated by Aaron Smuts. In his attempt to explain 
Livingston's predicament, Smuts acknowledges the redundancy envisioned by this 
problem, when he points out that "if we claim that a film makes a philosophical 
contribution, then we ought to be able to state what the contribution is."136 Accordingly, 
"if we cannot say what the philosophical work amounts to, then we have no reason to 
think that any philosophical contribution was made. However, if we can say what the 
philosophical contribution of a film is, then we need reason to think that the 
132 Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-18, 15. 
133 Livingston, P. (2008). "Recent Work on Cinema as Philosophy." Philosophy Compass 3 (4): 
590--603, 590. 
134 Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4Fall): 409-420,409. 
135 In other words, the problem of paraphrase is facing the proponent of what might be called 
"the strong thesis" with a dilemma: (a) Either the film's philosophical insight can be 
paraphrased, or (b) it cannot be. If (a), then the paraphrase suffices and the film is not making a . 
"unique" contribution to philosophy; if (b), then the film is not making a contribution to 
philosophy which is a practice that essentially involves language or concepts. 
136 Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4 Fall): 409-420, 411; see also: Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as 
Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-18, 12. 
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contribution is not wholly dependent on the linguistic medium."137 One who accepts the 
way the exclusivist view defines the activity of philosophizing and who would answer 
the CFP question affirmatively, then, faces a double bind: either a cinematic idea can be 
paraphrased as knowledge (and thus is not purely "cinematic" in the unique sense 
which follows the specificity of film as such) or the cinematic idea cannot be 
paraphrased (in which case there is no such idea, and does not prevail as 
comprehensible knowledge).138 A cinematic argument, both sufficiently explicit and 
sufficiently unique, is therefore impossible, since a philosophical argument that is an 
"internally articulated, nonlinguistic, visual expression of content" is irnpossible.l39 
With the foregoing review of this position, the first exclusivist argument, namely, 
that film cannot philosophize in ways which are essential to the definition of the practice 
is concluded. We tum now to the second exclusivist argument, namely, the idea that if 
there is to be philosophic content in film, or something cinematic content in philosophy, 
137 Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4 Fall): 409-420,409-411. 
138 As Daniel Shaw puts it: "The problem with this thesis, in Livingston's view, is that it raises an 
insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, if a philosophical insight embodied in a film cannot be 
paraphrased, then we may very well doubt whether it exists (what is it, if it cannot be said?). If it 
can be restated in rational terms, then how can there be anything specific to the cinematic 
medium in the content that is communicated?" (Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking 
Movies Seriously. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 110). See also: Livingston, P. (1992). 
Literature and Knowledge. A Companion to Epistemology. J. Dancy and E. Sosa. Oxford, 
Blackwell: 255-258; Gaut, B. (2003). Art and Knowledge. The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. J. 
Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 436-450; Carroll, N. (1995). Towards an Ontology of 
the Moving Image. Philosophy and Film. C. A. Freeland and T. E. Wartenberg. New York & 
London, Routledge: 68-85. 
139 Livingston, P. (2006). Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 11-18,12. 
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such content is either not uniquely cinematic, or inessential to the practice of philosophy, 
and thus not "philosophical" in the full sense of the term. 
The first of two objections supporting this latter claim, asserted first by Jerome 
Stolnitz, is the banality objection, which differs from the previous ones as it concedes that 
films can have philosophical content.140However, it asserts that any philosophical 
content films might have is trivial or banal, for the mere reason that films appeal to a 
wide audience, and are therefore designed to explore "nothing more complex than an 
easily understood philosophical message," which, as such, appears as trivial and banal 
to the sophisticated eye.141 Though admitting to the possibility of philosophically-
inclined content, or "philosophical language," embedded in film narrative, this objection 
maintains that any such content would merely introduce and promote the trivial and 
140 Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art/' British Journal of Aesthetics 12 (1992): 
191-200. Stolnitz argues for the inexplicable nature of "artistic truth," which make such a body of 
knowledge trivial and self-contained. In arguing that "the work of art has no reference beyond 
itself,"(p. 191) Stolnitz suggests that "a 'method of artistic truth' is not matter for debate and 
hardly makes sense" (ibid.) Even in the slim case of what can be referred to as "psychological 
truth" - namely, the knowledge about the psyche and mental predicaments of the fiction 
characters - the same argument applies, as this kind of "truth" is unverifiable and does not live 
outside the constrained parameters of the specific work of fiction within which it was initiated. 
"Art, uniquely, never confirms its truths," (p. 196) on the one hand, and on the other, more trivial 
sense, "the truth was knowable and known before the fictions appeared." (p. 197) any such 
"artistic" truth would, therefore, require other, necessary and sufficient reasons, to be taken 
seriously. In conclusion: "The truth derived from one work of art never confirms that derived 
from another work of art, though the truths are related to or resemble one another, not even if 
they should be identical" (p. 197). See also: Noel Carroll in "The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, 
and Moral Knowledge," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.1 (2002): 3-26. 
141Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). Film as philosophy. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and 
Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 549-559, p. 555. 
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obvious philosophical truths, and is therefore inessential to the progress and innovation 
of philosophy.142 
Finally, there is the problem of imposition. Stemming principally from the problem 
of agency, the imposition objection holds that any philosophical assertion allegedly 
claimed to be made by a film, would in fact be an imposition, made by an interpreter 
(whether the filmmaker or the spectator) in the process of perceiving and analyzing the 
film's ambiguous content.143 The need for this objection responds to the notion that film 
analysis, namely, the intellectual and hermeneutically oriented denouement of cinematic 
content, might yield a philosophically interesting (and valuable) outcome. This, the 
142 As mentioned before, this is much like the case of a screened lecture in philosophy. The lecture 
is philosophical; the film is not. See: Smith, M. and T. E. Wartenberg (2006). Introduction. 
Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, 
Blackwell: 1-9, 3: "It is important to acknowledge that there is, nonetheless, a trivial sense in 
which a film can be a work of philosophy. Relying on film's ability to transcribe reality, one could 
simply film a philosopher reading a paper out loud. If the paper is a work of philosophy, so, it 
could be argued, is the film that records its oral presentation. But the supporter of the idea of 
'film as philosophy' will not be satisfied with this example, for the philosophy contained in the 
film is in no way dependent on the medium of film itself." See also Livingston, who says that 
"There is no good reason to spurn or belittle the pedagogical functions to which films can be put 
in the philosophical curriculum" (Livingston, P. (2009). Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman, On Film 
as Philosophy. Oxford & New York, Oxford University Press: 35. 
143 See, for instance, Wartenberg, who presents this problem by stating that "the film itself, 
according to the skeptic, makes no such philosophical statement. That is something imposed 
upon it by me, the philosophical interpreter." (Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film 
as Philosophy. London & New York, Routledge: 8). Also, Amy Coplan states that a creator-
oriented interpretation of a work of a film has to rely on the claim that "a film's creators have 
direct acquaintance with a philosophical position, as long as it is plausible that the creators could 
be responding to the positions or ideas contained in the work." (Coplan, A. (2010). "Comments on 
Thomas E. Wartenberg'sThinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy." Film and Philosophy 14 (General 
Interest Edition): 99-108, 102}. 
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holders of this objection state, is scarcely the case.144 According to them, the interpretive 
practice is, almost by nature (and definitely by the nature of the type of content 
submitted for interpretation) the kind of practice that rests much more, even 
predominantly, on the schematic extrapolations of the interpreter, than on the submitted 
text. That is to say, basically, the interpreters are reading into the film more than is really 
there. Building on the problem of agency (according to which it is the interpreter, and 
not the film, who yields this outcome,) and pointing towards the ambiguous nature of 
the cinematic content (as both the generality and explicitness objections suggested), the 
holders of the imposition objection assert that any analysis of cinematic content is 
ultimately nothing but one (seemingly plausible) variation of a philosophically-inclined 
interpretation of an otherwise non-philosophical narrative.145 
Exclusivism Contested: Cinematic Narrative and the Exclusivist Objections 
As I suggested in the outset of the previous section, this list of objections raised 
for the sake of reinforcing the conclusions of the exclusivist view actually shows how 
indebted these objections, and indeed the exclusivist view itself, is to a misguided and 
ill-defined notion of narrative. I now undertake to explain and defend this critique. 
144 Ibid; also: Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). Film as philosophy. The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 549-559. 
145Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, pp. 25-26. 
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Each of the aforementioned problems focuses on the narrativity of fiction films. 
This, by itself, is valid, since fiction, by definition, implies narrativity. However, this 
exclusivist focus overlooks two important questions. (1) Is narrative, in fact, an essential 
character of film?(2) Even if we grant that narrative itself is indeed essential to film-
what makes it "cinematically" unique? In other words, by focusing on language as the 
essential way by which a narrative is formed, the exclusivists exhibit an understanding 
of the term under which its salience in the particular context of cinema turns out to be 
contradictory. This is so because (for one who accepts the exclusivist picture) either one 
holds a view that cinema is intrinsically a narrative phenomenon (in which case there is 
nothing distinctive about cinema in the first place) or one holds the view that cinema's 
distinctness rests on the manner of its narrativity (which is impossible, since narrativity 
here is understood as strictly linguistic). 
Let us take a closer look at this problem. For one, narrative is taken to be 
essential to what film is and what film does. That means that film is essentially a 
medium that "tells a story." The telling of stories is, according to the exclusivists, a 
practice which can be solely manifested linguistically. That leaves us with the question: 
if this is so, then who could assert that film is unique? After all, there are clearly many 
other ways to tell a story. Hence, as we will come to see, it is this deflated notion of what 
constitutes the narrative character of film, which leads thinkers like Livingston, Russell 
and Smith, to raise the objections analyzed above. Accordingly, we need to explore a 
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different understanding of cinematic narrativity, if we are to acknowledge the possibility 
of film as doing something which is unique (essential) to its nature, or, alternatively, 
explore the possibility that narrative - at least that which is explicated linguistically - is 
by no means a distinctive character of film. 
A more general assertion stemming from this critique can be formulated as 
follows. According to the exclusivists, film cannot make a significant and innovative 
contribution to philosophy since philosophy is, by its very determinate and internal 
nature, inaccessible to any "external" intervention.However, such an intervention is, by 
its very definition, non-philosophical. That is to say, if a given activity (for instance, 
philosophizing) is essentially tied with a given means of expression (i.e. linguistic 
formulation and argument through paraphrase), then it is necessary that other means of 
expression (i.e. film) are automatically excluded from the process. Going back to the 
hammer and screwdriver example I posed earlier, if we require a screwdriver to 
hammer nails in a way which is "unique to screw-driving" and "independent" (of 
hammering) we are, in fact, begging the question, since, under the essentialist view of 
the two concepts involved, one cannot be the other (or do what the other essentially 
does) without becoming the other (or being perceived as the other) thus not being itself 
(for the purposes of the action involved). The suggestion that film should philosophize 
in a "uniquely cinematic" way, but, at the same time, is essentially bound by narrative, 
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shows how the exclusivist position "loads the dice" in such a way that an affirmative 
response to the CFP question is made impossible in advance. 
This problem is best reflected in the problem of paraphrase and f:he generality 
objection. As I have shown before, the problem of paraphrase results from the 
assumption that philosophy is intimately tied to the linguistic capacity (the phrasing of 
arguments). The philosophical ends of rational conviction and thoughtful contemplation 
can only be achieved by means of linguistically formulated arguments. Accordingly, any 
attempt to phrase general arguments in an explicit way by means exclusive to film, 
which cannot explicitly generalize linguistic claims, is bound to failure. 
A similar critique can now be applied to the generality objection.The generality 
objection holds that film, which employs particular narratives, cannot qualify for the 
practice of philosophy, which is in the task of formulating "universal claim(s) that 
purport to provide general knowledge."146 In order to refute this objection, we can 
follow one of two lines of argument: first, we can undermine the assumption that 
philosophy is :indeed solely and exclusively "general." Alternately, we can show that 
film, despite our previous assumption, is not solely and exclusively "particular." Both 
lines of argument undermine the exclusivist claim, accord:ing to which it is commonly 
uncontested that there is a categorical difference "between the general truths that are the 
146Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 21. 
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subject matter of philosophy and the specific narratives that ... are present in films."147 
As W artenberg puts it: "even if we agree for the sake of argument that all philosophical 
knowledge is general," (namely of the form "Knowledge is justified true belief,") 
particular narratives can still be employed in the process of attaining this knowledge, 
and can therefore be relevant to the philosophical process.148 
Something similar holds for the explicitness objection. According to this 
objection, film is unable to formulate its content in the explicit way required by 
philosophy. However, if we hold this requirement to be binding, we are overlooking the 
second premise above, namely, the supposition which requires the cinematic 
contribution to philosophy, if such a contribution is in fact possible, to be done "through 
means that are exclusive to cinema."149 In other words, by demanding "explicitness" 
from film (on the one hand), we are overlooking its unique and exclusive means of 
expression (on the other hand). Smuts notes the inadequacy of this requirement when he 
writes that "in one sense, every particular philosophical contribution made by films is 
made by means that are necessarily unique to cinema, since no other art form is 
147Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 138. 
14BWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 140. 
149 Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4 Fall): 409-420,409. 
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cinema."150 As long as we hold the problem of paraphrase to be true, and, accordingly, 
the explicitness objection to be binding, the predetermined nature of philosophy 
undermines any sense of unique contribution we might want to assert. 
As I have shown here, the major problems framing the exclusivist argument -
namely, the generality objection, the explicitness objection and the problem of 
paraphrase - stem from a mistaken conception of narrative and its importance to the 
definition of film's essential nature. Even if we grant the exclusivist understanding of 
film as essentially a medium which presents narratives, it would be wrong, given this 
understanding, to examine the cinematic narrativity subsequently in terms that are 
ultii:nately non-cinematic (or, at least, not uniquely cinematic). The subsidiary criteria, 
which apply notions of "explicitness," "generality" and "paraphrasing" to film, must 
therefore undergo similar adjustments in order to befit the cinematic domain. That is to 
say, the mode of explicitness (or generality, or paraphrasing) required by film (in order 
to be considered as "philosophical") must be regarded as being essentially different 
from the parallel way that we understand this mode in the linguistic domain. Simply 
put, the idea of "explicitness" means something essentially different in the world of 
moving images than in the world of the written (or spoken) word. If .film is to 
philosophize, in a "uniquely" cinematic manner, it has to demonstrate explicitness (and 
generality, and paraphrasing, for that matter) in accordance with its essentially visual 
1so Smuts, A. (2009). "Film as Philosophy: In Defense of a Bold Thesis." The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 67(4 Fall): 409-420, 410. 
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and non-linguistic, nature. It is not that film necessarily cannot do so; but these concepts 
must be understood in the relevant way. 
Thus it becomes apparent that the central conviction of the exclusivist view-that 
film lacks the capacity of doing philosophy in a unique, independent and innovative 
way which is, at the same time, essential to what doing philosophy is - results from an 
understanding of cinematic narrative that does not hold. Seen in this light, this 
conviction must be understood as a presupposition and not a conclusion, as the 
exclusivists answer the question about the potency of film to philosophize by 
presupposing a negative answer to this question. By imposing on film a biased notion of 
narrative as a paradigmatically linguistic phenomenon, the exclusivists already 
presuppose that philosophizing means something that is either contrary to what film is, 
or at least essentially other than what film does. 
Exclusivism Negated: The CFP Question and Cinematic Narrative 
Our consideration of the exclusivist response to the CFP question concludes with 
the second major exclusivist claim; namely: whatever film does - which, on this view is 
limited to illustration and recording for the reasons discussed above - it does so in ways 
which might be essential to film (and hence uniquely cinematic) but are, by definition, 
inessential (and hence trivial and marginal) to philosophy. The exclusivists raise several 
objections in this regard - most notably the banality objection, the imposition objection 
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and the problem of agency - in order to downplay any possible significance of the 
cinematic contribution for philosophic practice. If it is in fact the case that illustration is 
essential to philosophy, then such illustration would have to have been intentional, and 
thus the work of a cognitive agent. Thus, if we can conclude that illustration is not a 
mere accessory, then we will also have disrupted the imposition objection and the 
problem of agency. 
Here too it is important to challenge the exclusivist objections, beginning with 
illustration. For the exclusivists to accept this form of cinematic participation in 
philosophy, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, we must remember that the capacity 
to illustrate, by way of a particular narrative which explicates a philosophical preconceived 
claim, and for pedagogical purposes, is, by itself, not uniquely cinematic. Other artistic 
mediums, such as literature and theatre, engage in concrete and detailed narratives, and 
can therefore serve philosophy in the same (putatively marginal) way that film does.151 
More importantly, however, it is just as vital to agree that pedagogy, for itself, is not an 
integral part of philosophy. In other words, the practice of philosophy, and, accordingly, 
151 See: Livingston, P. (2001). Narrative.The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Gaut and D. 
M. Lopes. London & New York, Routledge: 275-284; Livingston, P. (2003). Literature.The Oxford 
Handbook of Aesthetics. J. Levinson. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 536-554; Livingston, P. 
(2006). Cinematic Authorship. Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll 
and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 299-309; Livingston, P. (2006). "Theses on Cinema as 
Philosophy." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (1): 11-18. Also: Currie, G. (1999). 
Narrative Desire. Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion. C. Plantinga and G. M. Smith. 
Baltimore & London, Johns Hopkins University Press: 183-199; Currie, G. (2009). Narrative and 
the Psychology of Character.The Poetics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Narrative. N. Carroll. 
Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 61-72; Currie, G. (1998). "Reply to My Critics." Philosophical 
Studies 89: 355-366. 
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the activity of philosophizing, can do, by definition, without being taught or explained 
(two goals which are traditionally the role of pedagogy). The exclusivists maintain that 
philosophy is an independent practice defined by its internal features. As such, 
philosophy does not require an external feature (like pedagogy) in order to be defined. 
Any such help to philosophy, whether cinematic or otherwise, will therefore be 
inessential to the core definition of philosophy. 
The exclusivists are therefore willing to acknowledge the pedagogical value of 
film, and, accordingly, the cinematic capacity to assist philosophy in this regard, if we 
agree (1) that pedagogy, for itself, is separated from philosophy, for itself, and is 
therefore not an essential part of what philosophy is; and (2) that film is but one way, 
and by no means the only way, to elicit such pedagogical assistance in the practice of 
teaching philosophy. Under these constrains, film cannot be regarded as essential to 
philosophy, and the exclusivist position seems to stand on solid ground. 
However, yet again, far from mounting an argument, the position does little 
more than explicate a dubious presupposition. The mere separation between an activity 
(i.e. philosophy) and the requirement that this activity is to be taught and explained is 
artificial and oblique. This argument falls back on the assumption that an intellectual 
content is inseparable from the means by which it reaches the intellect. Yet, if we are to 
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define philosophy, there are ample reasons to think that we cannot exclude its ability to 
be explained from its definition.152 
This way of defining the philosophical activity, or any intellectual activity for 
that matter, negates the exclusivist assertion that pedagogy is inessential to 
philosophizing. However, even if we agree that its being taught (or explained) is 
essential to philosophy, we are still left to deal with the second condition, namely, that 
film, as an apparatus which employs pedagogical capacities, is not by any way an 
exclusive way to be doing so. In other words, even if we argue that philosophy must be 
taught (in one way or the other) as part of what philosophy is, we cannot make a similar 
claim regarding the unique role of film in doing so. The most we can establish is that 
film is but one way to teach philosophy, and while teaching is essential to philosophy -
the cinematic vehicle is not. Regardless, and although philosophy is not bound by any 
distinctive method of teaching, we nevertheless established that film, by illustrating 
philosophical ideas in manners which uniquely reflect its nature, can be regarded as 
doing philosophy by way of teaching philosophy. Accordingly, it is now fair to suggest 
that if film can elicit pedagogical output (which is, by itself, essential to philosophizing), 
and, if by doing so, it exhibits means of elicitation which are cinematically unique (i.e. in 
means which cannot be replicated by any other pedagogical device,) then it can be 
argued that film can indeed philosophize in ways which exemplify its unique nature. 
1sz See: Russell, B. (2010). "Limits to Thinking on Screen." Film and Philosophy'14(General 
Interest Edition): 109-116. 
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The second capacity of film relevant in responding to the exclusivist position, the 
ability of the cinematic medium to visually record images in motion, also demands a 
reformulation. Note here that by emphasizing this cinematic capacity, those who wish to 
deny any significant contribution to philosophy by film appeal to their understanding of 
the technical aspects of film, namely, film-as-apparatus, rather than its linguistic or non-
linguistic nature.153 This form of film participation in philosophy seems to fulfill the 
exclusivist concerns regarding the independence of the philosophical practice. As we 
change the prism by which we observe film, and examine film for its technical attributes 
instead of its content, we can now claim that the recording of a philosophical activity of 
any kind has nothing to do with what is being recorded. The exclusivists emphatically 
stress that the philosophical activity exists independently, whether it is recorded or not. 
The cinematic camera operates here solely as an external (and some would stress: 
accidental) mechanism, which merely captures the philosophical activity without 
muddling its content. 
To further make this point, consider the case where a security camera in a mall 
captures and records two philosophers, in the midst of their Christmas shopping, 
contemplating Kant's first critique. It would be presumptuous, and somewhat 
153 See, for instance, James Phillips who argues that "The specificity of the cinematic art is the 
passivity of the technological apparatus of reproduction before a given scene: to put it a little too 
pompously but not, for that matter, inaccurately, cinema is the contemplative eye of the storm of 
the technological manipulation of beings." See: Phillips, J. (2008). Introduction: What Can Cinema 
Do? Cinematic Thinking, Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema. J. Phillips. Stanford, 
California, Stanford University Press: 1-9, 1. 
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ridiculous, to assert that the outcome of such an incident can reflect in any way a 
cinematic capacity to participate in philosophy. To make this claim even more 
outrageous, we have only to replace the two philosophers in this example with two 
electricians, passionately discussing a recent power shortage they were called to amend. 
No one in his right mind would claim that the mere fact that the electricians were filmed 
in their discussion has anything to do with the professional content of the discussion. It 
is therefore important to note that the mere capturing of a philosophical activity by a 
cinematic camera cannot evolve into a serious claim about film's capacity to partake in a 
philosophical activity. 
As can be read from this example, the second form of film's participation in 
philosophy follows the same two conditions as did the first form discussed above. From 
an exclusivist point of view, if we wish to argue that film can partake in philosophy by 
explaining and illuminating its content, it is vital to agree that pedagogy is not an 
internal feature of philosophy, and that it can be achieved by various means (film 
included). Similarly, if we to argue that film can partake in philosophy by recording its 
presence, it is as important to accept that recording an object is not an integral part of the 
recorded object itself, and that, in any case, one can imagine various ways (which are not 
necessarily cinematic) to be doing so. 
As we recall, the first form of film's participation in philosophy complied with 
the first condition, but encountered problems with the second. It was not at all clear that 
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pedagogy is not in fact an integral part of philosophy. Unlike the first case, here the state 
is reversed: whereas it is pretty much uncontested that the recording of an object does 
not effect in any way the independence and integrity of the recorded object, it is not at 
all clear that act of recording can be achieved by means other than cinematic ones. On 
the contrary: cinema is, at the time of this writing, the only technological apparatus 
which is defined by its ability to visually capture images in motion. Other devices (like, 
for instance, a tape recorder, a stenographic device, a still-camera, and such) will fail, by 
definition, to do the job. Cinema, or, more precisely, the cinematic camera, is the only 
device available for such a task. From this technical point of view, it therefore seems that 
the second exclusivist condition discussed cannot be met. 
The problems with the second form of participation do not end here. The 
problem of agency is yet to be examined in this context. By reducing the participation of 
film in philosophy to mere recording, we unheedingly eliminate any hint of 
intentionality from such participation. In fact, this depiction of the cinematic role in 
capturing philosophical activity is so accidental and arbitrary that it might be wrong to 
even qualify as "participation." Participation, by definition, requires a minimal 
indication of intentionality on behalf of the participant. A film director, or an interested 
camera operator, might satisfy this condition. However, a cinematic camera, as a 
technical apparatus, captures the images presented in front of it on its own (after all, this 
is exactly what the technology of the camera is designed to do). In this view, film is "a 
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machine for automatically reproducing whatever finds its way in front of the camera 
lens."154 Accordingly, there is no active participation on behalf of the camera, no 
cognitive process of any sort, no intelligent decision-making process which 
demonstrates judgment. For this to happen, we need a film director, or a camera 
operator, or a film editor. We need the agent behind the camera to transform the mere 
recording of an action into participation. Film, under the technical definition examined 
here, is therefore unable to voluntarily partake in the activity it captures. 
Also, even if we disagree with the previous assessment and maintain that the 
mere recording of a reality set in front of a camera can be justly regarded (if only 
minimally) as a type of participation (in the recorded activity), we are nevertheless 
bound by the need to incorporate recent changes in film technology in our definition of 
film's technical capacities. For instance, digital technologies, animation, and other 
changes in contemporary cinema, have changed both the traditional role of the cinematic 
camera (as the "recorder" of real events held in front of it) and the nature of the 
cinematic product which evolve from this technical process.155 The camera is no longer a 
mirroring "recording device" which captures real events. The images it produces are 
154Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 9. 
t55 A thorough discussion regarding the changes in cinematic technology is held by Gaut in: Gaut, 
B. (2009). Digital Cinema. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and 
C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 75-85; and, most notably, in: Gaut, B. (2010). A 
philosophy of cinematic art. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, where Gaut 
maintains that the wide range of contemporary cinematic media exceeds the traditional 
photographic films and exhibits new scopes and potentials in the variety of digital cinema, 
animation and even interactive cinematic works (like videogames). 
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sometimes replaced by computer-generated images (CGI), which stand in no causal 
relation to real events that did or did not occur in front of the camera in the moment of 
shooting.156 
The two concerns outlined here seem to work in favor of the exclusivist 
conclusion, as they undermine even the narrowest and most insignificant participation 
of film in philosophy. However, and despite exclusivist objections, one can read a 
different claim into these concerns. As we have just seen, the first concern focuses on the 
mindless and technical nature of the cinematic apparatus. A film cannot be claimed to 
partake (or "participate") in anything, since film is merely a mindless mechanism. But 
suppose-in keeping with what was said in the first chapter-we expand (or revise) the 
definition of the cinematic apparatus to include the mindful and engaging nature of 
either the cognitive agent behind the camera (whether the director, who orchestrates the 
film, the cinematographer, who creates the visual outputs, the editor, who puts them 
together, or even the producer, who traditionally manages the entire process,) or the 
cognitive spectator which watches the film. Can we now make the same assertion about 
the accidental and mechanistic nature of the cinematic output? It is clear, from the 
parameters of the above mentioned example, that the instrument itself - the camera 
itself - cannot be a willing part of any process, contemplative or other. Even a security 
camera has to be turned on and set by an agent, and does not go on automatically. 
156 Ibid. 
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However, would it change our assumptions regarding these cinematic capacities if we 
learn that this camera is operated by Woody Allen, Ingmar Berman or Terrence Malick? 
And, similarly, would it matter if the film is viewed by a ten-year old, by an intelligent 
adult, by a coffee maker, or not viewed at all? A broader definition of film, which 
outlasts the narrow technical view of the cinematic world, seems to be called for.157 
The second concern, regarding the advancing digital nature of modern cinema, is 
also a two-edged sword. While seemingly supporting the exdusivist convention (by 
undermining the cinematic capacity to record real/true events), the digital era has 
undoubtedly opened the world of cinema to new and exciting possibilities. The old 
proverb that "seeing is believing" has been recharged with new meaning, in a way 
which forces us to reconsider the view which perceives the lack of real object in front of 
the camera as a deficiency. 
We are thus faced with what I take to be a devastating critique of the exclusivist 
thesis. Emphatically stressing that film cannot philosophize (in ways essential to 
philosophy, or by means essential to film), or that it can philosophize (but in an 
inessential way, which belittles the title,) this view ultimately fails because of a deep-
background assumption of what it means to understand a medium or its activity 
157 To elicit this point, imagine a film being screened in front of an empty theatre. The projector 
makes it technically possible for the consecutive imagery to be - again, technically - manifested 
on the screen. However, this activity requires a mindful audience - a cognitive spectator - in 
order to become the potentially engaging experience of "film viewing." 
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"essentially." These assumptions manifest themselves with specific reference to film and 
philosophy in the presupposition that the two main features of film are, with respect to. 
its content, narrativity and, with respect to its form, the unique technical capacity to 
record moving images.In both respects, this presupposition, besides foreclosing the CFP 
question in its very articulation, is misguided, at least in the way that it is constructed by 
the exclusivists. For even if narrativity is a distinctive feature of film - it must be 
cinematic, and not linguistic, narrativity which earns this title; and even if film is, indeed, 
mainly an apparatus -it is the ways by which it is used and practiced (namely, through 
the mindful engagement of both creators and consumers) which makes it what it is, 
namely, a screened experience of moving images. I hope in this chapter to have shown 
why film cannot be reduced to linguistic narrativity, nor to its mere technical capacities 
(which, as such, overlooks the various operators). It is hence fair to conclude that the 
exclusivist thesis, by failing to comply with "aesthetic turn" depicted in the first chapter, 
does not absorb the true importance of the CFP question. We turn now to see how the 
remaining views can hope of doing better. 
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CHAPTER III: FILM IN PHILOSOPHY 
Having rejected the exclusivist thesis, I turn now to a more radical - one might 
say "bolder"158 - account: an inclusivist thesis. Put briefly, the inclusivist thesis asserts 
that film, while (at least to a certain extent) a practice entirely separate from philosophy, 
can still be helpful, even useful to philosophy. This account accepts that "there is 
nothing controversial in the claim that philosophy and the arts in general, including film 
and literature, inhabit the same territory."159 Thus, the "traffic between the domain of 
'real philosophy' and any adjacent realm of self-reflective activity does in fact exist and 
should be embraced."160 What follows is the main argument of any inclusivist account, 
namely, that film can indeed be used to illuminate and enrich the argumentative core of 
the philosophical process. 
Inclusivism Introduced: Premises and Arguments 
Before beginning to unpack the inclusivist view, its advocates, and its rationales, 
a more fundamental issue must be addressed. Namely, as is clear from our discussion of 
the exclusivist thesis, each of the views regarding film's capacity to philosophize carries 
158 It is interesting to note that it is Livingston who tagged this thesis as 'bold', as opposed to his 
own 'modest' account. Wartenberg, by contrast, refers to his thesis as 'moderate', probably as a 
cautionary tale against more radical approaches, which might be seen as irresponsibly taking the 
issue at hand off the field and over the cliff. 
159 Smith, M. (2006). Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 33. 
160 Smith, M. (2006). Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 34. 
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with it its own (unconsidered) answer to the question: what is to philosophize? For 
reasons that have already become apparent, the answer we give to this question more or 
less determines which of the views one will take with respect to the narrower question 
to which this dissertation is devoted. It is accordingly important to provide some 
preliminary picture of what philosophizing is, before moving on to discuss any 
inclusivist claim regarding philosophy's readiness to include film in its endeavor. 
Indeed, my argument here is not merely to reject the primary exclusivist 
principles. My approach is more radical yet: I intend to show that the whole notion of 
the nature of the philosophical practice that is presupposed by the exclusivist account 
(and even by the inclusivist accounts to date) needs to be challenged.This challenge, 
though, is not so novel. The view of philosophy as exclusively restricted to "conceptual 
analysis" of general ideas was often contested by novice and philosophers alike.161 Recall 
Bernard Russell's remark that philosophy had become "the systematic abuse of technical 
161 Noel Carroll: If you hail from a Hegelian tradition in which tracking the state of society in 
terms of the play of dialectical forces is philosophical, then interpreting the interaction and 
mutation of such factors as manifested in a motion picture will count as philosophy. However, 
this view of philosophy is at least controversial, since many would contend that it does not 
sufficiently differentiate philosophy from social criticism. Perhaps a less contentious view of 
philosophy is that conceptual analysis is at least an important part of philosophy, even if 
philosophy tout court involves more than just conceptual analysis. If this is granted, then perhaps 
we can get a leg up on answering our question by investigating whether a film interpretation can 
ever contribute to conceptual analysis. It seems clear that interpreting certain artworks- especially 
philosophical artworks may require philosophizing on the part of the interpreter". (Carroll, N. 
(2006). Philosophizing Through the Moving Image: The Case of Serene Velocity.Thinking Through 
Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell, p.182.) 
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terms that had specifically been invented for that purpose."162 In a similar vein William 
James depicts such a philosophical practice as the works of "a blind man in a dark room 
seeking for a black cat - which is not there."163 John Dewey concurred, claiming that 
"philosophy only deserved attention and respect if it no longer considered just technical 
problems and if it turns from dealing with 'problems of philosophers' and returns its 
attention to the pressing problems of human beings."164 Suffice to say that there is a long 
list of similarly-minded thinkers.165 
From the outset it is apparent that any inclusivist picture of philosophy would 
have to move away from the rigid exclusivist picture, and from its inherent problems. 
Most specifically, a sustainable inclusivist picture of philosophy will have to override 
the problem of paraphrase, and to provide a viable rejoinder to the skeptic's explicitness 
and generality objections. In short, our conception of philosophy has to avoid the 
problems of the exclusivist premises, namely, the problem which is caused by 
philosophy's intimate ties with the generality of knowledge and, following that, the 
problem which is caused by similar ties between philosophy and its linguistic means of 
expression. The inclusivist avenue opens both premises for reexamination. 
162 Quote. Recall his portrayal in "Alice in Wonderland" 
163 Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy (1911) Ch. 1: 
Philosophy and its Critics; also: H. L. Mencken, as quoted in Peter's Quotations: Ideas for Our 
Time (1977) by Laurence J. Peter, p .. 427 
164 See: Erickson, S. A. (1984). Human presence: at the boundaries of meaning. Macon, Ga., Mercer 
University Press. 
165See: Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refr~ctions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image. New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, preface, pp.xvi-xvii. 
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A first inclusivist step towards a new, and more lucid, picture of philosophy 
draws its inspiration from the scholarly studies of Martha Nussbaum and Cora 
Diamond. In their respective works on the philosophical potential of literature, 
Nussbaum acknowledges the philosophical value of some literary pieces, which, by 
. employing language "more complex, more allusive, more attentive to particulars," are 
able to express "views of the world and how one should live in it"166 in a fuller and more 
emiched way than that of the "standard philosophical prose."167 Similarly, Diamond 
pinpoints the philosophical strength of literary texts in their narrative rather than their 
generality, claiming that their philosop~cal power is less because of the presence of a 
deductive argument than because they are "an exercise of moral imagination" that 
enables people "to see the situation differently."16B 
The broad contention of philosophy, devised by Nussbaum and Diamond in the 
context of the literary debate, moves away from the standard view of philosophy, 
"according to which philosophy is posing arguments and stating universal truths."169 
166Nussbaum, M. (1990). Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature. New York, 
Oxford University Press, p. 3; as quoted in Wartenberg (2007), p. 136. See also: Nussbaum, M. 
(1998). Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature. Aesthetics: The Big Questions. C. 
Korsmeyer. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 201-208; Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of 
Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
167Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, p. 136 
16s Diamond, C. (1991). The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind. Cambridge, 
MA, M.I.T. Press, p. 310; as quoted in Wartenberg (2007), p. 136. 
169Coplan, A. (2010). "Comments on Thomas E. Wartenberg's Thinking on Screen: Film as 
Philosophy." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest Edition): 105. See also: Coplan, A. (2004). 
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More importantly, it moves away from the exclusivist premise, according to which 
philosophy consists of, and can solely be expressed by, arguments. Amy Coplan, who 
agrees with Diamond's contention of philosophy, sharpens this distinction when she 
writes: "philosophy is more than logic chopping; it changes the way we are oriented to 
the world."170 
Inclusivism Deployed: Wartenberg'slnclusivist Account 
While granting the Nussbaum-Diamond conception of philosophy as 
"congenial,"171 Thomas Wartenberg, the most diligent advocate of the inclusivist view, is 
reluctant to employ this new outlook of philosophy as the structural basis for the 
inclusivist view. Instead, and while admitting that a full and accurate characterization of 
philosophy is "such a difficult task,"172 and is surely beyond the scope of a designated 
. 
work on the . philosophical capacities of film, Wartenberg suggests a threefold 
"Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62(2 
Special Issue: Art, Mind, and Cognitive Science): 141-152. 
170Coplan, A. (2010). "Comments on Thomas E. Wartenberg's Thinking on Screen: Film as 
Philosophy." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest Edition): 105. See also: Coplan, A. (2004). 
"Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62(2 
Special Issue: Art, Mind, and Cognitive Science): 141-152. 
171Wartenberg, T. E. (2010). "Response to My Critics." Film and Philosophy 14(General Interest 
Edition): 129-130. 
172Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, pp. 56-57. Also: Academics and non-academics: "This can be seen by comparing the 
reaction of non-academics to the question of whether film can philosophize to that of academic 
philosophers. The latter have a narrower conception of what philosophy is, so they tend to be 
more apprehensive than the former about characterizing films as doing philosophy. Whereas 
philosophers tend to be reluctant to grant film the ability to philosophize, most non-philosophers 
are intrigued by the idea and find it natural that films would raise the sorts of issues that they see 
as philosophical." (Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & 
New York, Routledge, p. 29) 
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characterization of philosophy for our consideration. First, in term of its goals and ends, 
philosophy is the practice which is concerned with "the eternal questions," namely, th~ 
big questions of existence, the nature of reality, the nature and conduct of human being, 
etc.173 Second, in terms of its subjects, philosophy is the practice which exposes and 
articulates the backbone abstractions, the logos and theory behind every other discipline 
(in a way which yields philosophical "fields" such as the philosophy of history, of 
science, of mathematics, of law, and so on). And, finally, in terms of its method, 
philosophy is a practice of discursive thinking, mostly associated with "'rhetorical 
strategies' such as the argument, thought experiment, and counterexample."174 
Wartenberg maintains that, despite appearances, the "gulf separating [him] from 
these two philosophers of literature," is not "as wide as it might appear." However, in 
justifying this assertion, W artenberg exposes substantial differences between his 
approach and that of the literature scholars. For one, the Nussbaurn-Diarnond attempt to 
redefine the practice of philosophy divorces philosophy's end results from its logical 
and argumentative roots (thus relinquishing the exclusivity of the standard means of 
expression associated with philosophy). Wartenberg's contention, by contrast, stays 
within the boundaries of philosophy as a practice that is intimately tied to certain 
argumentative practices and rhetorical devices. However - and here is where 
173 Shaw agrees with this distinction. See: Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies 
Seriously. London & New York, Wallflower Press. Pp. 114-115. 
174Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, pp. 28-31, 56-57. 
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Wartenberg' s claim becomes the grounds for the inclusivist thesis - these rhetorical 
devices can be cinematically performed and executed, thus rendering film as a 
potentially integral part of the philosophical practice. In other words, whereas the 
Diamond-Nussbaum contention of philosophy is an "attempt to show that there are 
philosophical tasks that require nonstandard means of exposition," Wartenberg' s 
conception of philosophy "emphasize(s) film's deployment of widely recognized and 
quite standard philosophical techniques."175 
It is noteworthy that although Wartenberg's three-legged conception of 
philosophy is not completely in alignment with the Diamond-Nussbaum account, it 
does part ways from the traditional (and one might add: academic) definition of 
philosophy in one key aspect. Instead of the rigid academic view, which regards 
philosophy as "an academic discipline with a highly specific methodology," Wartenberg 
suggests a broader definition of the term, which perceives philosophy as "the attempt to 
think systematically about fundamental issues of human existence."176 In other words, 
"philosophy names a range of concerns that are the common property of every 
thoughtful human being during at least some moments of his or her life."177 
I75Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, pp. 138-140 
176 Smith, M. and T. E. Wartenberg, Eds. (2006). Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell, p. 2 
177 Ibid. 
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This departure from the standard restrictions of the academic discipline of 
philosophy is an evident step away from the exclusivist account. We have already 
shown how the exclusivist' s predispositions about the nature of philosophy end up with 
a narrow definition which not only excludes film (or any visual medium for that matter) 
from the essential practice of philosophy, but renders the mere question about film's 
philosophical capacities redundant. If philosophy is restricted to its formal academic 
definition - namely, to a methodology intrinsically tied to language and properly 
formulated arguments as its means of expression- then "it seems quite implausible that 
a film could be capable of instantiating that methodology," since film is "an essentially, 
or at least typically, visual medium" and as such it "seems very different from the verbal 
forms of discourse that constitute traditional philosophy."178 However, if we assume a 
wider definition of philosophy, in which the essential concerns of the philosophical 
practice, are distinguished from the means by which these concerns are expressed and 
manifested, than it is worth asking whether film can be considered as a valid means to 
"mobilize those concerns in ways that would count as philosophy."179 
Wartenberg' s definition is an attempt to sketch a brief, yet useful, picture of what 
might count as genuine "philosophizing." The focal point of this definition of the 
philosophical practice rests on the last leg, namely, the method employed in the habit of 
doing philosophy. As Wartenberg himself acknowledges, his definition essentially 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
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"rejects a specification of philosophy rooted in its subject matter in favor of one based on 
its form or method." Since "every philosophical issue has been addressed within some 
other field,"180 the key for unveiling the heart of the matter lies in the notion "that there 
are certain modes of discourse that count as specifically philosophical." In other words, "this 
view treats philosophy less as a specific subject matter than as a set of specific ways of 
addressing topics that are also the concern of other intellectual fields."181 
On this view, therefore, philosophy is a practice that "consists of such specific 
discursive forms as the argument, the counterexample, and the thought experiment."182 
Accordingly, to "philosophize" is to employ these rhetorical devices in the course of an 
, investigation of certain subject matters. This picture of philosophizing is the ground for 
Wartenberg' sinclusivist thesis. In order to be considered as genuinely "doing 
philosophy,' film has to accommodate at least one of these rhetorical practices, in a way 
that embodies the specificity of cinema. Therefore, in order to examine the merits of the 
inclusivist claim, we first have to clarify the nature of these rhetorical practices. 
Following that, we have to show how film can make a genuinely unique contribution to 
philosophy, by way of an argument, a counterexample or a thought experiment. 
tao It is arguable whether Wartenberg is right saying this. There are topics- such as metaphysical 
questions - which are the sole inhabitant of philosophy. However, that doe~ not undermine the 
account and its focuses. 
tBtWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, p. 30. 
1B2lbid. 
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Achieving a clear understanding of the scope and nature of these three 
discursive devices is therefore necessary to establish the inclusivist thesis. When we 
examine the nature of these practices, and their intrinsic role in what counts as "doing 
philosophy," two important questions come to mind. 
First, it is fairly clear that W artenberg' s list of discursive techniques is not 
exclusive to philosophy. Other academic disciplines employ arguments and thought 
experiments, most notably the natural sciences as well as mathematics, and so it would 
be "a mistake to assert that philosophy alone of all the intellectual disciplines proceeds 
by means of a logical argument,"183 or by the other modes of discourse mentioned above. 
This question can be parsed as followed: 
(1) How are we, then, to distinguish between a philosophical argument (and thought 
experiment) and a non-philosophical one? 
(2) Should this, by itself, affect the level of conviction we should expect from film's 
ability to philosophize? 
Second, it is not clear from Wartenberg' s definition whether this list of discursive 
strategies is, in fact, a final list, and as such precludes other techniques from 
consideration, or whether it is instead an open-ended list, and, as such, invites us to 
consider other techniques as "doing philosophy." In other words: 
183Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, p. 30-31. 
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(3) Are there any other discursive devices that might comprise a broader and more 
' inclusive picture of the philosophical method? 
( 4) If this is so -why did Wartenberg fail to mention them? 
(5) And if this is not the case, what is it that makes these three devices - an argument, a 
counterexample, and a thought experiment - so intrinsically unique to be listed at 
the heart of the philosophical method? 
Wartenberg responds to questions (1) and (2) by suggesting that we determine 
the nature of a given rhetorical device by examining the context in which it is used. 
Recalling his threefold depiction of philosophy, it is evident that the practice of 
philosophizing, so called, is bound by a specific set of goals, which, as such, correlates 
with a given set of means. The goals of philosophy, and the means by which philosophy 
is practiced, are, therefore "mutually supportive."184 Conjointly, they create the "bigger 
picture" which is what makes something philosophical. Accordingly, the three rhetorical 
devices, while are admittedly not exclusively philosophical by their very nature, are 
indeed the heart of what "doing philosophy" is, when used in the context mentioned 
above, namely, as means for attaining a philosophical goal. Although these modes of 
discourse are shared by other intellectual disciplines and are therefore not exclusive to 
184 Ibid. 
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philosophy, once they are used for a certain end and in service of a certain subject - they 
are indeed exclusively philosophical. 
With this I tum the focus to questions (3) to (5), namely, whether an argument, a 
counterexample and a thought experiment are indeed the only discursive techniques 
which, under specific terms, can be considered as philosophical Here, Wartenberg first 
comes up with a somewhat unconvincing answer, when he provides an empirical 
warrant to support his selection of discursive techniques. According to Wartenberg, 
these techniques are worthy of our focus (insofar as they compose the integral part of 
what "doing philosophy" entails), since it can be shown that these three specific 
discursive techniques "have actually been used by philosophers" in the course of their 
work and "are generally accepted as genuinely philosophical."185 In short, since 
philosophers are known to be using arguments, counterexamples and thought 
experiments, in the course of their works, and since their works are commonly regarded 
as philosophical, one can deduce that these discursive devices are, by that very reason, 
intrinsic components of philosophizing. 
The shortcomings of this empirical evidence are numerous. For one, whereas it is 
probably true that philosophers throughout the ages had the tendency to employ these 
techniques in their philosophical works (and even, following Wartenberg, that the usage 
lBSWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 31. 
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of these techniques has indeed "flourished within analytic philosophy"186), this by itself 
does not prove that these techniques are (or can be), by virtue of their intrinsic nature, 
philosophical. Secondly, it can probably be shown that other discursive devices employ 
the same characteristics. In other words, a similar claim can be made about other 
rhetorical devices which Wartenberg fails to mention as embedding the works of 
philosophy. For instance, we can assert that a certain writing style - let us say, the 
mathematically influenced style of formal logic - is also an intrinsic component of 
"doing philosophy," simply because many philosophers have used it in order to convey 
their philosophical ideas. Such a conclusion will, of course, purport the deductive 
writing style of Spinoza and Wittgenstein as philosophical, while casting a shadow over 
Plato's dialogues and Nietzsche's parables (to name a few).187 Consequently, this 
empirical warrant seems to suggest that the weight of Wartenberg' s definition of 
philosophy rests on historical trends rather than on intrinsic merits. 
This line of argument seems, at first, to put Wartenberg' s definition of the 
practice of philosophy at risk. Since he fails to explicitly preclude other discursive 
1B6Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London· & New York, 
Routledge: 76. 
187 As Arthur Danto observes, philosophy comprises various genres of writing that include the 
most multifarious styles. These include myths, anecdotes, dialogues, lectures, allegories, 
summae, consolatios, essays, meditations, treatises, prolegomena, critiques, dialectics, 
encyclopaedias, systems, analyses, arguments, demonstrations, phenomenologies, aphorisms, 
fragments, poems, unscientific postscripts, refutations, tractatuses, investigations, manifestos, 
polemics, parodies - and, of course, the academic research paper. See: Danto, A. C. (1986). The 
philosophical disenfranchisement of art. New York, Columbia University Press. 
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techniques from the realm of the philosophical method, and since he justifies the ones he 
does include on empirical grounds, we are liable to assume that there might be other 
techniques which can exhibit similar qualities, and, more importantly, that there are no 
intrinsic qualities in these devices which make them the primal candidates for the work 
of philosophy. A different line of argument, one which pinpoints the intrinsic 
philosophical merits of these devices, is therefore required. Wartenberg supplies such an 
argument when he states that all three devices - an argument, a counterexample and a 
thought experiment - are in fact different, yet often interdependent, modes of 
argumentation. One can philosophize by presenting a verbally structured, logically 
oriented argument (in syllogistic form or otherwise). However, one can also be 
considered as philosophizing when reasoning by way of a counterexample or a thought 
experiment. It is evident to Wartenberg, then, that the task of philosophy, and, 
accordingly, what might be considered as "doing philosophy," rests on a variety of 
rhetorical techniques, which are greater than the formal argument alone. 
Inclusivism Unraveled: Argumentation by Instantiation 
This last point deserves to be emphasized, as it is a pivotal claim in favor of the 
inclusivist account. The items inhabiting Wartenberg's listof discursive devices 
employed in the method of philosophy in fact delimit the scope of the philosophical 
method by setting apart two modes of argumentation. First is the simple argument or 
argumentation by assertion. This first item needs no further explanation. A logical 
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argument is commonly agreed to be "the hallmark of philosophy."188 It is favorably seen 
as "essential to philosophy,"189 and therefore it requires no further justification when 
included as a privileged component of what "doing philosophy" entails. 
However, Wartenberg is also claiming that the method of philosophy cannot be 
restricted to this mode alone. He offers a second mode of argumentation, to which the 
two additional items belong, namely, argumentation by instantiation. This additional 
mode widens the scope of "philosophizing" by suggesting that one need not turn to the 
path of logical inductions in order to present arguments. One can instead raise 
arguments by way of supplying an adequate instantiation of a case-in-point. This line of 
argument is inhabited by counterexamples and thought experiments. 
With this indirect answer to our questions above, Wartenberg spells out the 
gravity of the inclusivist account. As we have already seen when discussing the 
exclusivist account, "if film cannot be shown to have the capacity to present arguments, 
then it might be thought that there can only be a tenuous connection between film and 
philosophy."t9o As strenuously argued by Livingston, the problem of paraphrase 
prevents film from being considered as a genuine component of philosophizing. A 
1sswartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, p. 76. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
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proper argumentation "lies outside the range of film's capabilities,"191 or so claims the 
exclusivist. Wartenberg objects to this point exactly.His definition of philosophical 
argumentation is significantly broader, and includes the rhetorical techniques of 
counterexample and thought experiment. Accordingly, if he is able to "demonstrate that 
films can indeed present arguments by showing that there is one type of argument ... 
that films are well-suited to make,"192 he shall succeed in making the inclusivist 
assertion, according to which film is capable, albeit in terms of selective techniques, to 
philosophize. 
However, and before doing so, W artenberg has to defend his assertion from its 
attackers, as the claim that instantiation is an independent (and, as such, valuable and 
unique) mode of philosophical argumentation is highly contested. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, instantiation is traditionally undersold as a rhetorical device which 
is always subsidiary to the core (deductive) argument, and is therefore never valuable 
on its own. Delving in the realm of the particular can elicit understanding of the 
argument and it can motivate the recipient to see the necessary outcomes of the 
argumer:t and to act on them. However, instantiation can never carry the argument 
itself, and bring it to its log!cal conviction. Instantiation can help to persuade and 
convince, but never to prove. It can illustrate a claim, but it can never restate it 
independently. It can demonstrate the way an argument works, but it can never replace 
191Jbid. 
192Jbid. 
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the argument itself. In short, counterexamples and thought experiments, while still 
acknowledged as valuable components of a philosophical process, are not to be 
considered as modes of argumentation, or as having any unique and indispensable 
argumentative role. 
Wartenberg agrees with his objector's conclusion. His disagreement lies not with 
the validity of the conclusion, but with the exclusivity of the premise which leads to it. 
While granting that "from a formal point of view ... the argument by example is an 
invalid form of argumentation, one that philosophers discuss under the rubric of 
inductive inference,"193Wartenberg stresses that this formal point of view is by no means 
the only point of view which helps define philosophical practice. Granted, if we adopt 
this premise in its entirety, then an attempt to use instantiation as a valid argument will 
result in a logical fallacy. It is commonly agreed that "generalizing from a single case to 
a universal proposition is invalid," and to do so "would be to commit the fallacy of 
composition by assuming that the character of a class of objects can be determined from 
an examination of just one of them."194 However, if we acknowledge that this premise 
reflects a narrow picture of philosophy, and that the particular nature of instantiation is 
more amenable to a broader picture (such as the one promoted by Wartenberg), then we 
can override this fallacy by pointing towards the role instantiation plays in the process 
t93Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & Ne"'.' York, 
Routledge: 81. 
t94Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 81-82. 
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of philosophical deliberation. By broadening the scope of what counts as philosophical 
argumentation to include linguistic practices which, although not sustaining the actual 
validity of the logical inference are nevertheless indispensably useful in the entirety of 
the philosophical process, we pave the road for considering counterexamples and 
thought experiments under this rubric. 
With this account of the broader picture of philosophy, W artenberg relies on a 
distinction made by Noel Carroll, according to which the argumentative role of 
cinematic narrative cannot be rejected outright. While Carroll agrees that "narrative 
films are not arguments/'195 he does affirm that "films often attempt to convince of us 
something, only the method they use ... is not that of a formal argument."196 Additional 
support for this distinction can be found in the works of Aristotle. In his Rhetoric, 
Aristotle discussed the role of particular instances as indispensable evidence for the 
general truth it seeks to vindicate, while in his Poetics he depicts the particular as an 
emotionally compelling means to communicate universal truths. While neither Aristotle 
nor Carroll credits the particular's attempt to establish a claim as a legitimate argument, 
both acknowledge its persuasive power. With this review of their positions in hand, we 
19SCarroll, N. (1996). Theorizing the Moving Image. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 281. 
196Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 80; for Carroll's position, see: Carroll, N. (2006). Philosophizing Through the Moving 
Image: The Case of Serene Velocity. Murray Smith and Thomas E. Wartenberg. Thinking 
Through Cinema: Film as Philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell: 173-86. 
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can now examine the two particular instances of thought experiment and 
counterexample, and evaluate their philosophical role.197 
Inclusivism Unraveled (2): Thought Experiments and Counterexamples 
So far, we have delineated the inclusivist account along the following lines. First, 
we agreed that philosophy cannot sustain itself without proper arguments. However, 
· what counts as a proper argument for these purposes is a matter of dispute. In contrast 
to the exclusivist view, we adopted a broader picture of the philosophical practice, 
widening the scope of what co~ts as philosophizing, by exploring the philosophical 
potential of other modes of argumentation, specifically, argumentation by instantiation. 
At least for dialectical purposes, we accepted the proposition that argumentation is 
essentially embedded in the realm of language and specific to rhetoric, and we 
acknowledged that deductive reasoning is the primary way of forming proper 
arguments. Given these assumptions, we introduced the philosophical merits of 
inductive reasoning for serious consideration. Along these lines, we then introduced two 
linguistic components of an inductive nature for consideration: a thought experiment and 
a counterexample. The claim that these two devices, when used in the course of a 
philosophical investigation, can make a significant and indispensable contribution to the 
overall philosophical practice is at the heart of Wartenberg's theory. Accordingly, if it 
197 For the references of this discussionf see: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as 
Philosophy. London & New York, Routledge: 81; Coplan, A. (2010). "Comments on Thomas E. 
Wartenberg's Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy." Film' and Philosophy 14 (General Interest 
Edition): 105; Aristotle, Poetics, 1451a36-b11. 
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can be shown that film is capable of incorporating or initiating these two argumentative 
practices (in a unique way that reflects what is specific to film), then it would be fair to 
assert that film can indeed "philosophize." 
In order to make the case for the inclusivist account, we must first articulate the 
nature of these rhetorical phenomena. In order to launch our investigation, we need to 
give an intelligible definition of these practices. Let us begin with the notion of a thought 
experiment. What precisely is a thought experiment? A working definition of the notion 
can be taken from lexical, philosophical, and cognitive scientific treatments of it.In the 
first respect, the Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines a thought experiment, being 
the English translation of what Ernst Mach calls aGedankenexperiment,198 as "a mental 
assessment of the implications of a hypothesis." In other words, a thought experiment 
appeals to the mental realm, and yields what Mach describes as "instinctive 
knowledge."In the second respect, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy articulates 
the functionality of a thought experiment as yielding "a constructed argument that is 
embedded in the world so as t? combine logical and conceptual analysis with relevant 
features of the world."199 As such, a thought experiment is the most conspicuous "of all 
the armchair methods of philosophy," to quote Williamson's somewhat cynical 
l9BMach, Ernst. (1960). The Science of Mechanics. LaSalle IL, Open Court. Cited by James Robert 
Brown in: "Thought Experiments," The Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 
12/11/2010. 
199Gooding, David C. (1988). "Thought Experiments." Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. 
E. Craig. London: Routledge. 
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remark.20°Finally, according to a treatment of the notion in cognitive science, we find the 
following characterization: a thought experiment, while intending to "confir[ m] or 
disconfir[m] some hypothesis or theory," performs this task through "an imaginary 
scenario."201 This characterization seems at first to involve a conflict of interests between 
the function of a thought experiment and its content. On the one hand, in terms of its 
function, a thought experiment is designed to say something comprehensible about the 
world and the way we view it. However, on the other hand, the content of such 
experiments usually requires us to adopt improbable (and sometimes impossible) 
dispositions, which are, by nature, outside the ordinary realm of the scientific view of 
the world. That is to say: a thought experiment, while designed to elicit substantial 
claims about "the real," is commonly constructed by way of fiction and fantasy.zoz 
zoo Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA, Blackwell. 
201Tamar Szabo-Gendler. (2002)."Thought Experiments". The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. 
London,Routledge: 388. 
202For further discussion on the mature and philosophical potential of thought experiments, see: 
Goodenough, J. (1995). On The Methodology of Thought Experiments. UEA Papers in 
Philosophy. Vol. 4; Read, R. and J. Goodenough, Eds. (2005). Film as Philosophy, Essays in 
Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. New York, Palgrave Macmillan; Arthur, R. (1999). "On 
thought experiments as a Priori Science." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 
13(No. 3): 215-229; Bishop, M. A. (1999). "Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments." 
Philosophy of Science Vol. 66(No. 4 (Dec.)): 534-541; Bokulich, A. (2001). "Rethinking Thought 
Experiments." Perspectives on Science val. 9(no. 3): 285-307; Brendel, E. (2004). "Intuition Pumps 
and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments." Dialectica Vol. 58(No 1): 89-108; Coleman, S. (2000). 
"Thought Experiments and Personal Identity." Philosophical Studies 98: 53-69; Cooper, R. (2005). 
"Thought Experiments." Metaphilosophy Vol. 36(No. 3, April): 328-347; Gomila, A. (1991). "What 
is a Thought Experiment?" Metaphilosophy 22(1 and 2): 84-92; Horowitz, T. and G. J. Massey 
(1991). Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Savage, Maryland, Rowman& Littlefield 
Publishers; Lebow, R.N. (2007). "Counterfactual Thought Experiments: A Necessary Teaching 
Tool." The History Teacher Volume 40(Number 2): 153-176; Norton, J.D. (1996). "Are Thought 
Experiments Just What You Thought?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(Number 3): 333-366; 
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Despite complexity, and maybe because of it, one can find an abundant usage of 
thought experiments in philosophy.203 Thought experiments are often employed in 
philosophy, and include such examples as Descartes' evil demon,204 Putnam's "brain in a 
vat,"205Nozick's "experience machine,"206 Derek Parfit's "teletransporter,"207 Thomson's 
case for abortion via the case of the dependent violinist,2°8Bernard Williams's discussion 
of an invitation to be a guest executioner,209Searle's Chinese Room experiment,210 and so 
on, to name a selective few.2n 
A brief analysis of these exemplary uses of a thought experiment in philosophy 
reveals, according to Wartenberg, how indispensably valuable this linguistic device is in 
Norton, J.D. (2004). "On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?" Philosophy of 
Science 71(December): 1139-1151; Sorensen, R. A. (1992). Thought Experiments. New York & 
Oxford, Oxford University Press; SzaboGendler, T. (1998). "Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of 
Imaginary Cases." Journal of Consciousness Studies 5(No. 5-6): 592-610; SzaboGendler, T. (2004). 
"Thought Experiments Rethought - and Reperceived." Philosophy of Science 71(December ): 
1152-1163; SzaboGendler, T. (2007). "Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and 
Cognitive Equilibrium." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 68-89. 
203 Earlier, Wartenberg suggested that this empirical fact alone can be a good enough reason to 
perceive the thought experiment as an integral part of the philosophical process. While I have 
objected to this empirical inference, I do agree with the factual basis of his claim. 
204 Descartes, R. and S. Tweyman (2002). Meditations on first philosophy. Ann Arbor, Caravan 
Books. 
2os Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
chapter1. 
206Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford, Blackwell: 34-35. 
207parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
20BThomson, J. J .. (1982). "A Defence of Abortion".The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion. Marshall 
Cohen, et al. (eds.). Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
209Williams, B. (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press. 
21o Searle, J. (1980). "Minds, Brains and Programs." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417-457. 
211 For a concise list and discussion, see: Cohen, M. (2005). Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classic 
Thought Experiments. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell; Damper, R. I. (2006). "The logic of 
Searle's Chinese room argument." Mind Mach 16: 163-183; See also: O'neill, 0. 1986, "The Power 
of Example", Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol. 61: 5-29. 
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the construction of a philosophical argument. Wartenberg concludes this analysis as 
follows: 
[A] thought experiment functions in a philosophical argument by 
presenting readers with a hypothetical case. They are then asked to endorse 
a general conclusion on the basis of their reaction to this case. The thought 
experiment mobilizes people's intuitions about certain ideas or concepts so 
that they can see why a general claim is true ... Thought experiments are one 
instance in which a narrative yields a philosophical truth. Even though a 
thought experiment tells a particular story, the truth that it establishes is 
general, for it does not rely on the specific details of its story. Instead, the story is 
used to illustrate a general truth that the reader is supposed to be able to 
accept by means of his or her reflection on the thought experiment's 
narrative.212 
Briefly summarized, a thought experiment serves as a powerful bridge between a 
general conclusion and its supporting arguments. This aim is reached through the 
introduction of a hypothesis, formed as a particular case and shaped as imaginary 
212Wartenberg, T. E. (2006). Beyond Mere illustration: How Films Can Be Philosophy. Thinking 
Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
22. See Also: Wartenberg, T. E. and S. D. Ross (1983). "Quine and the Third 
Manual."Metaphilosophy 14: 267-275. 
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fiction, which, while introduced in the course of argumentation, seals the deal for a 
favorable acceptance of the discussed conclusion.213 
A similar inquiry can now be focused on counterexamples. A counterexample is 
an example for all intents and purposes, namely, a rhetorical instrument, aimed to flesh 
out (in a demonstrative way) the relation between two entities, a universal principle and 
a particular instance. However, while following the same purposes a simple example 
might follow, the counterexample aims to undermine an idea rather than explicate and 
support it. In other words, a counterexample exhibits a different kind of relationship, 
both with a previously given example and with an idea that hovers in the background. 
The relationship of contrariety is thus between both the idea and its exemplar and the 
newly set instantiation of that very idea. 
A counterexample, as such, is therefore a case when a contrary example is given 
in order to undermine the same rule that a previous example was supposed to sustain. 
Despite the reversed relationship between the idea and its new example, the nature of 
the relationship is still representational. That is to say, the counterexample still 
represents the idea, but in a negative sense. In other words, the example now explicates 
what the idea is not, or, better yet, where the idea fails to manifest itself. If the idea states 
213 As for the imaginary content of thought experiments, see: Michele Le Doeuff, The 
Philosophical Imaginary (Stanford University Press, 1989); Tamar SzaboGendler, Thought 
Experiments: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases (New York: Garland Publishing, 
2000); Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Philosophy, Film and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Noel Carroll discusses the use of thought experiments in 
fiction in "The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge," The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 60.1 (2002): 3-26. 
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that all British people love soccer, and an example to this effect is John, who is a British 
citizen and a known fan of the game, then a counterexample to this effect can be Mary, 
who shares the same citizenship as John, but dislikes the game with all her heart. Mary's 
feelings towards the game constitute, in this scenario, a counterexample to the rule ("all 
British people love soccer"), and so her case represents the rule as false.214 
With the conjoining of these two working definitions, the world of 
argumentation by instantiation is cogently articulated. A thought experiment, in 
Wartenberg's words, asks a reader "to consider a certain possibility that she might not 
have considered before, a possibility that is often at odds with her established patterns 
of belief and action. Once this possibility is entertained as a real possibility, then the 
reader is confronted with the question of what justifies her customary belief rather than 
the possibility put forward in the thought experiment." Accordingly, a thought 
experiment is, to coin Wartenberg's phrase, a device for challenging the "tenacity of the 
214 It can be argued here that a counterexample does not merely undermine a previous rule, but 
also points to the fact that some other more comprehensive or more correct rule is in fact in play. 
For example, the fact that Mary doesn't like sports has not only a negative role (it disproves the 
statement that "All British people love soccer"), but also a positive one - it is simply an example 
of a more correct statement, like: "The citizenship of a person is no certain indicator of which 
sports they will like." 
The controversy here is strictly on the identity of the universal, which is, of course, a matter of 
context. The only way to identify the universal in question will force us back to the speaker who 
posed the example (as a counterexample) in the first place. In order to determine what kind of 
example it is, we have to determine the kind of relation it has with the universal, and, of course, 
to determine the universal with which it has this relation. As the case may be, we will deduce the 
rhetorical role of the particular from the argumentative intentions from the speaker. 
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habitual."215 Similarly a counterexample is a rhetorical mechanism which employs the 
power of examples to negate (or disprove) propositions and arguments. A 
counterexample to a universal claim is "a single instance that contradicts the universal 
claim. Thus, to use a trite example, if we asserted that all crows are black, the existence 
of an albino crow would be a counterexample to that general claim, for it would show 
that there is at 'least one crow that does not have the color specified by the 
generalization."216 
Although each of these practices is independent, and can be used separately in 
the course of a philosophical argument, the real argumentative power of these devices is 
unveiled when used together. In other words, the real impact of this mode of reasoning 
is reached when we provide a thought experiment as a counterexample to a philosophical 
thesis. While we can still employ the existence of albino crow as a counterexample to a 
general rule which claims otherwise, the real power of this device best unfolds when we 
employ "imaginary narratives that present cases that do not accord with the principle in 
question."217 The imaginary nature of the proposed scenario enables us to widen the 
scope of the principle in question, and to examine broadly the soundness and validity of 
the argument that sustains it. To use a common case (which was previously listed as one 
215Wartenberg, T. E. (2005). Philosophy Screened: Experiencing The Matrix. The Philosophy of 
Film, Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 
270-283. 
216Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 82. 
217Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 83. 
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of the predominant thought experiments in the history of philosophy), if we employ a 
scenario in which a frightful and malicious demon is toying with our minds (causing us 
to accept the rules of nature as given), we are then liable to conclude that any general 
assertion about the coherency of nature is ill-conceived. This is, of course, the gist of the 
Cartesian "evil demon" thought experiment, which is proposed as an imaginary - yet 
immensely effective - counterexample to our previously conceived idea regarding the 
nature of existence. 
One of the primary media that employ fiction and imaginary narratives is, of 
course, film. We are now in a position to argue for the following important claim. Films 
can present arguments when they are thought experiments that function as 
counterexamples to philosophical theses.218 This claim, which is the high point of the 
inclusivist account, can now be demonstrated in particular fiction films, as the final step 
in the construction of this account. In the practice of doing so, Wartenberg engages with 
a wide selection of fiction films, each of which he finds to be a prime candidate for 
"doing" philosophy. From this wide selection I focus briefly'on those films that exhibit 
cinematic counterexamples, and are considered as intrinsically philosophical for that 
reason. In order to do justice to the inclusivist view, I conclude this section with a brief 
summation of three of these films, and the way they display their philosophical 
character. 
ztsWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 86. See also: Lebow, R.N. (2007). "Counterfactual Thought Experiments: A Necessary 
Teaching Tool." The History Teacher Volume 40 (Number 2): 153-176. 
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The first film in this prestigious list is Michel Gondry' sEternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind (2004). In his thorough analysis of the film's most elaborated plotline, 
Wartenberg argues that the film is a cinematic thought experiment that presents a 
counterexample again~t utilitarianism. At the heart of the film's narrative we encounter 
the Sci-fi procedure of selective memory erasure. This procedure allows its customers to 
consciously initiate the erasure of painful memories, thus increasing their overall 
happiness and improving their welfare. However, despite the seemingly positive 
potential of this medical procedure, the film's characters end up as miserable and 
confused as they were before, now prone to repeat the same mistakes that led to their 
past suffering and bewilderment. The result of this procedure is designed to show us 
that the efficiency of our attempt to promote happiness can be inadvertently flawed, 
thus presenting a counterexample to the basic utilitarian premise, which states the 
opposite.219 
Another film that caught Wartenberg' s philosophical attention is the Wachowski 
brothers' blockbuster, The Matrix (1999).220 The film presents an apocalyptic scenario in 
which cognitive machines have won the eternal struggle with their human counterparts, 
219Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 87-93,136-139. 
22o For Wartenberg's interpretation of this film, see: Wartenberg, T. E. (2003). "Philosophy 
Screened: Viewing The Matrix." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 139-152; Wartenberg, T. E. 
(2005). Philosophy Screened: Experiencing The Matrix. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text 
and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 270-283; and, most 
notably: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: chapter 4, pp. 55-75. 
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and are now in control over the "real" world and its inhabitants. fu order to keep 
humanity in a submissive mode, the machines concocted a fictitious sensory r~ality, 
called "the matrix" which, like a computer program, functions as source of illusionary 
sensory perceptions and manipulates the humans to confuse the real for the illusionary. 
Adding his view to a long list of scholarly analyses of the film, Wartenberg presents The 
Matrix as a thought experiment which echoes the Cartesian "evil demon" thought 
experiment.221 fu assessing the philosophical importance of this cinematic "homage," 
Wartenberg claims that The Matrix is "a philosophically significant film in that it updates 
Descartes' deception hypothesis albeit in a new and very contemporary context."222 While 
221 Irwin, W., Ed. (2005). More Matrix and Philosophy. Popular Culture and Philosophy. Chicago 
& La Salle, illinois, Open Court; Lawrence, M. (2004). Like a Splinter in Your Mind: The 
Philosophy Behind the Matrix Trilogy. Oxford, Blackwell; Litch, M. M. (2002). Part I: Knowledge 
and Truth (Skepticism; Films: Total Recall and The Matrix). Philosophy Through Film. M. M. Litch. 
New York & London, Routledge: 5-36; Litch, M. M. (2002). Philosophy Through Film. New York 
& London, Routledge; Porter, B. F. (2004). Exploring the Nature of Reality: Metaphysics. 
Philosophy Through Fiction and Film. B. F. Porter. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson: 77-
156; Porter, B. F. (2004). Philosophy Through Fiction and Film. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 
Pearson; Wartenberg, T. E. (2003). "Philosophy Screened: Viewing The Matrix." Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy 27 139-152; Wartenberg, T. E. (2005). Philosophy Screened: Experiencing The 
Matrix. The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings. T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 270-283; Wrathall, M. A. (2005). "The Purpose of Life Is to End": 
Schopenhauerian Pessimism, Nihilism, and Nietzschean Will to Power. More Matrix and 
Philosophy. W. Irwin. Chicago & La Salle, illinois, Open Court. 11: 50-66; Zizek, S. (2002). The 
Matrix: Or, the Two Sides of Perversion. Chicago, Open Court. The anthologies are: The Matrix 
and Philosophy: Welcome to the Deserts of the Mind, William Irvin, ed. (LaSalle IL: Open Court, 
2002), More Matrix and Philosophy: Revolutions and Reloaded Decoded, William Irwin, ed. 
(LaSalle IL: Open Court, 2005), and Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Christopher Grau, ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005). The single-authored book is Matt Lawrence, Like a Splinter 
in YourMind: The Philosophy Behind the Matrix Trilogy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
222Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, p. 56. Wartenberg also mentions Christopher Falzon, who also discusses The Matrix 
as an "updating of the evil demon argument" (Philosophy Goes to the Movies, p. 29). However, 
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briefly mapping the controversy caused by the Cartesian argument (spreading from 
Kant and Wittgenstein to Heidegger and American pragmatism), Wartenberg asserts 
that the film is but another take on that exact controversy, adding its view by means of 
cinematizing the thought experiment. 
Before turning to the next candidate in this list of cinematic thought experiments, 
two cautionary notes are in order. First, it is imperative to note that Wartenberg's 
interpretation of these films, while cogent and intelligible, is by no means the only way 
to interpret them. Wartenberg himself acknowledges that both films inhabit the 
possibility of other interpretations. For instance, he mentions Julia Driver and Michael 
McKenna who interpreted The Matrix as a film that focuses on Plato's metaphysics 
rather than on the Cartesian argument.223 He also acknowledges the possibility that the 
film, while still stringed to the Cartesian hypothesis, is also a reflection of Hilary 
Putnam's "brain-in-a-vat" thought experiment. Similarly, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
mind, while still amenable to Wartenberg' s interpretation, can also be given other 
interpretations in other contexts, such as those given by Christopher Gra.u and Amy 
Coplan in their various publications.224 
according to Wartenberg, Falzon "does not draw any philosophical conclusions from this, merely 
comparing the film to others that employ similar narrative strategies." 
m See: Driver, J. (2005). Artificial Ethics. Philosophers Explore the Matrix. C. Grau. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 208-217; McKenna, M. (2005). Neo's Freedom ... Whoa! Philosophers 
Explore the Matrix. C. Grau. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 218-238. 
224 For his interpretation of Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, see: Grau, C. (2006). Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and the Morality of Memory.Thinking Through Cinema, Film as 
Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 119-133; Grau, C., Ed. 
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The plurality of interpretations of both films has to be taken into account when 
we embrace the inclusivist contention that these films present thought experiments 
which are counterexamples to a philosophical position, and are to be considered as 
"doing" philosophy for that reason. While this contention certainly falls within the valid 
scope of ways to approach these films, it is by no means the only way to approach them. 
One has only to ponder whether this possibility, by itself, is a good enough reason to 
undermine the solidity of the inclusivist project. 
Since I address this criticism at greater length in the next section, I move to a 
second cautionary note.It is evident that both films belong to the cinematic genre which 
is generally called "Sci-Fi." The Sci-Fi film genre, which goes back to its literary roots, is 
unique in its ability to employ certain dispositions, which combine and conjoin our 
"scientific" knowledge with our tendency towards the imaginary "fiction."This unique 
collision between the substantially "real" and the imaginary "fiction" makes the Sci-Fi 
film genre, according to Vivian Sobchack, the best cinematic candidate to emphasize the 
"actual, extrapolative or speculative science and the empirical method," as they interact 
(2009). Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind.Philosophers on Film.London & New York, 
Routledge; and Grau, C. (2006). "There is no 'I' in 'Robot': Robots and Utilitarianism." IEEE: 
Intelligent Systems 21Guly/August): 52-55. See also in this regard: Skees, M. (2010). "A 
Synecdoche: Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and Fredric Jameson's Theory of Post 
modernism." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest Edition): 81-98; For Coplan, see: Coplan, 
A. (2010). "Comments on Thomas E. Wartenberg's Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy." Film 
and Philosophy 14 (General Interest Edition): 99-108.For Grau's interpretation of The Matrix, see: 
Grau, C., Ed. (2005). Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford, Oxford University Press, and 
especially his chapter titled "Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy 
and The Matrix," pp. 10-23. 
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with the "transcendentalism of magic and religion."225 As such, this genre symbolizes 
"the radical alteration of our cultures' temporal and spatial consciousness,"226 and for 
that reason it can be considered "the most philosophical of . . . genres," according to 
Daniel Shaw.227 Shaw also maintains that the contemporary cinematic form of Sci-Fi 
products challenge this collision even more, by using high-tech computer-generated 
images which blur the discrepancy between the real and the imaginary in a most 
effective and vivid way. 
The uniqueness of the Sci-Fi genre, once again, poses a challenge for the 
inclusivist assumption. It might be claimed here that the films can be claimed to be 
"doing" philosophy (by presenting thought experiments) only in the right cinematic 
setting, i.e. within cinematic genres which are designed to focus on the scientific nature 
of existence, namely, within the Sci-Fi genre alone. If this is true, the inclusivist view 
becomes very restricted, as it applies only to the Sci-Fi genre, and only to a very limited 
scope of philosophical topics. This, indeed, is a point with which the inclusivist must 
grapple. 
While indirectly acknowledging the cinematic priority of the Sci-Fi genre, 
Wartenberg objects to the restrictive conclusion suggested here. He does so by 
225Sobchack, V. (1993).Screening Spaces: The American Science Fiction Film. New York, Ungar 
Publishing: 53. 
226Sobchack, V. (1993). Screening Spaces: The American Science Fiction Film. New York, Ungar 
Publishing: 223. 
227 Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press: 44. 
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introducing another film for our philosophical consideration: Carol Read's The Third 
Man (1949).228 _This film, which is not a Sci-Fi film under any sense of the term, depicts· a 
conflict between two American friends in the post second world war Vienna. Hollis 
Martins Goseph Cotton) is a pulp fiction writer who is invited by an old friend of his, 
Harry Lime (Orson Welles), to come to Vienna and help him with a business venture. 
Martins arrives in Vienna to find his friend dead and himself stricken by disturbing 
rumors about his friend's moral character. While investigating his friend's death, 
Martins unveils Lime's true character: Lime appeared to be a notorious criminal who, 
prior to his alleged demise, was a black market entrepreneur, whose specialties included 
selling diluted tubes of penicillin to children hospitals. Lime, who has faked his death to 
avoid capturing, approaches Martins and offers him partnership. The disappointed and 
disillusioned Martins, after a long and torturous soul search, gives Lime to the 
authorities. Lime, the fallen friend who became a cold-hearted cynical criminal, dies in 
the gutters of Vienna, as befits his moral character. 
According to Wartenberg's analysis of The Third Man, the film can (and should) 
be viewed as making an important philosophical contribution to the world of ethics, by 
countering essential notions in the Aristotelian ethics, most specifically Aristotle's 
22BWartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: Chapter 6, pp. 94-116; Wartenberg, T. E. (2009). "Teaching Philosophy Through Film: 
Aristotle's Theory of Friendship and The Third Man." Film and Philosophy 13(Special Interest 
Edition: Teaching Philosophy Through Film): 19-34.; see also a more recent interpretation of this 
film in: Knight, D. (2011). The Third Man: Ethics, Aesthetics, Irony. Ethics at the Cinema. W. E. 
Jones and S. Vice. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 285-299. 
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account of friendship and his idea of moral intelligence. In his Nichomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle discusses the importance of friendship in the construction of a moral character, 
and, separately from that, the role of moral intelligence (or practical wisdom, phronesis) 
as the capacity which involves "getting one's facts straight and being clear about one's 
moral priorities.u229Wartenberg asserts that while these separate topics have always been 
~t the focus of a philosophical debate, they are scarcely put together as interdependent 
matters in a way which, as such, creates a problem for the Aristotelian account. 
According to Wartenberg, the thought experiment concocted in the film The Third Man 
does just that: it unveils the problematic nature of these two Aristotelian qualities when 
considered jointly, thus making a significant (and somewhat unprecedented) 
philosophical contribution to the shaping thereof. 
Wartenberg calls the account that springs from the cinematic counterexample, 
"the vicissitudes of moral intelligence." He goes on to explain that the film, by 
narratively juxtaposing the ethical dispositions of friendship with the mundane 
implementation of moral intelligence, is actually "engaged in thinking about the 
complexity of our ethical lives and, in particular, certain difficulties we have in acting in 
a morally intelligent manner."230 Accordingly, "by presenting these disparate elements 
229Wartenberg, 97. For A preliminary account of Aristotle's concept of practical intelligence, see: 
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1985), 1141a25-28, Op. cit., 114lb15-23. The moral dimensions of friendship are 
depicted in Books VITI and IX of his Nichomachean Ethics. 
23DWartenb~rg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 97. 
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of Aristotle's theory in a unified narrative," the film unveils "the systematic 
interconnections of Aristotle's discussion."231 
What I find most interesting in this analysis and what, in turn, justifies the 
assertion that this film is indeed a prime example of the cinematic ability to 
philosophize, is W artenberg' s next step in his discussion of the film. After establishing 
the conclusion that the film tackles two major aspects of Aristotle's ethics by putting 
·them together in one narrated scenario, he goes on to argue that this achievement is 
uniquely cinematic, and cannot have been reached in other argumentative platforms, 
most notably that of linguistic thought experiments. According to W artenberg, "The 
Third Man supplements our ethical theorizing in a way that philosophers' normal 
examples ... cannot, for such examples are designed to elicit specific intuitions and thus need to 
simplify the complexity of our moral lives."232 The film achieves something that a linguistic 
thought experiment cannot, namely, the "cinematic equivalent of skepticism."233 This is 
not to suggest, of course, that the argument for (or against) skepticism cannot be 
231Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 104. It is worth noting that Wartenberg objects to a more simplistic interpretation, 
introduced by Noel Carroll. Carroll claims that The Third Man does philosophy by presenting a 
counterexample to a general claim implicit in E. M. Forster's well-known remark: "if I had to 
choose between betraying my country and betraying a friend, I hope I should have the guts to 
betray my country." Wartenbergbelievesthat this interpretation is missing the point, for "if the 
philosophical interest of The Third Man depends upon its being a counterexample to a dubious 
moral principle, then its contribution to philosophy will be banal at best, thereby confirming the 
banality objection."(Wartenberg, 95) Also, if this is the case, "we would not need a story as 
complex and involved as The Third Man."( Ibid.) 
232Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Scree~: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 98. [emphasis mine] 
233Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 99. 
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conveyed linguistically. However, the experience of skepticism, as the unavoidable 
outcome of the clash between the quest for simplification in ethical theory and the 
irreducible complexity of life, can only be achieved by means that are capable of 
robustly representing the discrepancy between these two elements. There is good reason 
to suppose that cinematic medium is, by far, the medium most suited to create such a 
discrepancy. 
Accordingly, if we earnestly subscribe to this last statement, we would have to 
look for unique cinematic techniques which are employed in the process of creating the 
cinematic thought experiment.Plotline and narrated thoughts alone are unable to carry 
the weight of this claim. It is imperative to broaden the scope of what falls under 
"cinematic specificity," and look for the unique way in which the film conveys its 
philosophical substance elsewhere. 
These unique cinematic attributes can be found in camera movements and the 
depiction of camera angles. Wartenberg identifies three scenes in which the camera, so 
to say, speaks louder than words. The first scene is the flash of light which accidently 
unveils the living Lime standing in a Viennese doorway; the second scene is the 
confrontational meeting of Martins and Lime on top of Vienna's most famous Ferris 
wheel; and lastly, the third scene is Martins's visit to the children hospital, where he 
encounters the victims of Lime's awful character. In all three cases, an "atmosphere of 
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pervasive uncertainty" is achieved by using "a slightly tilted camera" (figures 3.1-3.2)234 
to articulate the main point of view (POV) of each scene.Wartenberg stresses this point 
when he asserts that "by having us look at its world slightly askance" through the lenses 
of a tilted camera, "the film not only registers its central character's distrust, but also it 
distances us from the conversations it so depicts, keeping us a little off balance and 
dubious about the veracity of some of the characters." 
Such is the case, for instance, in the scene where Martins learns that Lime is alive. 
A shot-by-shot analysis of this scene unveils the important role of the tilted camera. First 
we see the drunken Martins walk back to his hotel (figure 3.3). In the shadow of a 
nearby doorway we see a cat, rubbing at the feet of an unknown man who lurks in the 
shadows (figure3.4). Martins then notices the cat and the man (figure3.5). Mistakenly, he 
assumes that the unknown man is following him. He teases the man to reveal himself, 
mocking the man's failure to respond with the query "cat got your tongue?" (figures3.6-
3.7). A neighbor, who is awaked by the commotion, turns on the light in order to shout 
at Martins (figure3.8). The doorway is now suddenly in the light, and the smiling face of 
Harry Lime is revealed to the astonished Martins (figure3.9). A tilted camera is inyolved 
in the creation of all these shots, thus creating an askance POV, which reflects both 
Martins's and the viewer's skeptical experience. 
234Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 99. 
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The effect is similar where the scene in the Ferris wheel is also depicted by using 
the tilted POV as a representation of philosophical skepticism. While Lime's o~ POV 
obliterates his crimes by presenting the insignificance of mankind (figure3.10), Martins's 
POV of Lime (which is, of course, also the viewer's POV) is tilted and disharmonious, 
philosophically implying that the figure in the frame is as tilted (and crooked) as the 
camera which portrays him (figure3.11). 
Finally, in the last scene, where Martins visits the children hospital to witness his 
friend's crimes, the tilted camera is replaced by another cinematic technique which aims 
to sharpen and articulate the POV of the scene: the close-up (figures3.12-3.14). The 
position of the camera, much like its slant angles, is a specifically cinematic technique, 
aiming to unveil the emotional fabric of the scene, and to allow us "to perceive our own 
situation and its requirements more clearly."235 In this case, the close-up aims to help the 
viewer shift their perspective from the previously skeptical POV (created by the tilted 
camera) to a new POV of empathy and compassion. As we follow the disillusioned 
Martins walking down the row of hospital beds, we cannot but notice that we adopt his 
POV, despite the fact that we never literally see the world through his eyes. In other 
words, Martins's POV, which is created by a close-up shot on his face, does not include 
Martins' actual field of vision. We adopt Martins's POV, without being able to see what 
he actually sees, namely, without having a real access to his view. The pictures of dying 
235Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 105. 
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children, the victims of Lime's criminal character, are conspicuously absent. But that is 
exactly what makes the scene so powerful, and the philosophical disposition it aims to 
promote so erninent.Wartenberg concludes that "in so doing, the film steers clear of the 
dangers of including exploitative images of suffering children while still providing its 
audience with the images it needs to understand the film's point."236 
236Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge: 105. This technique - the creation of an effective and influential POV which does not 
include the actual view which substantiate it - is rather common within the cinematic practice. 
Two famous examples of scel;les which \mploys this technique are the shower scene from 
Hitchcock's Psycho (1960) (which depicts a murder without ever showing the murder itself), and 
the sequel scenes from Steven Spielberg's Jaw (1975), which manages to show a shark-attack on a 
fishing boat, without ever showing the shark itself. The power of this technique is, therefore, 
uncontested. 
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CHAPTER IV: FILM AS PHILOSOPHY 
Thus far, I discussed two responses to the CFP question - the exclusivist and 
inclusivist accounts - which, despite subtle differences, share a similarly modest set of 
expectations of the cinematic capacity to philosophize. Working, more or less explicitly, 
with a dichotomy between art and philosophy (which is at least as old as Plato,) these 
accounts share a basic conception of the cinematic phenomenon. According to these 
accounts, film is defined by two major features. First, technologically speaking, film is 
conceived as an apparatus, a device intended to capture, edit and project the (illusionary) 
experience of moving images. Secondly, in terms of the content manufactured by this 
device, film is conceived as a visual manifestation of narrative, created (and consumed) 
by cognitive agents in order to elicit meanings from visually narrated images. As we 
have seen in the proceeding chapters, the centrality of these cinematic features, assessed 
separately yet interdependently, supports both the exclusivist and the inclusivist in their 
respective accounts. 
Next, both accounts share a similar conception of the activity of philosophy. 
Stemming from the traditional view of the ways and means of philosophical 
investigation discussed at the outset of chapter one, both accounts perceive 
philosophical activity as the manifestation of argument in language, pointed toward the 
substantiation of general principles and inferred propositions. They do, however, part 
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ways regarding the scope of this activity. The exclusivist perceives the philosophical 
activity more narrowly, as an intellectual process of making arguments that are 
explicitly and formally constructed; while the inclusivist provides a broader conception 
of this activity, incorporating a greater variety of rhetorical and argumentative 
techniques, such as counterexamples and thought experiments. Despite disagreements, 
both accounts hold the philosophical activity to be primarily a linguistic practice; if only 
to the extent that philosophy must somehow or other be phrased in order to proceed. 
Since language is the only means by which an argument can be manifested as such, both 
accounts yield an essentialist view in this matter. 
For these reasons exclusivism and inclusivism are both possible answers to the 
CFP question, answers which remain open for criticism. Focusing on the technical lens 
through which film appears as apparatus, the exclusivist maintains that it is the 
cognitive agent (filrnrnaker or spectator) who philosophizes, and not film itself, not film-
qua-film. The existence of a cognitive agent is, of course, a prerequisite in any 
philosophical activity worthy of the name. Thus the absence of such agency in 
thecinematic phenomenon - understood as "mere" apparatus - makes impossible the 
suggestion that film can philosophize. Moving to the second feature of film, namely, its 
narrative form, the exclusivists argue that even if we extend our notion of cinematic 
engagement with philosophy by aiming to elicit philosophical meaning from the 
cinematic narrative, we are still required to face some serious problems arising from the 
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fundamental (and unbridgeable) differences between narrative form and the ways and 
forms of philosophy. The cinematic narrative - and any narrative for that matter - is 
essentially ill-suited for the demands of philosophical discourse, for reasons explained 
above as the problems or objections related to explicitness, generality, banality, 
paraphrase, and imposition.For these reasons, the exclusivist asserts answers the CFP 
question negatively. 
Against the exclusivist, the inclusivist overcomes the problem of agency (which 
stemmed from the view of film as apparatus, rejected by the inclusivist) by arguing for 
the importance of spectatorial experience for the comprehension of cinematic narrative. 
Working within the frame of cognitive-psychoanalytic film theory, the inclusivist 
maintains that film can be considered as philosophizing only by the ways it appeals to 
the hermeneutic capacities of its creators and its consumers.This, however, raises other 
problems for the inclusivist. Although justly refuting the problem of agency, the 
inclusivist still has to face the problems of explicitness, generality and phrasing 
(regarding the initial ability of film to elicit comprehensive material worthy of 
hermeneutical analysis) and the problems of banality and imposition (which first 
challenge the innovation of such an analysis, and then question the mere standard by 
which we are expected to prefer one analysis over another). 
Responding to such concerns, the inclusivist rejects the basic exclusivist 
conception of narrative, as an inherently deficient form of expressing philosophical 
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truths, and thus, the wrong form by which one can philosophize.Arguing for the 
broader scope of philosophical activity, the inclusivist maintains that narrative is a form 
well-suited to elicit and manifest philosophically-charged rhetorical devices, like 
counterexamples, explanatory instantiations and, most famously, thought experiments-
and, indeed, enjoys a long history of being used for just such purposes. If such 
argumentative roles can fairly be attributed to narrative, we can assert that narrative, in 
in whichever form it manifests itself, can in fact genuinely and innovatively 
philosophize. Consequently, the inclusivist comes up with a more congenial answer to 
the CFP question, locating film's capacity to philosophize in the cognitive effects a 
narrative potentially upholds in eliciting the above mentioned rhetorical techniques. 
Both approaches, as summarized here, yield their accounts by similarly focusing 
on film's uniqueness, whether through its technical features or its unique brand of 
narrativity. As our task is to consider whether or not film-qua-film can philosophize, we 
must define those attributes that are uniquely cinematic-namely, what accounts for 
"film's specificity"- and, turning back to its alleged capacity to philosophize, what 
counts as a "specifically cinematic'' manner of philosophizing.It is here where my 
critique of the exclusivist (in Chapter Two) and inclusivist (in Chapter Three) accounts 
rests.For, as I have shown, any claim that the cinematic narrativity is in fact unique - at 
least to the extent that it can bear the load of philosophizing in ways which are 
indicative of the nature of film-qua-film- must rest on a conception which breaks down 
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the tie between narrative (as the cohesive telling of stories) and language (as the 
putatively central means to elicit this task). After all, the uniqueness of film rests in its 
visual nature and its ability to capture (and manipulate) images in motion. Accordingly, 
our understanding of the idea of a narrative has to adapt this nature, in order to be 
considered as "specifically cinematic." This entails a different sense of "narrative" 
altogether. Cinematic narrative, as such, is inherently visual. It is explicated and 
manifested through images, their juxtaposed sequential appearance, and through the 
way in which they "frame" reality in order to create indexical, symbolic and figurative 
significance. Cinematic narrative can only be considered as "uniquely cinematic," if and 
when attention is paid to this form of narrativity. 
It was evident from my critique that neither the exclusivist position nor the 
inclusivist undertakes to account for this unique nature of cinematic narrativity. Both 
accounts maintain the traditional (linguistic) conception of narrative, which, at least 
historically, stems from literary theory and is therefore strongly affiliated with its 
linguistic performance. If we recall from the discussion regarding the philosophical 
potential of literature led by Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond in Chapter Three, 
the comparison to the literary concept of narrative is, in fact, a double edged sword. 
Whereas it does open up the inclusivist contention, according to which narrative, by 
itself, is not inadequate to partake in philosophy, it still relies on an insufficiently adept 
conception of narrative. Later in this chapter I will show how the uniqueness of 
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cinematic narrativity can be best explained if we compare it to the narrativity embedded 
in other non-linguistic artforms, most notably music. For now, it will suffice just to 
indicate what I take to be the preconceived flaw in the view of narrative maintained by 
both the exclusivist and the inclusivist positions. 
To sum up, and as we recall from the concluding moments of Chapter Two, the 
main objections advanced by the exclusivists can all be traced back to the (incomplete or 
incorrect) manner in which they understand the narrative and technical features of 
cinema. In Chapter Three, we saw how inclusivists-in attempting to demonstrate 
certain respects in which film can contribute to the activity of philosophy-pointed to 
the need to radically alter these presuppositions about film's intrinsic nature. They did 
not, however, provide the conceptual or methodological resources with which such an 
alteration could be accomplished. The place to look for those resources is in the writings 
of those who wish to defend the claim that film not merely contributes (in some ways, in 
some cases) to the activity of philosophy, but actually philosophizes.For these thinkers, 
in contrast to the inclusivists, film is not merely included in but integral to philosophy. 
Aptly dubbed "film as philosophy," the viewpoint of the thinkers in question 
yields what I call the integralist thesis. The integralist account firmly rejects the 
asymmetric notion between film and philosophy diagnosed in the foregoing chapters, 
adopting a more equal (and less prejudiced) picture of the intrinsic merits of the 
cinematic form. This, in turn, amounts to what I take to be the integralist' s most 
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innovative contribution to the CFP debate, namely, a new look at the specifications and 
capacities of film-qua-film, and, no less importantly, a new methodological approach, 
which renovates the entire contextual framework of the CFP question itself (hence, 
"film-philosophy".) 
Let me expand on this last notion, as it is crucial to the comprehension and 
evaluation of the integralist thesis. It is clear that the integralist response to the CFP 
question provides responses to both exclusivisrn and inclusivisrn. Integralists aim to 
defend the idea of "film as philosophy" against the cautionary allegation that it is 
unsubstantiated (and whimsically irresponsible) - "the bold thesis" (Livingston), or 
"super bold thesis" (Smuts). Moreover, and in no less emphatic fashion, they wish to 
separate their thesis from ideas like Wartenberg's"screened philosophy." Against the 
exclusivist allegations, the integralist will show how "film as philosophy," whereas 
possibly 'bold' (at least in the eyes of traditionalists), is nevertheless an imminent step, 
which sterns from the evolutionary and constantly developing nature of art and 
aesthetics, and hence paves the way to traditional aesthetics (or "philosophy of film") 
being replaced by "film-philosophy."Integralists distinguish themselves from the 
inclusivist position by arguing that by deploying the idea of "screened philosophy'' we 
are still obliged to an inherent distinction between philosophy-understood as a 
linguistic and argumentative activity-and the phenomenon of "being screened," which 
is external to and contrasted with philosophical activity. Leaning on Stephen Mulhall's 
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"philosophy in action," the integralist aims to show that it is not philosophy which is 
being, as it were accidentally, screened.For film, properly defined, is fully and uniquely 
philosophical. 
Theintegralist focuses on the notion of "film specificity" persistently employed 
by both exclusivists and inclusivists as an evaluative criterion. The integralist argues 
that both exclusivists and inclusivists are blind to the full extent of this criterion when 
used to designate the uniqueness of film-qua-film, either by analyzing film's medium 
specificity, or the narrativity of film. For if we choose to explain cinematic narrative in 
the same way and method by which we explain "literary narrative," then we make any 
meaningful claim about cinematic uniqueness impossible in advance. In this way, the 
integralist shows, both inclusivist and exclusivist accounts eliminate the potential of a 
criterion such as "film specificity." 
While noting this thematic misconception, Simon Critchley remarks that "to read 
from cinematic language to some philosophical meta-language is both to miss what is 
'specific to the medium of film and usually to engage in some sort of cod-philosophy 
deliberately designed to intimidate the uninitiated."237 Following Critchley, Frampton 
adds that such an approach "simply ignores cinematics and concentrates on stories and 
character motivations."23B Both Critchley and Frampton allude to Stephen Mulhall's 
237Critchley, S. (2005). Calm: On Terrence Malick'sThe Thin Red Line. Film as Philosophy, Essays in 
Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 133-148,139. 
238 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 9. (emphasis mine) 
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observation, according to which films are not merely "philosophy's raw material, nor a 
source for its ornamentation," but instead must be conceived as "philosophical exercises, 
. 
philosophy in action- film as philosophizing."239 
Accordingly, the integralist position is committed to a certain view of what it is 
to philosophize which can be said to define integralism as such. Namely, a view of the 
relation of film and philosophy is integralist if and only if it begins with the 
understanding that by "aesthetic analysis" we mean analysis of the film~s logic from an 
aesthetic point of view as much as the converse. This central contention of the integralist 
view comes into clearer focus when we articulate how it differs from the underlying 
presuppositions of the exclusivist and inclusivist positions. 
This chapter is designed to introduce and defend the integralist position.! begin 
by expanding on the thematic and conceptual change embedded in the loaded 
terminology of the "film-philosophy" framework. Following that, I introduce the 
integralist' s key components, by alluding to observations by its founding father, Stanley 
Cavell, and, to no lesser extent, to its various evolutionary stages, in the writings of 
Stephen Mulhall and Daniel Frampton.! then go on to assess exemplary cinematic cases 
that serve to defend the integralist thesis. 
Integralism Unpacked: The True Meaning of the 'Film-Philosophy' Turn 
239Mulhall, S. (2002).0n Film. London & New York, Routledge: 2. See also: McClelland, T. (2010). 
"What Is It Like To Be John Malkovich?: The Exploration Of Subjectivity In Being John 
Malkovich." Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 7(2): 10-25. 
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The unpacking of the integralist thesis begins with the unfolding of the recent 
emergence of "film-philosophy." Briefly introduced in Chapter One as the conclusive 
moment of the radical shift bestowed on the fields of film theory and aesthetics, the 
contextual framework created by "film-philosophy" induces practitioners - who are 
hence referred to as film-philosophers- to challenge the most basic assumptions and 
predispositions which have governed philosophy in its engagement with film since 
beginning. This challenge is manifested in two consecutive motions. First, the film-
philosophers break away from the traditional view of film theory (in both cognitivist 
and psychoanalytic tra~itions), and, correspondingly, from the conventional way by 
which philosophy of film has been practiced (in both analytic and continental 
traditions).They create a thematic barricade against the traditional questions and 
investigatory techniques which embed this practice. Second, they present a new 
approach to the nature of film as well as to that of philosophy, by uttering substantially 
different presuppositions regarding both the uniqueness of cinema and the 
characteristics of the philosophical experience. Consequently, the film-philosophy 
approach presents itself not merely as a newer (and, as such, somewhat ordinary) film 
theory, but in fact as a post-theoretical attitude, which, as such, offers a new thematic 
lenses through which we should sharpen our gaze at film, at philosophy, and at their 
interconnectivity. This new approach - depicted once as "a new order of magnitude"240 -
24o Flaxman, G. (2000). The brain is the screen: Deleuze and the philosophy of cinema. 
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has captured the minds of many recent scholars.241 Following their responses to this 
innovative change, the integralist answer to the (now revised) CFP question was born. 
As shown in Chapter One, the triggering moment of the film-philosophy 
approach can be traced back to the stagnation that has bewildered the philosophical 
studies of aesthetics, in particular that which engages the philosophy of film, and which 
acutely evolves into film theory. The hegemony of traditional approaches to art and film 
- and, consequently, of the philosophical methods used to theorize and comprehend the 
cinematic phenomenon- was undermined by its own theoretical limitations. Constantly 
aiming to elicit an adequate comprehension of what film does (or can do), philosophical 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 19, 261. 
241 See: Carel, H. and G. Tuck (2011). New takes in film-philosophy.Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, UK; New York, Palgrave Macmillan; Pisters, P. (2012). The neuro-image: a Deleuzian 
film-philosophy of digital screen culture. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press; Shaw, 
D. (2008). Chapter Two: Pioneering Film-Philosophy. Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies 
Seriously. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 20-26; Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising 
Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. 
Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47; Sinnerbrink, R. 
(2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London; New York, Continuum International 
Pub. Group; Davis, C. (2009).Scepticism and the Mystery of Other Minds: La Chienne. Scenes of 
Love and Murder, Renoir, Film and Philosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 26-46; 
Read, R. J. and J. Goodenough, Eds. (2005). Film as philosophy: essays in cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. New York, Palgrave Macmillan; Morrey, D. (2009). Listening and 
Touching, Looking and Thinking: the Dialogue in Philosophy and Film between Jan-Luc Nancy 
and Claire Denis. European Film Theory. T. Trifonova. New York & London, Routledge: 122-133; 
Mullarkey, J. (2009). Film as Philosophy: A Mission Impossible? European Film Theory. T. 
Trifonova. New York & London, Routledge: 65-79; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refractions of Reality: 
Philosophy and the Moving Image. New York, Palgrave Macmillan; Mullarkey, J. (2011). Film 
Can't Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-Philosophy of Cinema. 
New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 86-100; Phillips, J., Ed. (2008). Cinematic thinking: philosophical approaches 
to the new cinema. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press; Singer, I. (2008). Cinematic 
mythmaking: philosophy in film. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
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investigation kept falling into the thematic trap of trying to conceptualize film for what, 
supposedly, is its essence. This erroneous approach to cinematic essentialism,Z42 
superseded by the middling success of competing film theories to elicit an adequate 
empirical explanation of the cinematic phenomenon, prompted the reexamination of the 
boundaries between film and philosophy. 
The conventional and hierarchical dichotomy, according to which film is the 
subject of inquiry and philosophy is the distinctive method of inquiry, namely, of 
systematically thinking about film, accordingly - if also ironically - made way for film-
philosophy which, as given by its name, is based on a symmetrical conjunction between 
the two practices. This hyphenated conjunction is at the heart of the matter, as it 
underscores a fundamentally different affiliation between the two practices. Daniel 
Frampton, a predominant figure in the articulation of "film-philosophy," even goes as 
far as to drop the hyphenation altogether, eliciting instead a new kind of thinking which 
he calls "filmosophy."243 Tellingly, the focal point of this symmetry was not any of its 
singular components, but the mere concept of thinking. As Deleuze puts it, the guiding 
light of this new approach to film and philosophy aims to provoke a "shock to thought," 
242 See Carroll and Bordwell on "post-theory", as well as Carroll's arguments against medium 
essentialism. More so, the downfall of essentialism can be traced back to the governing attempts 
to give an essentialist answer to the ontology of art and film. 
243 Hence the title of his book. See: Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, 
Wallflower Press. See also: Nunan, R. (2010). "Filmosophyand the Art of Philosophical Analysis of 
Films." Film and Philosophy14(General Interest Edition): 135-154. 
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since it revises the mere possibility of "thinking" within the conjoined domain of film-
philosophy, reunited.244 
Systematic thinking has long been seen as the fundamental characteristic of 
philosophy. The film-philosophy turn challenged this disposition, offering the 
possibility of "cinematic thinking," namely, of film thinking on its own course. Moving 
away from the asymmetrical perception favored by earlier film theories, in which film is 
passively portrayed and "remains at odds with the disengaged, intellectually curious, 
puzzle-solving attitude of the cognitivist film viewer,"245 the film-philosophers 
embraced the more active perception which rests on the possibility of autonomous 
cinematic thinking, existing independently without the need to be translated into 
recognizable forms of philosophical argumentation in order to sustain a thought. Since 
film was commonly taken to "resist rational reconstruction or cognitive 
comprehension,"246 this standard seems impossible to many. However, such unique 
thinking, if it is to occur, can be ascribed to what the theorist Edgar Morin calls 
photogenie, or the aesthetic dimension of the image. Traditionally, film is taken to be an 
244Deleuze, G. (1989). Cinema 2: The time-Image. London, Athlone, p. 156 (and later in pp. 189-
224); See also: Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London; New 
York, Continuum International Pub. Group, p. 137; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refractions of Reality: 
Philosophy and the Moving Image. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 176-180; Massumi, B. 
(2002). A shock to thought : expressions after Deleuze and Guattari. London ; New York, 
Routledge. 
245Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London ; New York, 
Continuum International Pub. Group: 154. 
246Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London ; New York, 
Continuum International Pub. Group: 53. 
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inferior form of knowing, and is subsumed within a theoretical framework that typically 
reduces its aesthetic complexity. However, the aesthetic characterof film, as the 
typological core of a new brand of thinking, is, as Morin explains, the most significant 
identifier of the cinematic phenomenon. Highlighted as "the 'magical' aspect of images," 
this "specifically 'photogenic' dimension" can only be "revealed to us ... through the 
cinematograph."247 Any previously discussed account that overlooks this unique feature 
of the image and is instead anchored on the intellectual engagement with narrative, 
remains incomplete. For, this feature, given its categorical character for the phenomenon 
of film, "exceeds cognitivist narrative functionality, and thereby exposes the viewer to 
an intensive experience of aesthetic singularity."24B 
When pinpointing the shift in philosophical aesthetics that rests beneath 
integralist positions on the CFP question, one cannot escape the philosophical 
implications of this change. One way to describe the underlying motivations of this shift 
would yield the rejection of one philosophical tradition in favor of another, thus 
relocating the film-philosophy turn within a greater historical context. The tradition 
being rejected is the Platonist one (however much it may or may not represent Plato's 
247 Morin, E. (2002). The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, p. 
15. See also: Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London; New 
York, Continuum International Pub. Group, p. 53; Andrew, D. (2009). Edgar Morin. The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New 
York, Routledge: 408-421. 
248 Morin, E. (2002). The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 
pp. 13-17 (emphasis mine). See also: Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking 
images. London; New York, Continuum International Pub. Group, p. 54. 
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views on image and reality, on art and dialectic, as communicated in the dialogues 
themselves). Fqr, the revival of aesthetic experience is most clearly at odds with the role 
and the attributes that Plato, in many if not most interpretations, assigns art and 
pictorial representation (especially in Book X of the Republic, and in the famous allegory 
of the Cave in Book VII).249 This position, in its "embryonic mythic form,"250 exposes the 
lure of the image as essentially the downfall of conceptual thinking. However, as Robert 
Sinnerbrink puts it, this can now be understood as part of a "Platonic prejudice" (or at 
least a Platonist prejudice) that has governed philosophy (and, correlatively, philosophy 
of film) since its dawn. Stemming iconoclastically from the myth of the cave, this 
segregated attitude amounted to a picture of philosophy as a sophisticated supplicant of 
truth, hierarchically distinguished from its rival claimants, such as sophistry, rhetoric, 
and poetry. The general attitude - stemming from the prejudice of epistemically 
privileging "philosophy over art (including film,)" and similarly prioritizing 
249 See: Bauer, N. (2005). Cogito Ergo Film: Plato, Descartes and Fight Club. Film as Philosophy, 
Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 39-56, p. 48; Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a 
Romantic Film-Philosophy. New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 34-35; See also: Pepperell, R. and M. 
Punt, Eds. (2006). Screen Consciousness: Cinema, Mind and World. Amsterdam; New York, 
Rodopi; Allen, R. (1995). Projecting lllusion, Film Spectatorship and the Impression of Reality. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Currie, G. (1995). Image and mind: film, philosophy 
and cognitive science. Cambridge England New York, NY, Cambridge University Press; Carroll, 
N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 112-114; 
Gilmore, R. A. (2002). "Into the Toilet: Some Classical Aesthetic Themes Raised by a Scene in 
Trainspotting." Film and Philosophy 5-6: 77-85, p. 80; Yanal, R. J. (1999). Paradoxes of emotion and 
fiction. University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 13-24; Mullarkey, J. (2009). 
Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25, 
60. 
zso Isaacs, B. (2008). Toward a new film aesthetic. New York, Continuum, p. 121. 
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"conceptual reflection over perceptual experience" - perniciously subdues any 
aesthetically specific experience to the unfounded superiority of conceptual 
comprehension, thereby reducing the specificity of film to "familiar philosophical 
tropes."251 It is hence argued that these Platonist confines, which are central to any prior 
attempt to conceptualize, theorize and analyze film (whether as an artistic whole or as a 
collection of instances and features,) are, by definition, blind to the possibility of a more 
complex, and more idiosyncratic, relationship between philosophy and film.252 
In order to overcome this fundamental predicament we require a new strategy 
and a new thematic arsenal in order to truly uncover the cinematic experience, and in 
order to truly explore the possibility of a cinematic philosophy.253 Namely, in order to 
251Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 25. 
252This critique of Platonism is strongly associated, at least in relation to aesthetics, with 
Nietzsche. While echoing the Platonic fable of the cave, Nietzsche writes: "After Buddha was 
dead people showed his shadow for centuries afterwards in a cave - an immense frightful 
shadow. God is dead: but as the human race is constituted, there will perhaps be caves for 
millenniums yet, in which people will show his shadow. And we- we have still to overcome his 
shadow!" (Nietzsche, "New Struggles", The Gay Science, 108). For a further discussion of the 
Nietzschean alternative, see: Zuckert, C. (1985). "Nietzsche's Rereading of Plato." Political Theory 
13(2): 213-238. See also: Lampert, L. (1986). Nietzsche's teaching: an interpretation of Thus spoke 
Zarathustra. New Haven, Yale University Press; Lampert, L. (1996). Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press; Lampert, L. (2001). Nietzsche's task: an interpretation of 
Beyond good and evil. New Haven, Yale University Press; Lampert, L. (2010). How philosophy 
became socratic: a study of Plato's Protagoras, Charrnides, and Republic. Chicago ; London, 
University of Chicago Press. 
253Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 31. See also: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as 
Philosophy. London & New York, Routledge, pp. 15-31. 
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encapsulate the full potential of film as a "thinking experience" we have to let go of 
traditional misconceptions, and instead adopt a more pluralistic, and much less 
univocal, paradigm which better captures the elasticity and eclecticism of film, but, 
almost as importantly, that of philosophy itself. 
This new arsenal can be found in the counter-tradition arising from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's non-theoretical approach to aesthetics emphasizes the 
importance of "looking," as opposed to "thinking," in the manifestation of what can be 
described as the activity of philosophizing.254 Resting on the prerogative of "showing'' 
(rather than "telling,") the Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy put weight on the 
image, which achieves things that "argumentative prose could not."255 For one, as 
discussed in chapter three, showing provides reasons for us to accept the philosophical 
position being shown. By matching our perceptual understanding of the world, "it 
provides evidence that this is actually the way the world is."256 Admittedly, and as 
mentioned in earlier chapters, this evidence is sometimes disregarded for reasons such 
as: (1) the image is a work of fiction; (2) the image is a singular instance (a mere 
example) and not a general claim; (3) the image lacks the structure, and hence the 
254 The "thinking" aspects of "showing" are thoroughly discussed in various publications. For 
instance: Wilson, G. M. (2005). Narration as Showing.The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text 
and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 198-208; Emmet, E. R. 
(1968). Learning to Philosophize.Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books. 
255 Read, R. J. and J. Goodenough, Eds. (2005). Film as philosophy: essays in cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
256 Read, R. J. and J. Goodenough, Eds. (2005). Film as philosophy: essays in cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
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power, of an argument. Whereas these objections might have been successful when 
mentioned, it can be claimed now that they are not as strong as we previously thought, 
since (1) they miss the visuality of the image as the carrier of the experience, and (2) they 
are all bound by the same Platonist prejudice, which, as such, begs the question. But 
also, and more importantly, films "'show' us the absurd by running outside the limits of 
thought and language."257 Their multi-sensuous experience combines "the contingencies 
of time and place, the singularities of performance, and the resonances of reflection."258 
As they "comprehend and coordinate writing, vision, listening, event and spatiality,"259 
they manage to open up profound new ways of thinking.26o 
The revival of aesthetics, as a thinking practice and not merely as an object of 
thought, is hence championed by film-philosophers and other film theorists (such as 
Alain Badiou,261 Jacques Ranciere,262 and Bernard Stiegler263) becauseit opens up the 
257 Read, R. J. and J. Goodenough, Eds. (2005). Film as philosophy: essays in cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
zsssinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 27. 
259Perniola, M. (2004). Art and its shadow. New York London, Continuum, p. 35. 
260Perniola, M. (2004). Art and its shadow. New York London, Continuum, p. 34. 
261Badiou, A. and A. Toscano (2005). Handbook of inaesthetics. Stanford, Calif., Stanford 
University Press. 
262Ranciere, J. (2006). The politics of aesthetics : the distribution of the sensible. London ; New 
York, Continuum. Also: Ranciere, J. (2009). The emancipated spectator. London, Verso. Also: 
Ranciere, J. (2009). The emancipated spectator. London, Verso. See also: Ranciere, J., D. Keates, et 
al. (2009). The aesthetic unconscious. Cambridge; Malden, MA, Polity. 
263Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and time. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press; Stiegler, B. 
and S. F. Barker (2011). Technics and time, 3 : cinematic time and the question of malaise. 
Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. 
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possibility of cinematic philosophy, understood as film "espousing philosophical 
experience" on its own unique coil.264 While keeping w~th its main attitude towards the 
CFP question, the integralists aim to bridge the gap between the visual and verbal 
media, by expounding the inherent value of aesthetic objects, and, consequentially, by 
showing that they are capable of upholding their value, while omitting the assumption 
that film must be reduced (or translated) into a philosophically acceptable "conceptual 
metalanguage"265 in order to sustain philosophical meaning. Such an assumption, 
according to Sinnerbrink, "ignores the possibility that .... films 'think' in their own 
specific media; or that there might be ways in which films prompt us to question what 
we take philosophy to be or how thinking can occur; or that we might be forced to think 
something anew because of the kind of experience . . . that certain films can elicit or 
evoke."266 
Integralism Expounded: Cinematic Thinking and the experience of Philosophy 
Having proposed film-philosophy as the groundbreaking thematic background 
for the integralist thesis, I turn now to examine the ways that this thematic atmosphere 
is harnessed to support an integralist answer to the CFP question. The focal point of 
264Perniola, M. (2004). Art and its shadow. New York London, Continuum, p. 34. 
Z65Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 25; as for heresy, see chapter six in: Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New 
philosophies of film: thinking images. London; New York, Continuum International Pub.Group, 
especially pp. 132-135. 
266Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 33. 
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such an answer would undoubtedly be the innovative idea of "cinematic thinking," 
namely, the idea that film is capable of producing a new and cinematically unique kind 
of thinking which, as such, can be claimed to be "philosophical." 
The illusive nature of "cinematic thinking" - as an autonomous and independent 
form of aesthetic existence (which can be, but need not be, reduced to "conceptual 
metalanguage"267 in order to sustain as thinking) - is hence the core of our examination. 
The centrality of this idea to the integralist view requires that we begin by clarifying 
what is meant by the claim that film can think independently, before moving on to 
examine if such thinking, if it is to occur, can be referred to as philosophical. 
In doing so, it becomes evident that the key element which marks the difference 
between cinematic thinking and any other previously held definition of thinking, resides 
in the phenomenological analysis of film, as an instance of the broader 
phenomenological analysis of consciousness and the specific case of (conscious) 
thinking. According to such analysis, film is perceived as something which "exists" in 
the world (in space and time) only when experienced (technically formulated, when 
projected and viewed). Recall the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted in 
the first chapter, who already made this observation, by claiming that any harmony, or 
merger, between philosophy and film, which can be accommodated, independently and 
267Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy. New 
Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York, NY, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 25-47, p. 25. 
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uniquely, as a new type of "cinematic" thinking, "is because the philosopher and the 
moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certain view of the world which belongs to a 
generation."268 In other words, if we to comprehend the true nature of "cinematic 
thinking," we are bound by the need to experience it as such.269 
It is important to recall, at this point, that we have already discussed, to some 
extent, the phenomenological nature of the cinematic phenomenon, vis-a-vis the idea of 
spectatorial experience. We have already seen, that is, what role the involvement of the 
spectator in the creation of a "viewing experience" plays in the definition of the 
cinematic occurrence. However, our previous discussion of this feature was conducted 
without reference to film-philosophy and with the aim of suggesting adequate responses 
to such problems as the agency problem and supporting the cognitive approach to film 
theory. This time around, in the context of film-philosophy, the spectatorial experience 
ceases to be separate from the film itself. Instead, the existence of film itself - of "film-
qua-film" - is taken to be coterminous with the spectatorial experience. In other words, 
the cinematic experience (as allegedly the phenomenological domain in which 
"cinematic thinking'' occurs) is a hybrid, yet singular, occurrence, which, as such, 
26BMerleau-Ponty, M. (1964).The Film and the New Psychology. Sense and Nonsense, 
Northwestern University Press: 48-59, pp. 54, 59. 
269For further reading, see: Casebier's Film and Phenomenology (1991); Alexander Sesonske's 
"Cinema Space" (1973) and Edward Casey's "The Memorability of the Filmic Image" (1981); 
George Linden's Reflections on the Screen (1970) and Stanley Cavell's The World Viewed: 
Reflections on the Ontology of Film (1971); Sobchack's The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience (1992); Derek Jarman's Blue (1993). 
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necessarily includes the spectatorial presence in its comprehension. In yet another way, 
the spectator - and, most certainly, the spectator's state of mind, cognitive capacities, 
psychodynamically molded desires, and such - are no longer separated from what, 
essentially, the cinematic phenomenon is.27o 
In this respect we can see how film-philosophy, the ultimate destination of the 
phenomenology of film, fundamentally reframes the question of essentialism with 
respect to film as a medium and philosophy as an activity. For, the integralist abandons 
the question "what can film do?" and instead goes back to the original formulation, 
namely 11What is film?" In so doing, the integralist suggests that, under the premises of 
film-philosophy, both formulations are, in fact, the same question. In other words, film 
27° For a further discussion of the "cinematic experience," its relation to cinematic narrative and 
the ways it can be manifested as thinking, see: Massumi, B. (2011). Semblance and event: activist 
philosophy and the occurrence arts. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press; Fabe, M. (2004).Closely 
watched films: an introduction to the art of narrative film technique.Berkeley, University of 
California Press; Fleishman, A. (1992). Narrated films: storytelling situations in cinema history. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press; Luhr, W. and P. Lehman (1977). Authorship and 
narrative in the cinema: issues in contemporary aesthetics and criticism. New York, Putnam. On 
cinematic thinking, see: Felleman, S. (2006). Art in the cinematic imagination.Austin, University 
of Texas Press; Grodal, T. K., B. Larsen, et al. (2005). Visual authorship: creativity and 
intentionality in media. Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen; 
Grodal, T. K. (2009).Embodied visions: evolution, emotion, culture, and film.Oxford; New York, 
Oxford University Press; Grodal, T. K. (1997). Moving pictures : a new theory of film genres, 
feelings, and cognition. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press; 
Buckland, W. (2012). Film theory: rational reconstructions. New York, NY, Routledge; Phillips, J., 
Ed. (2008). Cinematic thinking: philosophical approaches to the new cinema. Stanford, Calif., 
Stanford University Press; Constable, C. (2009).Adapting philosophy: Jean Baudrillard and The 
matrix trilogy. Manchester, UK; New York, Manchester University Press; Palgrave Macmillan; 
Peretz, E. (2008). Becoming visionary: Brian De Palma's cinematic education of the 
senses.Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press; Rodowick, D. N. (2001). Reading the figural, or, 
Philosophy after the new media. Durham, Duke University Press. 
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"is" what it "does"; the experience film manifests is nothing more or less than the 
aesthetic manifestation of its essence. As Carl Plantinga, whose works on the spectatorial 
engagement with film have paved the way to such understanding of this matter, notes: 
"any abstract meaning that a film might have is ancillary to the experience in which that 
meaning is embodied." If we keep with the cognitivist picture of the spectatorial 
experience, namely, if we reduce cinematic thinking "to a bare bones propositional 
message," we ignore the true significance of the spectator's experience as we 
misunderstand "the function of the viewing experience in developing the film's themes 
and ideas."271 A proper understanding of this experience will therefore assert that the 
cinematic experience "creates its own meaning," since an "affective experience and 
meaning are neither parallel nor separable, but firmly intertwined."272 
The embodied character of experience (such as that of the spectator) in the 
fundamental understanding of the cinematic phenomenon is, thus, the first key feature 
271Plantinga, C. R. (2009). Moving viewer: American film and the spectator's experience. Berkeley, 
University of California Press, p. 3. 
272Plantinga, C. R. (2009). Moving viewers: American film and the spectator's experience. 
Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 3. See also: Plantinga, C. (1997). Notes on Spectator 
Emotion and Ideological Film Criticism.Film Theory and Philosophy. R. Allen and M. Smith. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 372-393; Plantinga, C. (2005). Spectator Emotion and Ideological 
Film Criticism.The Philosophy of Film, Introductory Text and readings.T. E. Wartenberg and A. 
Curran. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 148-159; Plantinga, C. (2009). Emotion and Affect.The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, 
Routledge: 86-96; Plantinga, C. (2009). Spectatorship.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 249-259; Plantinga, C. 
(2009). Trauma, Pleasure, and Emotion in The Viewing of Titanic: A Cognitive Approach Film 
Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies. W. Buckland. New York & London, Routledge: 
237-256; Plantinga, C. and G. M. Smith, Eds. (1999). Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and 
Emotion. Baltimore & London, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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in the comprehension of the type of "thinking" which emerges from such unification. 
Here we turn to a second distinctive feature, namely, the non-linguistic manifestations 
of this experience. Plantinga is insistent in this regard, when he argues that even in such 
cases where "the meaning to be taken from the experience of the film may contradict the 
abstract meaning an interpreter might glean from film dialogue,"273 the true meaning of 
the cinematic message -namely, the actual"thinking" that can be called "cinematic" -is 
embodied, as says the film theorist V. F. Perkins, in the aesthetic dimension of the 
cinematic phenomenon, which, as such, "has a built-in tendency to favour the 
communication of vision and experience as against programme."274 
To the extent that this embodiment feature obtains, one might reasonably 
wonder if there is any possibility of a just analysis of something like cinematic thinking 
in formal writing. At a minimum, one might doubt that it is possible to focus on non-
linguistic attributes, using language. In other words: what sense is there to the claim for 
the possibility of a non-linguistic-aesthetic-cinematic philosophy, if we can only elicit 
this claim in argumentative writing? To answer this question, I would go back to 
Wittgenstein, for whom the "showing rather than telling" idea corresponds with another 
idea (developed in Philosophicallnvestigations) often parsed as "Wittgenstein's ladder."275 
The gist of this idea is as follows.We take language to be a temporary vehicle to achieve 
273Plantinga, C. R. (2009). Moving viewers: American film and the spectator's experience. 
Berkeley, Uirlversity of California Press, p. 3 
274 Perkins, V. F. (1972). Film as Film.Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, p. 155. 
275Tractatus, 6.54; Culture and Value, 28. 
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a certain end. Once we reach the end, we no longer need the vehicle. I use language in a 
similar vein here. I make claims (formed in language through arguments) regarding the 
exclusivity of film's aesthetics. If needed, I will "show" - and accordingly analyze -
specific film sequences in order to prove my point. Once the argument reaches a certain 
point - I will just say "now, go and see for yourselves." Thus, I use language up to that 
point as a ladder- and then drop the ladder altogether. By then, I suppose, we will find 
ourselves inside the screening room, watching and experiencing the philosophy being 
projected in fr~mt of us. 
We have thus relocated the phenomenological existence of the cinematic thinking 
process, which, despite being non-linguistic, is nevertheless functional, systematic, and 
ontologically identifiable.276 Working with this foundation, we now turn to expand upon 
the core propositions of the integralist view, working with and against the writings of 
film-philosophers like Cavell, Mulhall and Frampton. 
276 It is interesting to note here that Plantinga, in his attempt to substantiate the role of the 
spectator in the creation of the non-linguistic cinematic thinking, rests on an analogy to Cleanth 
Brooks, who made a similar claim about prose. Coining the term "the heresy of paraphrase," 
Brooks argued that meaning in poetry is irreducible to other linguistic formulations, because "a 
true poem is a simulacrum of reality ... an experience rather than any mere statement about 
experience or any mere abstraction from experience." In other words, the essential structure of a 
poem (as distinguished from the rational or logical structure of the propositional statements) 
resembles the phenomenological nature of the cinematic experience, in the sense that it occurs as 
a performed experience and not as a metaphysical entity. See: Brooks, C. (1947). The well-
wroughturn; studies in the structure of poetry.New York, Reynal& Hitchcock. ' 
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Justly considered to be the founding father of this approach,277Cavell develops 
his account of a unified cinematic thinking experience, by alluding to distinctive 
philosophical tradition which, as such, existed independently prior to the emerging of 
the cinematic phenomenon.278 In his four-part magnum opus - The World Viewed (1979), 
The Claims of Reason (1979), Pursuits of Happiness (1981), and Contesting Tears (1996)- as 
well as in his more recent Cities of Words (2004), and elsewhere, Cavell establishes the 
tradition in question as that of skepticism.279 The idea of cinematic thinking as skepticism 
277Sinnerbrink makes a typological note, according to which "Bordwell and Carroll are the 
founders of the analytic-cognitivist approach, we could cite Cavell and Deleuze as exemplars of 
the film-philosophy approach." 
278 For Deleuze, his approach is constructed mainly in the two volumes of "cinema": Deleuze, G. 
(1986). Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. London, Athlone; Deleuze, G. (1989). Cinema 2: The 
time-Image. London, Athlone. Cavell's view is constructed in his three major monographs: 
Cavell, S. (1971). The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of 
Remarriage. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; and: Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: 
The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. Chicago & London, The University of 
Chicago Press; his view is further pursued in: Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean What We Say? 
New York, Cambridge University Press; Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of 
Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press; Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim 
of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy. Oxford, Clarendon Press; and: 
Cavell, S. (2004). Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
279 See: Cavell, S. (1979). The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press; Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, 
Morality and Tragedy. Oxford, Clarendon Press; Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: The 
Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; Cavell, S. 
(1996).Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. Chicago & 
London, The University of Chicago Press; Cavell, S. (2004). Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters 
on a Register of the Moral Life. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
In Cities of Words Cavell slightly turns away from skepticism and presents an alternative global 
justification of film as a mode of philosophy, namely, "ethical perfectionism" (Cavell1990 and 
2004: passim). Cavell understands perfectionism not as a theory of morality, but as "a dimension 
or tradition of the moral life" (Cavel11990: 2). This adjustment, Wartenberg recommends, should 
be put aside, as Cavell's "earlier work has had greater impact within the philosophy of film," but 
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stems from what he takes to be an ontological misconception regarding the spatial-
temporal nature of the visual. Traditionally, the discrepancy between an object and an 
image of that object is agreed to be the result of a categorical difference that sets them 
apart. An object exists, ontologically speaking, :in the dimension of "the real," whereas 
an image exists conceptually, corresponding with the "real" object in a representational 
manner. This, Cavell argues, is a questionable assumption.280 There is nothing in the 
thing itself which subscribes this disparity. The appearance of both the object and "its 
image," categorically speaking, abides to the same possibility of sight. A visual 
appearance of something - namely, its sight - is not, as Mulhall explains, "an 
extraordinary happening", but the thing itself, appearing, as it were, as one.281 
Accordingly, whereas an epistemic claim that "objects can be said to have or to make 
sounds," is a valid claim, a similar claim about the visibility of an object (namely, an 
object "have or make sights") is, by default, invalid.282 
Perceived as such, the cinematic image, now indiscernible from the object it 
"represents," appears before our eyes in its entirety, claiming our serious attention as if 
it was "really" there. This, of course, is the innovation in Cavell's thesis. The presented 
also since "adding a second concern to film's philosophical menu does not alter the global nature 
of Cavell's approach." I agree with Wartenberg's assessment, and will show the Cavelian idea of 
cinematic thinking to work in both cases. See: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film 
as Philosophy. London & New York, Routledge. 
zsocavell, S. (1971). The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, ch. 2-3. 
zstMulhall, S. (2002).0n Film. London & New York, Routledge, pp. 63-67. 
282fuid. 
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object, as Cavell maintains, is not really there, as it is actually a celluloid imprint of an 
object which was once "there" (in front of a camera, that is) but is not "there" 
anymore.283 We are thus faced not with "something happening," which, accordingly, 
requires our epistemic confirmation, but with "something that has happened," which, 
accordingly, we are required to absorb.284 Comparing this to the ways that we encounter 
memories, it is obvious that this need to absorb the cinematic reality is a cause for grave 
uncertainty. As our relationship with the world and with other people predominantly 
relies on the possibility of "knowing," the sudden need to overcome or succumb to the 
283 Cavell explains this temporal contingency as such: "[A] network's cameras are ... placed ahead 
of time. That their views are transmitted to us one at a time for home consumption is merely an 
accident of economy; in principle, we could all watch a replica of the bank of monitors the 
producer sees ... When there is a switch of the camera whose image is fed into our sole receiver, 
we might think of this not as a switch of comment from one camera or angle to another camera or 
angle, but as a switch of attention from one monitor to another monitor ... The move from one 
image to another is motivated not, as on film, by requirements of meaning, but by requirements 
of opportunity and anticipation-as if the meaning is dictated by the event itself. As in monitoring 
the heart ... say, monitoring signs of life-most of what appears is a graph of the normal, or the 
establishment of some reference or base line, a line, so to speak, of the uneventful, from which 
events stand out with perfectly anticipatable significance. If classical narrative can be pictured as 
the progress from the establishing of one stable situation, through an event of difference, to the 
reestablishing of a stable situation related to the original one, [television's] serial procedure can 
be thought of as the establishing of a stable condition punctuated by repeated crises or events 
that are not developments of the situation requiring a single resolution, but intrusions or 
emergencies--of humor, or adventure, or talent, or misery--each of which runs a natural course 
and thereupon rejoins the realm of the uneventful." (Cavell, S. (1984). Themes out of school: 
effects and causes. San Francisco, North Point Press, pp. 257-258.) 
284 Cavell, S. (1971). The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, pp. 23, 25-61. 
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corrosiv~ effects of the cinematic uncertainty is, for lack of better words, what the 
cinematic experience is all about.zss 
This, for Cavell, is "the truth of skepticism," namely, the central predicament of 
the human condition, which prodigiously exposes itself throughout our experience with 
the cinematic imagery. The engagement with cinema, so to speak, puts us in the 
condition where "we can never know with certainty of the existence of something; call it 
the external world, and call it other minds."286 Skepticism - itself an inevitable 
consequence of the human condition - is therefore, when deployed cinematically, the 
explication of human beings' inability to transcend their metaphysical and epistemic 
constraints.287 The cinematic power, so to speak, hence res~s in the acknowledgement of 
this condition. As a manifestation of the condition of skepticism, the cinematic 
experience embodies the "failure of acknowledgment," and is hence "a form of 
attunement with others [which] characterizes the way we exist with others in the world 
in a manner that is not based on knowing."zss 
2B5Allen, R. (2006). Hitchcock and Cavell. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. 
Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 43-53, p. 43. 
286 Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 37; See also: Allen, R. and M. Turvey (2001). Wittgenstein, theory, 
and the arts.London; New York, Routledge, p. 120; Allen, R. (2006). "Hitchcock and Cavell." The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64(1): 43-53, p. 44. 
287 Allen, R. (2006). Hitchcock and Cavell. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. 
Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 43-53, p. 44-45. 
2BBAllen, R. (2006). Hitchcock and Cavell. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. 
Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 43-53, p. 44-45. 
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Cavell's philosophy of skepticism marks the first step in the construction of the 
integralist view of the CFP question. The framing idea of the condition of skepticism, 
best manifested in the creation of a new type of relation between image and thought, 
thus becomes the primary color of any cinematic thinking which can be acknowledged 
as philosophical. Deleuze, in his Cinema works289, provides a similar founding moment 
for integralism, albeit in a different philosophical and rhetorical idiom. Delving into the 
fundamental nature of the cinematic image, Deleuze articulates the unique attributes of 
the cinematic imagery, so as to define cinematic reality. Much like Cavell, then, Deleuze 
responds in his account to what he takes to be a philosophical (and cultural) crisis of 
meaning. This time around, however, the crisis in question is that of nihilism. Responding 
to this crisis, Deleuze argues, cinema 11 gives rise to" certain concepts, which do not 
preexist within cinema, and yet 11 are cinema's concepts, not theories about cinema. So 
that there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, 
'What is cinema?' but 'What is philosophy?'"290 Here we see, for Deleuze as well as for 
Cavell, why it is that film-philosophy (in its ultimate expression as the phenomenology 
of film) is not concerned with the way philosophical activity engages with film, but the 
way that film engages in philosophical activity. 
2B90eleuze, G. (1986). Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. London, Athlone; and: Deleuze, G. (1989). 
Cinema 2: The time-Image. London, Athlone. 
29D0eleuze (1989: 280). 
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Indeed, in talking about the philosophy of film Cavell shows- as does Deleuze, 
in ways we will not be able to analyze in depth here291 -how film philosophizes. His 
"philosophy of film" does not stop with the discursive analysis of film but goes further 
291For further reading, see:del Rio, E. (2008). Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, Powers of 
Affection. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press; Martin-Jones, D. (2008). Deleuze, cinema and 
national identity: narrative time in national contexts. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press; 
Martin-Jones, D. (2011). Deleuze and world cinemas. London; New York, Continuum; Sutton, D. 
and D. Martin-Jones (2008). Deleuze reframed: a guide for the arts student. London; New York, 
I.B. Tauris; Marrati, P. (2008). Gilles Deleuze: cinema and philosophy. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press; Massumi, B. (2002). A shock to thought: expressions after Deleuze and Guattari. 
London; New York, Routledge; Rodowick, D. N. (2010). Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's film 
philosophy. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; del Rio, E. (2008). Introduction: Cinema 
and the Affective-Performative. Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, Powers of Affection. 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press: 1-25; Flaxman, G. (2000). The brain is the screen: Deleuze 
and the philosophy of cinema. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; Pisters, P. (2003). The 
matrix of visual culture: working with Deleuze in film theory. Stanford, Calif., Stanford 
University Press; Pisters, P. (2012). The neuro-image: a Deleuzian film-philosophy of digital 
screen culture. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press; Pisters, P. and C. M. Lord (2001). 
Micropolitics of media culture: reading the rhizomes of Deleuze and Guattari. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press; Rodowick, D. N. (2010). Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's film 
philosophy. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; Rushton, R. (2012). Cinema after 
Deleuze: Deleuze encounters. New York, Continuum; Mullarkey, J. (2009). Gilles Deleuze. Film, 
Theory and Philosophy, the Key Thinkers. F. Colman. Montreal & Kingston, Ithaca, McGill-
Queens University Press: 179-189; Bogue, R. (2009). Gilles Deleuze. The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 368-377; 
Davis, C. (2009). Film as Philosophy: Cavell, Deleuze, Zizek and Renoir. Scenes of Love and 
Murder, Renoir, Film and Philosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 4-25; Kennedy, B. 
(2000). Deleuze and Cinema, The Aesthetics of Sensation. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press; Rushton, R. (2012). Cinema after Deleuze: Deleuze encounters. New York, Continuum; 
Trahair, L. (2007). The Machine of Comedy, Gunning, Deleuze, and Buster Keaton. The Comedy 
of Philosophy, Sense and Nonsense in Early Cinematic Slapstick. New York, State University of 
New York Press: 59-85; Colman, F. (2011). Deleuze and cinema: the film concepts. Oxford; New 
York, Berg; Powell, A. (2007). Deleuze, Altered States and Film. Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press; Colman, F. (2011). Deleuze and cinema: the film concepts. Oxford; New York, 
Berg; Flaxman, G. (2012). Gilles Deleuze and the fabulation of philosophy. Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press; Rodowick, D. N. (1997). Gilles Deleuze's time machine. Durham, 
NC, Duke University Press; Bogue, R. (2003). Deleuze on cinema. New York, Routledge; 
Colebrook, C. and I. Buchanan (2000). Deleuze and feminist theory. Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press; Marrati, P. (2008). Gilles Deleuze: cinema and philosophy. Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press; Martin-Jones, D. (2008). Deleuze, cinema and national identity 
narrative time in national contexts. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. 
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by demonstrating through specific genres that film itself "philosophizes" this claim. 
Philosophy of film is thus, itself, film philosophizing. Following Cavell, the integralist 
suggests that the cinematic image "thinks" the condition of skepticism as an implicit 
response to what Sinnerbrink tags as the "retrieval of the ordinary," namely, the attempt 
to overcome skepticism by providing "an image for what philosophy strives to 
overcome, but also sometimes struggles to express."292 As Rothman points out, the 
world projected on the screen is not "real" -but neither is "reality," for that matter.293 To 
put it slightly differently, the world projected on the screen is real - but, still, it does not 
exist (at least "now," when projected). The world on film is a moving image of 
skepticism, as Cavell puts it, since the possibility of skepticism is internal to the 
conditions of human knowledge. Both the real and the "projected-real" thus 
conclusively amount to a skeptical experience, which is constructed, and is then 
analyzed- namely, philosophized - as such.294 As Cavell concludes: "to my way of 
292Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film: thinking images. London ; New York, 
Continuum International Pub. Group, p. 90. 
293: Rothman, W. (2009). Stanley Cavell.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and 
Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 344-355; see also: 
Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, p. 54. 
294 This point is further stressed in the writings of William Rothamn, one of Cavell's most 
adamant followers and interpreters. See: Rothman, W. (2009). Stanley Cavell. The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, 
Routledge: 344-355; Rothman, W., Ed. (2005). Cavell on Film. Albany, NY, State University of 
New York Press; Rothman, W. and M. Keane (2000). Reading Cavell's The World Viewed, A 
Philosophical Perspective on Film. Detroit, Wayne State University Press; and also: Rothman, W. 
(2004). The "I" of the Camera, Essays in Film Criticism, History, and Aesthetics. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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thinking the creation of film was as if meant for philosophy-meant to reorient 
everything philosophy has said about reality and its representation, about art and 
imitation, about greatness and conventionality, about judgement and pleasure, about 
scepticism and transcendence, about language and expression."295 
Looked at through the lens of the opening salvo Cavell provides for integralism, 
the cinematic capacity to philosophize seems an unavoidable - almost "natural" -
outcome of the condition of skepticism. This condition, which pervades the human 
condition itself, is, according to Cavell, a defining phenomenon of cinematic experience, 
and thus of cinematic thinking-via-experience. 
Extending Cavell's work, Mulhall for:r~s a similar picture of the cinematic 
experience. In a famous passage in his innovative book, On Film (2002; second edition 
2008) he sets the coordinates for what he perceives film to be doing, namely, to engage 
in philosophical activity ("philosophy in action"). He writes: 
The sopNstication and self-awareness with which these films deploy and 
develop [the relation of human identity to embodiment] together with a number 
of related issues also familiar to philosophers, suggest to me that they should 
themselves be taken as making real contributions to these intellectual debates. In 
295 Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, p. xii; Also: Gilmore, R. A., Ed. (2005). 
Doing Philosophy at the Movies. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, p. 6. 
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other words, I do not look to these films as handy or popular illustrations of 
views and arguments properly developed by philosophers; I see them rather as 
themselves reflecting on and evaluating such views and arguments, as thinking 
seriously and systematically about them in just the ways that philosophers do. Such 
films are not philosophy's raw material, not a source for its ornamentation; they 
are philosophical exercises, philosophy in action -film as philosophizing. 
Much like Cavell, Mulhall holds that the cinematic realm, by itself, is capable of 
engaging with the philosophical domain. That is, he assumes"the aesthetic priority and 
the argumentative relevance of particular experience" as the preliminary setting for the 
possibility of (philosophical) cinematic thinking.296 However, unlike Cavell, Mulhall 
paints a somewhat broader picture of such thinking.297 Whereas Cavell focuses 
exclusively on the condition of skepticism, as the umbrella term that archetypically 
characterizes cinematic thinking, Mulhall proposes a more diverse account, pointing 
towards a more fundamental attribute of thinking as such, namely, the. philosophical 
prerogative of self-reflection. 
According to Mulhall, any philosophical thinking of other topics (that is: of 
topics other than philosophy itself) are subsidiary to the basic nature of thinking as such, 
296Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society107: 279-294, p. 279. 
297 "I further identify a number of questionable assumptions about the nature of philosophy that 
underlie their qualms about my project" see: Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very 
Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society107: 279-294, p. 279. 
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which resides in one's ability to examine one's own conditions of possibility. 
Accordingly, when thinking about other things, philosophy is exhibited in its "most 
parasitic mode," as it embarks on "another domain of human practical activity," while 
raising "questions about [the] grounding assumptions or basic conceptual 
presuppositions" of this domain, which the "practitioners within this domain are not 
capable of answering," since "anything they offer in response will presuppose the very 
categories that are in question."298 Following that, if philosophical thinking is to 
overcome its "parasitic moment," we are bound to assume that by thinking "in the 
condition of philosophy" we expect philosophy to interrogate its own most basic 
resources.299 Such resources, Mulhall argues, can be found in "the real content and 
qualities of any particular films," in the way they can be understood as themselves 
"reflecting upon (let us say) aspects of the nature of film."300 
Casting this as "film in the condition of philosophy,"301Mulhall proceeds to claim 
that cinematic thinking, .namely, "film as philosophy," is separated from (yet 
29BMulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society107: 279-294, p. 280. 
299Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society107: 279-294, pp. 283. And also: "if philosophy requires a certain self-questioning or self-
accounting from every other human enterprise, then it must in all consistency require it of itself." 
(p. 292) 
30DMulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society107: 279-294, pp. 281-282. 
3D1Mulhall, S. (2008).0n Film, Second Edition.London & New York, Routledge, pp. 7, 130; 
Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of film:. thinking images. London ; New York, 
Continuum International Pub. Group, pp. 119, 133; Dufresne, T. (2011). "On Film, Theory, & "Film 
as Philosophy": Or, Philosophy Goes 'Pop'." Film and Philosophy 15: 139-154, p. 148. (empahaia 
mine) 
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intertwined with) other "presences" of philosophy in film, such as that of theory (which 
he tags "philosophy of film") and that of film analysis (which he acknowledges as 
arbitrary.)302Film in the condition of philosophy is a uniquely cinematic state of affairs, 
in which film launches a discussion of loaded philosophical questions - regarding 
matters like the nature of time, the idea of "being towards death," criteria for personal 
identity, moral relevance of childhood, maternity and adulthood, and the epistemic 
dichotomy of dream and reality - as depending, primarily, on film's own condition, 
namely, on "the photographic reproduction (or better, transcription) of human 
beings."3°3 The unique characteristic of the cinematic thinking experience, namely, the 
"unpredictable but undeniable capacity to translate (and to fail to translate) certain 
individual physiognomies into movie stardom," is, according to Mulhall, "one of the 
necessary possibilities to which embodied creatures such as ourselves are subject."304. 
Hence, the mere possibility of thinking (philosophically) within the cinematic domain 
presupposes, so to speak, the subjection of thinking to "the nature of photographic 
transcription as such."3os 
302 This point is stressed by Daniel Shaw, in: Shaw, D. (2006). On Being Philosophical and Being 
John Malkovich. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 111-118; Shaw, D. (2008). Film and Philosophy, Taking Movies Seriously. 
London & New York, Wallflower Press; and: Shaw, D. (2009). "Teaching Philosophy Through 
Film: Signs and the Problem of Evil." Film and Philosophy 13(Special Interest Edition: Teaching 
Philosophy Through Film): 151-156. 
303Mulhall, Stephen. 2002. On Film. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 2-3. 
304Jbid. 
305Jbid. 
179 
This, for Mulhall, is one way, perhaps the prominent way, by which thinking 
occurs. He writes: "to make progress by reflecting upon the conditions of [one's] own 
possibility is ... as good a characterization as could be desired of the way in which any 
truly rigorous philosophy must proceed; for any philosophy that failed to engage in such 
reflection would fail to demand of itself what it makes it its business to demand of any 
and every other discipline with which it presumes to engage."306 In other words, the idea 
that film embodies "philosophy's voice" (namely, thinking) forces us to let go of the 
understanding of such a voice as being "one of expertise, as if authorized by some 
restricted species of knowledge."307 On the contrary; we have to - we must -
acknowledge its innate accessibility to "every competent language-using creature," if we 
are to grasp properly and thereby acknowledge its "autonomy and individuality."3os 
While capturing this sentiment in Cavell, Mulhall concludes: "I understand 
[philosophy] as a willingness not to think about something other than what ordinary 
human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that 
ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having 
306Mulhall, Stephen. 2002. On Film. London & New York: Routledge, p. 6.(emphasis mine) 
307Mulhall, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear You Scream: Acknowledging the Human Voice 
in the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. 
Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 57-71, pp. 70-71. 
30BMulhall, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear You Scream: Acknowledging the Human Voice 
in the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. 
Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 57-71, pp. 70-71. 
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occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape 11309 
Following this governing portrayal, cinematic thinking, as manifest~d in the "experience 
of particular films," can absorb, and acutely embody, a self-reflective motion towards 
the condition of their own possibility. Whereas this condition is embedded in "ethics, 
art, imagination, emotions and thinking [itself] ... "310 their experience of these 
phenomena as presented in or activated by particular films might yield constructive and 
illustrative results. 
Between skepticism and self-reflection, Daniel Framptonprovides a unique 
portrayal of cinematic thinking, going so far as to replace the hyphenated relationship 
between film and philosophy with one unified term, filmosophy, conjoining the attributes 
of thinking and the aesthetic domain under one conceptual roof. This term is a highly 
intriguing pun, which indicates the somewhat adventurous nature of Frampton's 
account. 
Frampton begins by facing what he takes to be the unique nature of film.He 
quotes Walter Benjamin, who said that "a different nature opens itself to the camera 
than opens to the naked eye,"311 in order to infer that film "is a world of its own ... a 
309 Cavell, S. (1984). Themes out of school :effects and causes. San Francisco, North Point Press, p. 
9 
310Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society107: 279-294, p. 294. 
311 Benjamin, W. (1999). The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.llluminations. 
London, Pimlico, p. 230. 
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world that is a cousin of reality ... a second world that feeds and shapes our perception 
and understanding of reality."312 According to Frampton, this world and the world 
outside film can easily be characterized in each other's terms. For instance, when I experience 
the "real" world my perceptions can easily be characterized as images almost to the 
point that "my eyes become cameras, unafraid to lock onto faces or scenes or 
moments."313Following Cavell's ontological premises, Frampton asserts that film allows 
us to "re-see reality," as it challenges our view of reality, forcing a phenomenological 
realization about how reality is perceived by our minds. It "refigures reality"314 and 
reveals it, "exactly by showing a distorted mirror of it."315 
From these considerations, two parallel conclusions follow.The first conclusion 
isthat the categorical distinction between reality and film-reality, at least as far as the 
viewer-perceiver is concerned, is false. The viewer-perceiver is an active participant in 
both realities, and he manifests them with the same vocabulary. Here, Frampton takes 
on McGinn's dream argument, discussed in Chapter One, and applies it to reality as a 
whole. The mechanism which creates our concept of reality is analogous to the 
mechanism which creates film and cinematic realities. Therefore, there is no real 
justification for making a clear ontological distinction between the two.So, too, the 
second conclusion from the considerations above is that, as Frampton puts it, "the 
312 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press, p. 1. 
313 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
314 Ibid, p. 3 
315 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
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nature of aesthetic experience, as a form of knowledge, is as valid as rational thought."316 
The clear distinction between imagining and thinking, and the restrictive association of 
philosophy with the latter, has to be reexamined, along the lines of the first conclusion. If 
reality and film share a solid ontological basis, than the possibility of a shared epistemic 
vocabulary has to be acknowledged too. 
Expounding on this shared vocabulary, Frampton coins the terms "filmind" and 
"film-thinking" as indicative of what he takes to be filmosophy's unique concept of film-
being (or "being in the condition of film," as Mulhall would have it). With these 
concepts, Frampton aims to show how cinematic thinking, properly experienced 
through phenomenological lenses, is, in fact, an integration of (what Frampton calls) 
"para-narrational 'showing' and mise-en-scene aesthetics."317 By filmind, Frampton 
means "a conceptual understanding of the origins of film's actions and events ... as an 
organic intelligence;" By film-thinking he refers to "the action of film-form in 
dramatizing the intention of the filmind."318 Put together, these terms elicit "a (new kind 
of) 'thinking' ... which resembles no one single kind of human thought, but perhaps the 
functional spine of human thinking."319 The compartments of this thinking process are 
316 Ibid, p. 2 
317 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press, pp. 6-7. See also: 
Mullarkey, J. (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image. New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, p. 156; Nunan, R. (2010)."Filmosophyand the Art of Philosophical Analysis of 
Films." Film and Philosophy 14(General Interest Edition): 135-154. 
318 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press, p. 7. 
319 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press, p. 7. 
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the various phenomenological elements of film: focusing, editing, cutting, framing, 
camera movement, camera angles, directorial directives and frame compositions - all of 
which '"think' a certain relation to the story being told." As such, they evolve into a new 
kind of thought, an "imagistic thinking," to philosophy. In turn, philosophy then stops 
from being a subject, and is now "a practice, a creative practice." As it were, philosophy 
becomes "[just] another kind of film."32o 
#Experience of Particular films": Integralism and the Embodiment of Fiction 
Resting on the conjoined efforts of Cavell, Mulhall and Frampton, the integralist 
position unfolds as a radical, yet systematically plausible and effective, answer to the 
CFP question.321 Under the governing phenomenological framework of film-philosophy, 
the integralist answer deploys the idea of "cinematic thinking," in a way which -
quoting Frampton (and echoing Deleuze)- creates a "new system of thought, a new 
episteme."322 Resting on the aesthetic becoming of the visual, this new systematic 
thinking is manifested through the habituation of philosophical predications - like 
skepticism, and self-reflexivity - to create a new realm, a new type of "being," in which 
320 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press, p. 10-11. 
321 Frampton tags this answer as the "affective thinking of film" (Frampton, 2006, p.12), whereas 
Cavell, following Wittgenstein (which is said to 'clear the way' for seeing film as philosophy) 
forwards a therapeutic model of philosophizing-via-skepticism, which likened the condition of 
skepticism to the experience of watching a film (Goodenough, 2005, p 30). 
322 Frampton, D. (2006). Filmosophy.London & New York, Wallflower Press, p. 11; Livingston, P. 
(2009). Cinema, philosophy, Bergman: on film as philosophy. Oxford ; New York, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 3, 23; Allen, R. and M. Turvey, Eds. (2003). Camera Obscura, Camera 
Lucida: Essays in Honor of Annette Michelson. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, p. 63; 
Flaxman, G. (2000). The brain is the screen: Deleuze and the philosophy of cinema. Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, p. 25. 
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the philosophical insights are embedded in experience, thus expressed (that is, argued) 
through its performativity rather than by linguistic formulations. As Mullarkey so nicely 
puts it, the goal sustained by integralism aims "to extend this democracy of thought 
such that cinema too can be seen to think, only not according to how different extant 
philosophies represent cinematic thought, so much as how they are each, equally, a part 
of it."323 
lntegralism does not only aim to offer an affirmative answer to the CFP question, 
but in fact to change the framework of the question entirely, and thus our basic 
understanding of both film and, more importantly, philosophy. Thus, while not 
explicitly raising the question "what is philosophy," the integralists very much pose a 
thematic challenge to the perception of philosophy as an activity that "gives account in 
argumentative form through linguistic means."324lt goes without saying that such an 
innovative pursuit, whose overwhelmingly sweeping nature is only matched by its 
tenacity, requires further demonstration in order to be sustained. Rather than attempting 
an overarching articulation and defense of their claims, though, I aim to validate their 
cause by means of a sympathetic critique of the way that the integralists advance their 
main claim.For their way of making their case is in some respects infelicitous. I begin 
323Mullarkey, J. (2011). Film Can't Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a 
Non-Philosophy of Cinema. New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan: 86-100, p. 90. 
324 As Mulhall says: "these are assumptions about film; but they are also assumptions about 
philosophy-about what genuinely philosophical reflection is and should be". (Mulhall, S. (2007). 
"Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society107: 279-294, P. 285). 
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with beginning, i.e., Cavell. For Cavell, the truth of cinematic skepticism (and, hence, the 
experience of cinematic thinking) is best explicated in two cinematic genres, which he 
tags "comedies of remarriage" and "the melodrama of the unknown woman," 
respectively.325 Standing in opposition to classical comedies, the comedy of remarriage 
recounts the coming back together of a couple, which rekindle their love (which has 
always been there) by first facing, and then overcoming, divorce. The female protagonist 
of these films often undergoes what Rothman articulates as a form of a "spiritual quest," 
creating herself anew, and then is embraced as such by her renewed partnership, 
gaining a mutual acknowledgment throughout the process.326 Contrarily, in the genre of 
melodrama, the woman seeks fulfillment outside marriage. Hence, the melodrama, 
which is adjacent to the comedy of remarriage, can be seen as a mechanism of negation, 
325 More specifically, the Comedies of remarriage genre includes George Cukor' s The Philadelphia 
Story (1940) and Adam's Rib (1949), Leo McCarey'sThe Awful Truth (1937), Frank Capra's It 
Happened One Night (1934), Howard Hawks' Bringing Up Baby (1938) and His Girl Friday (1940), 
and Preston Sturges' The Lady Eve (1949). Similarly, the melodrama of the unknown woman genre 
includes George Cukor's Gaslight (1944), Max Ophiils' Letter from an Unknown Woman (1948), 
Irving Rapper's Now, Voyager (1942), King Vidor's Stella Dallas (1937). It is worth noting here that 
Cavell also tackles other films -like, for instance, The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946) and 
Double Indemnity (1944) - as well as several Alfred Hitchcock films. However, he most 
predominantly focus on this narrow selection, in a way which suggests that he holds it as 
essential to the embodiment of his claim. See also: Klawans, S. (2005). Habitual Remarriage: The 
Ends of Happiness in The Palm Beach Story. Film as Philosophy, Essays in Cinema After 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 149-163. 
Later published in: Reading Cavell. A. Crary and S. Shieh. London & New York, Routledge: 218-
229. 
326 See: Rothman, W. (2003). Cavell on Film, Television, and Opera.Stanley Cavell. R. T. Eldridge. 
Cambridge, UK; New York, Cambridge University Press: 206-238, P. 212. 
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undermining a theme "that hinges on the threats of misunderstanding and violence" 
which embody the happiness of the comedies.327 
What is tellingly unique in these two genres, according to Cavell, is their shared 
focus on human relationships and mutual acknowledgement. In remarriage comedies, the 
"war between the sexes" is a struggle for mutual recognition. The female protagonist 
takes on a quest of self-identity, which begins by her "thinking of her own existence," 
then "announcing of her cogito ergo sum," and finally, moving from "haunting the world 
to existing in it."328(As Cavell himself puts it, she moves to the final establishment of "the 
power to think for oneself, to judge the world, to acquire ... one's own experience of the 
world."329)This quest is, of course, finalized when the marriage is restored, and the 
mutual recognition of the other is accomplished. Complementarily, in the "melodrama 
of the unknown woman," this quest takes a less comic, and somewhat more precarious, 
form. For instance, whereas "in the comedies the past is open, shared, a recurring topic 
of fun, no doubt somewhat ambiguous," the melodramas present a past which is 
"frozen, mysterious, with topics forbidden and isolating."330 Similarly, whereas in 
remarriage comedies "the action of the narration moves ... from a setting in a big city to 
327 Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, p. 5. 
32BRothman, W. (2003).Cavell on Film, Television, and Opera.Stanley Cavell. R. T. Eldridge. 
Cambridge, UK; New York, Cambridge University Press: 206-238, p. 226. 
329 Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, p. 220. 
33o Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 5-6. 
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conclude in a place [of perspective] outside the city," in the melodramas "the action 
returns to and concludes in a place from which it began or in which it has climaxed, a 
place of abandonment or transcendence."331 In a complementary notion, these minute 
differences are nevertheless underlined by the goal that both gemes share, namely, the 
unveiling and acknowledgment of the "power of transfiguration," as expressed in the 
woman's suffering creation (whether ending in triumph, as in the comedies, or not, as in 
the melodramas.) 
As it were, the focal point of the narrative of both these gemes is the intense 
playing out of the relationship between an individual and a privileged other. This, for 
Cavell, is the most suited setting to accommodate the condition of skepticism, as it 
exposes the protagonists (and, correlatively, the viewers) to questions of identity, self-
manifestation and the affirmation of existence.332 These questions, formed as 
experiences, aptly manifest the condition of skepticism, as they embody and single out 
the protagonist's quest for self-identity (which, as such, can be seen as exemplar of 
mankind's overcoming, or transcending, skepticism.)333 The woman's transfiguration 
331 Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 5-6. 
332 Cavell, S. (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romamicism. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
333 See also: Cavell, S. (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and 
Tragedy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 216, 441, 446; Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). New philosophies of 
film: thinking images. London ; New York, Continuum International Pub. Group, 213. 
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hence provides "a certain verification of this philosophy, hence, of philosophy as 
such."334 
Mulhall takes a somewhat similar path when sustaining his own version of film 
in the condition of philosophy. Unlike Cavell, however, it is the unique dynamic of 
cinematic sequences- or film series- that catches his attention (instead of film gemes.) In 
the course of the construction of his idea, Mulhall delves into a comprehensive analysis 
of several cinematic sequels, centering on the Alien quartef335 and the Mission: Impossible 
series.336 In doing so, Mulhall first has to ward off the critique, which suggests that by 
delving into the narrative of these films, he does nothing more than a traditional (and 
hermeneutical) film analysis. To wit, he emphatically stresses that, though seemingly a 
practice of film analysis, his reading of these films, and especially his focus on their 
sequential cross-referential existence, is what bases - and formally unveils - the activity 
of philosophizing which is embedded in their cinematicity. As his reading does not 
334 Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, p. 220. 
335Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979); Aliens (James Cameron, 1986); Alien3 (David Fincher, 1992); and Alien 
Resurrection (Jean-Pierre Jennet, 1997). He focuses on these films in: Mulhall, S. (2002/2008). On 
Film.London & New York, Routledge; Mulhall, S. (2003). "Ways of Thinking: A Response to 
Andersen and Baggini." Film-Philosophy 7; Mulhall, S. (2005). In Space, No-one Can Hear You 
Scream: Acknowledging the Human Voice in the Alien Universe. Film as Philosophy, Essays in 
Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell. R. Read and J. Goodenough. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 57-71. 
336 Mission: Impossible (Brian De Palma, 1996); Mission: Impossible II Gohn Woo, 2000); Mission: 
Impossible ill (J. J. Abrams, 2006); Mission: Impossible- Ghost Protocol (Brad Bird, 2011). He 
focusses on these films in: Mulhall, S. (2006). The Impersonation of Personality: Film as 
Philosophy in Mission: Impossible. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and 
T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 97-110. 
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presuppose these films to be seen merely as "handy or popular illustrations" of 
philosophical material, it becomes evident that his analysis merely uses the form of 
analysis as a "ladder" to unveil the true sense by which these films are actually 
"philosophy in action." 
Stressing this point, he even complains that his critics, being so overwhelmed by 
the radical introduction of his book, that they failed to see that most of the book is a film 
analysis, which suggests that the analysis is as important as the introduction, if not more 
so. He writes: "fustead, my brief introduction to these readings has been the sole focus 
of attention; and the shocking discovery is made that its extravagant general claims are 
not there given any clear, equivalently general justification. It is as if, despite my explicit 
initial attempts to ward off the very idea of films as illustrating independently-
established philosophical theses, even sympathetic readers of my book find it all-but-
... 
impossible to see my readings of specific films as anything other than illustrations of a 
general method, and so as dependent for their interest upon my independently 
establishing some prior methodological theses about film and philosophy ... But on my 
understanding of the matter, the only justification my more general introductory claims 
could receive is embodied in the readings that they introduce. It is hard for me to see 
quite why this aspect of my work is so hard for others to see."337 
337_Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
107: 279-294, p. 284. 
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What Mulhall finds so revealing about the sequential appearance of these films 
can be traced back to the two major attributes of the film-sequence phenomenon, 
namely, their mutual abidance to the same cinematic reality (on the one hand) and the 
variety of filmmakers, each equipped with different talents, artistic visions and thematic 
viewpoints (on the other). That is to say, the cinematic sequel, as a "point of intersection 
between a director's talents and artistic vision,"338 complements and contrasts the 
creation of a consistent and cohesive cinematic universe. In particular, since each film in 
the series is, at once, a result of a new directorial vision yet committed to its 
predecessors, "the significance of the cinematic auteur seemed impossible to avoid."qs9 
Thus, Mulhall devotes a significant part of his book to a similarly thorough 
analysis of the cinematic corpus of each of the directors of these series.34° This emphasis 
makes the point Mulhall wishes to convey, namely, that the singularity of each film -
and of the series as a cohesive reality - stems from the individuality of the directors, the 
individuality of the protagonist (Ellen Ripley, played, in all the Alien films, by the actress 
33BMulhall, Stephen. 2002. On Film. London & New York: Routledge, p. 5. 
339Mulhall, S. (2006). The Impersonation of Personality: Film as Philosophy in Mission: Impossible. 
Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. Malden, MA, 
Blackwell: 97-110, p. 97. It is fair to mention that by this Mulhall exposes himself to a vast 
critique, which takes the authorial role of any of those who partake in the creation of "a film" to 
be highly contestable. See for instance: Livingston, P. (2008). "Recent Work on Cinema as 
Philosophy." Philosophy Compass 3(4): 590-603, p. 593-594; Carroll; Gaut. ~ 
340 In the Alien case, the works of Ridley Scott (Blade Runner, 1982), James Cameron (The 
terminator, 1984, and Terminator 2: Judgment Day, 1991), David Fincher (Se7en, 1995, and Fight 
Club, 1999), and Jean-Pierre Jeunet (The City of Lost Children, 1995). In the case of Mission: 
Impossible, he is less detailed, but we can extract his idea by alluding to the corpus of Brian De 
Palma, John Woo, and J. J. Abrams. 
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Sigourney Weaver; and Ethan Hunt, played, in all the Mission:Impossible films, by the 
actor Tom Cruise) and hence proceeds as itself being a manifestation of our concept of 
individuality, namely, of human individuality as such. By illuminating "the individuality 
of cinema as a distinctive art form and as a distinctive phenomenon of everyday human 
experience," these films, apart and together, extract a "mode of engagement" which, as 
Mulhall claims, actually "lives" within the films themselves.341 Hence, "we cannot settle 
the question of whether any of these sequels actually does attain or exemplify that 
condition except by watching them-by attending to our concrete experience of their 
qualities."342 
This last point is, for certain, what every integralist agrees upon. They do, 
however, seem to favor different films and cinematic archetypes, when implementing 
the claim that cinematicity, or the experience of film as such, can be considered as 
philosophical. Cavell favors a specific genre of comedy (and an equally esoteric genre of 
melodrama);343Mulhall also favors the branding of films, joined in sequential relations; 
and Frampton, whose variation of integralism is the most adventurous, seems not to 
have any favorite at all (which is not necessarily to his credit). 
341Mulhall, S. (2006). The Impersonation of Personality: Film as Philosophy in Mission: 
Impossible. Thinking Through Cinema, Film as Philosophy. M. Smith and T. E. Wartenberg. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell: 97-110, p. 97. 
342Mulhall, S. (2007). "Film as Philosophy: The Very Idea." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
107: 279-294, p. 282. (emphasis mine) 
343 Cavell, S. (1979). The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, p. 104. 
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Moreover, such "favorites" seem to stand for a certain form (or construction) of 
narrative. Namely, what articulates each group of films as such (either as genres or as 
sequels) has to do with the cohesiveness of their narrative structure. In Cavell's hand-
picked genres, it is the ''boy meets girl; boy marries girl; girl divorces boy (and 'finds' 
herself in the process)" structure which hold these films together, whereas in Mulhall's 
case it is the reciprocal responsibility (of the various directors) to the cohesiveness of the 
cinematic plot-line which seals the deal for the viewers of such film series. Admittedly, 
neither takes the narrative to be transmitted linguistically, as it is present in the way the 
plot of the film unfolds. However, it is the narrative, namely, the structural assembling 
of the plot (as strengthened by the governing force of the genre/sequel ideas,) which 
allegedly carries the load of "thinking'' on screen. 
This, in turn, raises a challenge for the integralists. By focusing on the narrativity 
of their favored films, both Cavell and Mulhall seem to overlook the actual cinematic 
experience, which, as such, exceeds the narrow parameters of narrativity, as it exists, 
phenomenologically that is, in the domain of visual perception, which, by itself, does not 
necessarily abide by narrative rules and structures. This point can easily be 
demonstrated if we take reality, instead of "cinematic-reality," as the case in point. 
When we experience reality - by observing it, comprehending its meanings, and 
engaging with its existence - we scarcely employ narrative structures in order to 
accomplish these tasks. That is to say, the phenomenological appearance (or 
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"becoming") of reality, as such, is not (necessarily) intertwined with our ability to tell 
stories. The mere phenomenon, comprehended as such, is, or at least can be, so to speak, 
narrative-free. Moving back to cinematic "reality," if we to claim that this reality, by 
powers which are innate to its phenomenological existence, is liable to express 
philosophical messages (or, in other words, to be experienced as "philosophy in action") 
it would be wrong to hang this mysterious "power" on narrative, as it is an almost 
accidental mechanism, which, in any way, is not essential to the construction of the 
cinematic phenomenon. 
Another form of demonstration (which further stresses this challenge) can be 
found in an argument, made by several film scholars (including some predominant 
inclusivists) regarding what they identify as avant-garde (or "experimental," or 
"structural") films.344 Films like Andy Warhol's Empire (1964), Tony Conard'sThe Flicker 
(1965) and Derek Jarman's Blue (1993) are often acknowledged as non-narrative, yet fully 
"cinematic" attempts, directed at the definition and nature of film itself. In other words, 
these films - by way of their incomprehensible (i.e. non-narrative) "cinematic'' 
344 See: Wartenberg, T. E. (2007). Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy. London & New York, 
Routledge, ch. 7; P. Adams Sitney, "Structural Film," Film Culture 47 (1969); P. Adams Sitney, 
Visionary Film (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 407; Noel Carroll, "Philosophizing 
Through the Moving Image: The Case of Serene Velocity," in Murray Smith and Thomas E. 
Wartenberg (eds) Thinking Through Cinema: Film as Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 
176; Trevor Ponech, "The Substance of Cinema," in Murray Smith and Thomas E. Wartenberg, 
Thinking Through Cinema, p. 197; Arthur Danto, "The Philosopher as Andy Warhol," 
Philosophizing Art: Selected Essays (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 63; 
Rudolf Arnheim, "Motion," in Film as Art (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), p. 150. 
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performance - manage to think their own existence and limitations (that is: to 
philosophize), and as such, to be considered as cinematically philosophizing their own 
condition of possibilities. In yet another way, these films accomplish a self-reflective 
task, without being, or resting on, their narrativity. The inclusivists mentioned here 
takes this to be the only form of 11 cinematic thinking," as they claim that fiction films -
due to reasons discussed in earlier chapters - cannot incorporate or abide by the task of 
self-reflectivity.345 
Mulhall emphatically objects to this inclusivist restriction. His account of 
"cinematic thinking" rests on the broad assumption that the philosophical capacity of 
self-reflection is not limited to structure films alone, but is, in fact, the distinctive 
characteristics of other cinematic instances, such as the fiction series he favors. H Mulhall 
is right - and I believe he is - and the possibility of 11 cinematic thinking" (by self-
reflection) resides in fiction films (and not merely in "experimental" ones), then it cannot 
be due to their narrativity. If both narrative films and non-narrative films can exhibit the 
345Wartenberg, T. E. (2010). "Response to My Critics." Film and Philosophy 14 (General Interest 
Edition): 123-134, p. 125: "structural films were intended for an audience that shared certain very 
specific assumptions about those films." Wartenberg goes on to say that "avant-garde films like 
Andy Warhol's Empire (1964) and Tony Conrad's The Flicker (1965) are philosophical 
experiments that characterize certain features of film as essential to the medium." (p. 133) 
Hence, "the sophisticated viewers to whom Warhol addressed his film could be assumed to have 
an awareness that the film would be departing from standard narrative films by eschewing many 
of the features usually employed by them." (See Wartenberg, Thinking on Screen, Ch. 7, pp. 117-
132.) Structural films can therefore be taken as "works of philosophy'', as long as the philosophy 
within them is restricted, of course, to that of film (i.e. "film as philosophy of film".) see also: 
Russell, B. (2010). "Limits to Thinking on Screen." Film and Philosophy 14(General Interest 
Edition): 109-116, p. 114. 
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same "activity" (that of self-reflection), one cannot claim that this activity resides in 
cinematic narrative. 
It becomes evident that we cannot simply accept these claims for cinematic 
thinking as given. The selectivity in their assembling, and their overly emphasized focus 
on the narrativity of their content, call for a cautionary examination of the idea they are 
allegedly claimed to implement. As Mullarkey notices (in what he calls the 
"transcendent choice of film"), "the selection of particular films to establish a theoretical 
paradigm of what film is and how it works ... transcends the corpus of different films 
and film elements as a whole. The transcendent choice already forms the filmic materials 
so as to legitimate the theory ab initio, and therefore is circular."346 This character of the 
choice, according to Mullarkey, is a severe challenge to the integralist view, at least with 
respect to the ways that the integralists exemplify their contentions. For if their 
contentions cannot be manifested in the cinematic experience itself - and not in specific 
narratives, gemes or other grouping entities, then Mullarkey is right to claim that the 
mere idea of film philosophizing is circularly bound by the way one chooses to elicit 
such philosophizing.As Mullarkey puts it, "film philosophizes here because it accords 
with a favored kind of philosophy."347 He thus concludes: "What frequently claim to be 
346Mullarkey, J. (2011). Film Can't Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a 
Non-Philosophy of Cinema. New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel ~d G. Tuck. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan: 86-100, p. 89. 
347Mullarkey, J. (2009). Film as Philosophy: A Mission Impossible? European Film Theory. T. 
Trifonova. New York & London, Routledge: 65-79, p. 66. 
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'open' readings of film still remain pre-figured philosophical interpretations of film-
philosophy. Consequently, the aim of seeing film as philosophy is more often than not 
reduced to 'film as text as philosophy,' in as much as the film's audio-visual matter, no 
less than its cultural, technological and/or commercial dimensions, are nonetheless, read 
or interpreted from a ready-made philosophical vantage-point."348 
Both Cavell and Mulhall often argue that their respective choice of films is 
particularly indicative for their perceptions of the cinematic experience, and thus are 
especially well-suited for the independent and unique manifestation of thinking, which 
is the experience of the moving image. In other words, they argue that "the films [they] 
study themselves study their relation to their medium and its audience."349 However, 
stemming from the above critique, when Cavell refers to these films as "food for 
thought,"350 or as existing "in a state of philosophy,"351 he is yet to tell us - or, rather, to 
show us, to make us experience "in the flesh," so to speak - how this really 
348Mullarkey, J. (2011). Film Can't Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a 
Non-Philosophy of Cinema. New Takes in Film-Philosophy. H. Carel and G. Tuck. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire & New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan: 86-100, p. 88. 
349Mulhall, Stephen. Stanley Cavell, Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994,223. (emphasis mine) 
350Cavell, S. (1995). The Thought of Movies.Philosophy and Film.C. A. Freeland and T. E. 
Wartenberg. New York & London, Routledge: 13-32; also published in: Cavell, S. (2005). The 
Thought of Movies (1983).Cavell on Film. W. Rothman. Albany, NY, State University of New 
York Press: 87-106. 
351 Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, p. 13. 
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works.352Cavell himself concedes that his own conviction is unsteady, by saying that "I 
still sometimes participate in this doubt, so it is still in part myself whose conviction I 
seek."353Mulhall too, as Livingston critically notes, fail to indicate the basis on which his 
case-by-case comparison of the film and a given reading of it, might be made.354 
In the conclusion to this chapter, I wish to offer a way-out for the integralists. As 
I generally agree with their contention, regarding the possibility of a "cinematic 
thinking" which rests on, or is exhibited in, their phenomenological cinematicity, I wish 
to offer a new example for "philosophy in action." Keeping in mind the strong case 
against cinematic narrativity which was voiced here, I proceed with an example on an 
altogether different plane. 
I wish to begin my demonstration with a concept Mulhall acknowledges in his 
demonstration: the author. The existence of an author, as the creator of the cinematic 
reality (which can then philosophize, ill one way or another) is predetermined in the 
concept of narrative. Since "narrative" is the structural (and comprehensible) telling of a 
story- there must be, by definition, someone (or some individuals) who initiate (and 
352See also: Davis, C. (2009). Film as Philosophy: Cavell, Deleuze, Zizek and Renoir. Scenes of 
Love and Murder, Renoir, Film and Philosophy. London & New York, Wallflower Press: 4-25, pp. 
16-20. 
353 Cavell, S. (1981). Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 80-81. 
354 Livingston, P. (2008). "Recent Work on Cinema as Philosophy." Philosophy Compass 3(4): 590-
603, p.594. 
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design) this story. Thus, the idea of narrativity as such rests on the presupposition of a 
creator, an author or a narrator. 
Now, if we thus hold the existence of the author as presumptive, we must 
examine the nature of cinematic authorship.355 Traditionally, the debate regarding the 
cinematic author draws from a similar concept in literary theory. Namely, the identity of 
the cinematic author - as the one who creates the narrative of the film itself (an explicit 
author) or as the one whose point of view is the innate anchor of the film's narrative (an 
implicit, or sometimes implied, author) - is taken to be synonymous with its literary 
meaning.Since cinema was "historically" taken to have a close affinity to linguistic art 
forms (such as literature, prose and theatre) this depiction of the cinematic author 
seemed, at first, to be plausible. 
355 See: Bordwell, D. (2003). Authorship and Narration in Art Cinema. Film and authorship. V. W. 
Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press: 42-49; Fabe, M. (2004). Closely watched 
films: an introduction to the art of narrative film technique. Berkeley, University of California 
Press; Grodal, T. K., B. Larsen, et al. (2005). Visual authorship: creativity and intentionality in 
media. Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen; Livingston, P. 
(2005). Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford, Clarendon Press; Luhr, W. and P. 
Lehman (1977). Authorship and narrative in the cinema: issues in contemporary aesthetics and 
criticism. New York, Putnam; MacCabe, C. (2003). The Revenge of the Author. Film and 
authorship. V. W. Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press: 30-41; Meskin, A. 
(2009). Authorship. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. P. Livingston and C. 
Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 12-28; Naremore, J. (2004). Authorship. A 
Companion to Film Theory. T. Miller and R. Starn. Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell: 9-24; 
Rothman, W. (2004). Thoughts on Hitchcock's Authorship. The "I" of the Camera, Essays in Film 
Criticism, History, and Aesthetics. W. Rothman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 263-
280; Salchannel, M. (2003). Cinema in Search of Its Authors: On the Notion of Film Authorship in 
Legal Discourse. Film and authorship. V. W. Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University 
Press: 152-178; Sarris, A. (2003). The Auteur Theory Revisited. Film and authorship. V. W. 
Wexman. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press: 21-29; Wexman, V. W., Ed. (2003). Film 
and authorship. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press. 
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However, here is where I think this understanding is misleading. These 
background assumptions regarding cinematic authorship led us to what I consider the 
unnecessary. prioritization of cinematic narrativity in the discussion of cinematic 
thinking. In order to free us from the tyrannical hold of narrative, I wish to offer a 
different sense of authorship, which, in turn, corresponds with a similarly different 
sense of narrativity. 
In the current connection, I suggest we compare film to music. Music is a non-
verbal performance that is closer than literature to film in most of the dimensions that 
remain controversial.l have in mind the following dimensions: interpretation, 
evaluation, artistic nature, aesthetic merits, the language-less affinity with language, the 
nature of the respective experience, the role and importance of recipients (audience), and 
finally and most importantly, the role of narrativity in the creation of the relevant 
spectatorial experience.356In light of these more or less closely common dimensions, I 
pose the question: how does authorship manifest itself in music? 
Take, for instance, a solo pianist, for instance, Glenn Gould. When he plays 
Mozart - who is the author? If we follow the literary definition of authorship we end up 
3S6Wierzbicki, J. E. (2012). Music, sound and filmmakers: sonic style in cinema. New York, NY; 
Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge; Smith, J. (2009). Music.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
and Film. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga. London & New York, Routledge: 184-195; Chell, S. 
(1984) "Music and Emotion in the Classical Hollywood Film: The Case of The Best Years of Our 
Lives," Film Criticism 8(2): 27-38; Cohen, A. (2000) "Film Music: Perspectives from Cognitive 
Psychology," in J. Buhler, C. Flinn, and D. Neumeyer (eds.) Music and Cinema, Hanover, NH: 
University Press of New England, 360-77. 
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in a deadlock. Assuming that by authorship we roughly mean "control" and "creative 
intentions" (as well as "actual (ontological) performance")- we cannot determine if the 
author is Gould, Mozart, or maybe the producer of the show, or the technician who 
installed the electronics, or the craftsman who built the piano. We can, of course, rest on 
Carroll's distinction, which separates the work of art (the musical piece) from its 
instance (the performance).357 But even then the situation is still blurry. When we are 
asked to articulate - by way referring to authorship - the nature of the experience we are 
about to have at the concert, we cannot say wholeheartedly that it's Glen Gould ("I have 
tickets to a Glen Gould concert") because once we are asked "what will he play?" we 
have to supply a different answer. The matter gets more complicated when we go to a 
concert given by a symphonic orchestra. What is the authoritative role of the first 
violinist? The musician who plays the second trumpet? What about a string quartet? 
Following these examples, it is clear to me that we must change the way we 
understand the concept of authorship, when applied to music, and, similarly, when 
applied to film.358 We have to abandon the literary connotation of this term, and instead 
adopt a new concept, which perceives authorship in terms of meaningful reception 
(instead of focusing on creation). We should disregard the way the artistic phenomenon 
is created, and instead examine the way that it is received and perceived. Further 
357 See: Carroll, N. (2008). The Philosophy of Motion Pictures.Malden, MA & Oxford, Blackwell. 
358 See: Langer, S. K. (1953). Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a 
New Key. London, Routledge; Langer, S. K. (2006). A Note on the Film. Philosophy of Film and 
Motion Pictures: An Anthology. N. Carroll and J. Choi. Malden, MA, Blackwell: 79-81. 
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stressing this point, let us imagine that a computer, or, better yet, a herd of elephants, is 
causally responsible (in a way which can be demonstrated and proven factually) for the 
existence of "something" which can be then written down as musical notes, and played 
by an orchestra in Albert Hall. Who is the author of this "something"? I suggest that the 
author -in the new sense applicable to non-verbal performing arts - is the experiencing 
agent, whose mind concocts this "something" as meaningful (either intellectually or 
emotionally).359 
By supplanting this literary notion of authorship with the proposed musically-
inspired conception, we create a new understanding of narrativity. The un-authored 
narrativity - that is: the narrativity which stands for a comprehensive understanding of 
visual content by an engaged spectator- no longer necessarily rests on the plot (as it 
unfolds in the film as such) and instead becomes an experience (as manifested in the 
interactive motion of the spectatorial presence).360 This renewed narrativity is, therefore, 
not a quality of the film, but an attribute of temporality. It is a "moment" that "happens" 
when the film and the spectator interacts. Hence, if we are to rest our understanding of 
cinematic thinking on the narrativity of certain films (or, better yet, on the narrativity of 
359 "John Cage has made the division between music and noise problematic, leaving it possible 
that sets of sounds from the street could be music, while other sets which we would 
spontaneously suppose music happen not to be, just because of the circumstances of their 
production." (Danto, A. C. (1983). "Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art." Humanities 4(1): 
1-2.) See: (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUJagb7hLOE). 
360To further discuss this claim, see: Goodman, N. (1976). Languages of art: An approach to a 
theory of symbols. 2nd ed. Indianapolis, Ind., Hackett Pub. Co. 
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film as such), this must embrace the new understanding of narrativity, befitting the 
performativity of film, which "exists in time" and can therefore be captured not in a film 
(in its entirety,) and certainly not in a genre or series of films - but in a "cinematic 
moment." 
I wish to end this chapter with three exemplars - out of numerous possible 
exemplars - of such a cinematic moment. Due to obvious constraints, I am forced to 
describe them linguistically. One can only accept, in good faith, that these exemplars, 
when realized as cinematic moments - or sequences (to use the more convenient 
technical term) - are able to manifest the cinematic narrativity presupposed here, hence 
yielding the cinematic thinking which Cavell and Mulhall have argued for. 
The first "moment" is taken from the opening scene of Charlie Chaplin's City 
Lights (1931).361 In City Lights, Chaplin presents us with the story of the little tramp 
(played by Chaplin), as he falls in love with a blind flower girl (Virginia Cherrill), who 
mistakes him for a rich benefactor. Her blindness prevents her, of course, from seeing 
reality for what it is. The tramp, determined not to disappoint the girl, goes out of his 
way to support her, and provide her the means for the operation which will restore her 
eye-sight. Though succeeding in this task, the tramp deteriorates to poverty. The girl, 
now rehabilitated, works in a successful flower shop, daydreaming about her 
361 Although I refer to City Lights as a Chaplin movie, seemingly suggesting that the directorial 
role implies authorship, this is not, in fact, the case. Although Chaplin was known to be the one 
distinctive author-in-control, I use this way of introducing the film here as a mere convenience. 
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mysterious benefactor, and wonders if she'll ever see him again. She does meet him, in 
the final moments of the film, and recognizes him by feeling his hands. "You?" she asks, 
as the climactic moment unfolds. The tramp nods, shyly yet emotional, and the film 
ends with the famous close-up on his kind eyes. 
In 1931, talking movies were already a common practice. Yet, Chaplin made City 
Lights as a silent movie, preciously deciding to ignore the possibility of sound (with the 
exception of the mandatory background music, which he composed and conducted). 
This remarkable directorial decision evolved in a film which presents us with "pure 
cinema," which is not "corrupted" with the parallel existence of voiceover, dialogues or 
subtitles. That is to say, language does not take control of the film, and its entire 
narrativity is constructed by visual means alone. Since the silence of this film-that is, its 
lack of any linguistic component-results not from an incapacity, but rather is a result of 
intentional decision, we must take notice. 
One of the major effects of this refusal of language occurs in the opening scene of 
the film. Here a crowd is gathered in an inauguration ceremony of a monument, titled 
"peace and prosperity" (figure4.1). After the dignitaries make their speech (figure4.2), 
the monument is unveiled (figure4.3). To the great surprise of the applauding crowd, the 
little tramp is really unveiled, sleeping in the lap of one of the statues (figure4.4). The 
tramp awakes (figure4.5), tries to descend from the monument, but, comically enough, 
falls on the drawn sword of another stature (figure4.6). Greeting the crowd with a wave 
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of his hat he tries to make a break, only to be stopped by the national anthem which is 
suddenly played (figure4.7). As the distress of the dignitaries and law enforcement 
grows (figure4.8), the tramp tries to leave the monument (figure4.9). As he descends, the 
drawn sword of the statue confronts him (figure4.10). In a blink of the moment, the 
tramp draws his cane, and looks as if he is engaged in a duel with the statue (figure4.11). 
This gesture is immediately replaced by a more defensive one (figure4.12), then with an 
apologetic one (figure4.13), and then, finally, with the tramp leaving the scene 
(figure4.14). 
This scene, cinematically comprised from a sequence of shots and ingenious 
editing, presents a visual image which constructs a narrative. If were to narrate this 
scene, we would probably say: "the tramp is unveiled sleeping on the monument, and 
then descends in a comical manner." But this would be missing the point of this 
cinematic presentation altogether. If we want to give a more accurate portrayal, we 
would point out the physical attributes of the nameless "little tramp, "and the fact that 
everything happens on a monument titled "peace and prosperity." The accumulation of 
these facts- achieved "purely" by cinematic means, without a word being said- creates 
a certain experience - argued in this chapter to be a philosophical experience - of a 
man's struggle against the conformity of empty statements and surpassing values. The 
little tramp's wave of a cane is a challenge against the overwhelming (yet, somewhat 
pathetic, or megalomaniac) force of "peace and prosperity." The philosophical 
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"thinking" which is enacted here is, therefore, an embodiment of an aversion against the 
tyranny of novel ideals. It exposes the duplicity and (probably) immorality of these 
governing ideals, and mocks the law-enforcers and dignitaries of society, by comically 
locating them in the feet of the monument. In short, this scene - and not necessarily "the 
film in its entirety" (namely, the film itself) - can be seen as "philosophy in action," as it 
depicts a philosophically charged "moment," using nothing but the cinematicity of the 
experience at hand. 
This wonderful moment in City Lights is joined by another. Later in the film, the 
tramp visits the blind flower girl at her residence. He reads her the paper (figure4.15), 
where a news-article reports that "Vienna doctor has cure for blindness." At this point, 
the spectators are often happy and relieved, that they miss the sub-title of this article, 
which surprisingly states: "free operation for the poor" (figure4.16). Why is that so 
utterly surprising? Because the main premise of the entire film, as stemmed from the 
film's narrative and plotline thus far, gave us the impression that a cure, if it at all to be 
found, is costly, and hence beyond the reach of the poor girl, and definitely beyond the 
reach of the tramp (despite being misidentified as a rich man). Chaplin manages to 
insert a groundbreaking moment, which is so unique in its singularity, that it sometimes 
goes unnoticed. But it's there, presented as a clear and undeniable cinematic moment, 
that, as such, challenges not only the narrative structure of the entire film, but, more 
importantly, the nobility of the values which underlined the film thus far (such as: 
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compassion, kindness, solidarity, the social order, among others). In other words, a brief 
glance at a newspaper article (which the tramp himself seems not to notice) opens up a 
mountain of thoughts, which should, perhaps, be seen as philosophical objections to 
conformity. 
Another such "philosophical" moment occurs in the midst of Alfred Hitchcock's 
The Man Who Knew Too Much (1956). Here, the protagonist (Dr. Benjamin McKenna, 
played by James Stewart) is on a quest to find his abducted son. Just coming back from 
Morocco, where his son was abducted by a political group (after McKenna accidentally 
discovered an assassination plot), McKenna takes a cab to meet Ambrose Chappell, a 
man McKenna believes is holding his son (or at least knows his whereabouts). Leaving 
the cab (figure4.17), McKenna begins to walk down the street (figure4.18), his face 
showing determinacy and worry, as he is about to confront the unknown abductor 
(figure4.19). But then he hears a noise, probably footsteps, coming from behind him 
(figure4.20). He hesitates, unsure about the nature of the sound, and then decides to 
move on (figure4.21). The noise is then repeated, this time louder than before, easily 
identified as footsteps (figure4.22). McKenna turns around (figure4.23) -but the street is 
empty (figure4.24). The unidentified source of the footsteps makes him nervous and 
frightened (figure4.25). He moves on, only to hear the threatening footsteps again 
(figure4.26). This time, when he overcomes his fear and turns around (figure4.27), an 
image is seen coming from around the far corner of the street (figure4.28). McKenna is 
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now alerted and tensed (figure4.29), awaiting an attack in every minute. In the next six 
shots, the camera changes it angle. Until now, it followed McKenna and reflected his 
POV. Now, it moves to the near end of the street, waiting in suspense to the unavoidable 
collision between McKenna and the mysterious man (figures4.30-4.32). McKenna stops, 
looks at his watch (as if checking the time), trying to detach himself from the situation 
(figure4.33). The man approaches, hesitates (when he passes by McKenna), and then 
moves on (figure4.34) McKenna is left standing, his face showing suspense taken over 
by suspicion (figure4.35). The man proceeds to a nearby courtyard (figure4.36), and 
then, before entering the yard, he turns around, and sends a last intimidating look at 
McKenna (figure4.37). McKenna, now back in his combat mode, sends a similarly 
confrontational look back (figure4.38). But then he notices something (figure4.39). The 
camera quickly follows his look, and unveils a sign (which hangs above the courtyard), 
which states: "Ambrose Chappell, taxidermist" (figure4.40). We move back to McKenna, 
while processing the information given to us by the sign (figure4.41). His face changes 
again, this time showing determinacy and readiness to action (figure4.42). The 
mysterious man is Ambrose Chappell, the alleged abductor of his son! It is time to 
confront him! 
This scene, created by the "master of suspense" of modem cinema, in fact does 
much more than create the mere emotional effect of suspense. With ingenious camera 
movements, an acute performance of James Stewart, an (almost unwilling) participation 
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of the spectators, and with no sound (other than the footsteps) Hitchcock achieves a 
cinematic moment which is enriched with philosophical substance. One can depict such 
a moment in Cavellian terms, noticing the epistemic skepticism which governs the 
scene. McKenna- as well as the spectators (who are put "in his shoes/' so to speak, by 
the camera angle and the echoing footsteps)- is "the man who knew too much." But he 
seems not to know at all, or, at least, not to know with certainty, what, in fact, is going 
on. He is in doubt regarding the source of the footsteps, the whereabouts of his son, the 
immanence of an attack, and even to the true identity of Ambrose Chappell (which, as 
we later find out, is a place and not a person). In short, he finds himself in an all-
encompassing state of doubt, of skepticism, which is embodied in his every move and 
gesture, and, more importantly, in every camera-angle and every cinematic-cut. That is, 
the condition of epistemic skepticism is embedded in the mere cinematicity of the 
experience, both that of McKenna (who partakes in the reality of the filmscape) and that 
of the spectators (the unwilling, yet integral, silent participants of the same reality). With 
this, Hitchcock achieves a philosophical experience which we could say, for lack of 
better terms, is embodied in the cinematic moment. 
These examples - understood as cinematic moments, pure sequences of shots, 
and not as scenes of films that are the work of certain authors, belong to a series or to a 
genre, and so on - serve the integralist position far better, I suggest, than do the 
cinematic examples deployed by Cavell and Mulhall (among others). If we are serious 
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about the claim that cinematicity - and not the narrative (as such), or film (as such) - is 
what can be understood as "philosophizing," we ought to turn to examples like these as 
unveiling the way that cinema manifests, enacts, and thus realizes philosophy. The 
fragmented nature of my examples prevents us from resting on the narrativity of the 
film. The absence of language in them, helps us focus on the visuality of the experience 
as it unfolds. With this, the full impact of integralism is at last explored. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having traversed the spectrum of views concerning film and philosophy, from 
Livingston's denial of any meaningful relation between them, to Frampton's position 
that philosophy as "[just] another kind of film," we are ready to outline an 
understanding of this relationship, an understanding that provides a platform for the 
next stage of research, in the wake of the arguments made in the dissertation.! dub this 
understanding "philosofilm," a more robust version of the integralist thesis, to be 
developed in further work on neurologically informed film-philosophy. As a version of 
integralism, emerging from the differences between the exclusivist and inclusivist 
accounts, philosofilm constitutes a project of elaborating a more complete justification of 
the positive reply to the motivating question of this dissertation: Can film philosophize? 
With philosofilm, I aspire towards a unifying theory that, like other versions of 
the integralist thesis, endorses the idea of film as philosophy.Despite appearances, 
philosofilm is not a mere anagram of Frampton's filmosophy.l do share Frampton's 
intention for a unifying theory, describing film and philosophy as a single practice. 
Nevertheless, philosofilm is diametrically opposed to filmosophy.For while Frampton 
turns philosophy into "[just] another kind of film," philosofilm aims to consider film, in 
a certain respect, as "just another kind of philosophy."Both the support for this claim 
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and the feasibility of philosofilmrest on innovations in technology and philosophy of 
mind. 
The first aspect arises from recent developments and the massive changes in the 
field of technology. The technological revolution of recent decades has radically changed 
the face of film, both that of the cinematic apparatus and that of the viewing habits (and 
experience) of the moviegoers. A film-philosophy theory cannot overlook these 
technological innovations and their vast impact on the world and nature of film. This 
new era of film can be exemplified in the following instances, among others: the old 
cinematic image imprinted on celluloid was -replaced by a computer generated digital 
image; old movie theatres lost their place to new, enhanced theatres, with improved 
sound systems and projecting equipments; television joined in, and the spectacle of the 
moving image was shifted from the public domain to one's living room; the world of 
DVDs created the difference between the marketed film and the "director's cut." In 
short, film experience, as well as film technology, has undergone a radical change in 
recent years. This change, I argue, strongly affects the mode and manner by which film 
philosophizes. 362 
362 See: Altman, R. (2000). A Semantic/Syntactic Approach to Film Genre. Film and Theory: An 
Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, Blackwell: 179-190; Caldwell, J. T. (2000). Modes of 
Production: The Televisual Apparatus. Film and Theory: An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. 
Oxford, Blackwell: 125-143; Carroll, N. (1988). Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in 
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111-124; Collins, J. (1993). Genericity in the Nineties: Eclectic Irony and the New Sincerity. Film 
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A second aspect of philosofilm is rooted in the growing trend of philosophy of 
emotions. The philosophical interest in emotions, feelings and passions, has a long and 
controversial history.The span of this history is extensive.From Aristotle's ancient ideal 
of happiness and the Stoics' conception of tranquility through modern approaches, 
including Adam Smith's notion of sympathy and Burne's passions enslaving reason, to 
contemporary echoes of Nietzsche's concept of overcoming and Freud's dealing with the 
subconscious, along with the more recent psychology of moral intuitionism and the 
behavioral practice of moral emotivism, it is widely acknowledged that emotions play 
an important (and intelligent) albeit controversial part in our comprehension of the 
world.Philosofilm draws explicitly on this rich tradition in combination with 
neurological studies of the emotions, applying this combination to twentieth century 
phenomena of film viewing and cinematic experience.For a central thesis of philosofilm 
is that film has become a leading force in the stimulation and manipulation of our 
emotions and feelings. The spectatorial experience of cinema deeply involves our active 
emotional participation: we shed a tear in a romantic movie; we laugh at comedies; we 
Theory Goes to the Movies. J. Collins, H. Radner and A. Preacher Collins. London & New York, 
Routledge: 242-264; Collins, J. (2000). Television and Postmodernism. Film and Theory: An 
Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, Blackwell: 758-773; Enzensberger, H. M. (2000). 
Constituents of a Theory of the Media. Film and Theory: An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. 
Oxford, Blackwell: 552-564; Sobchack, V. (2000). The Scene of the Screen: Envisioning Cinematic 
and Electronic "Presence". Film and Theory: An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, 
Blackwell: 67-84; Solanas, F. and 0. Gettino (2000). Towards a Third Cinema. Film and Theory: 
An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, Blackwell: 265-286; Starn, R. (2000). Television 
News and Its Spectator. Film and Theory: An Anthology. R. Starn and T. Miller. Oxford, 
Blackwell: 361-380. 
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cling to our seats in horror movies and we are typically flooded with various kinds of 
emotions -from anger, disappointment, fear and suspense, to empathy, sympathy, envy 
and revenge- during a cinematic encounter. This emotional reaction to film exemplifies 
the way we engage with the world, what Sartre depicts as our intelligent strategies of 
living.363The project of philosofilm, outlined here, is to follow this line of argument, as 
well as the works of contemporary scientists and neuro-philosophers like Joseph 
LeDoux and Angelo Damasio,364 to argue that the meaning of emotions is a vital 
dimension in accounting for film's philosophical nature.365Moving beyond the 
363 See: Sartre, J.-P. (1948). The Emotions. New York, Citadel/Lyle Stuart; Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being 
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narrativity framework of the integralist position discussed in Chapter Four, philosofilm 
identifies film's philosophical power with its capacity to embody, manipulate, and 
generate emotions. 
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